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("we keep coming 
back and coming back 
to the vision of dis-
placement at the site of 
enactment, procurement, 
debasement, trans-
substanti ation, fulmination, 
culmination . ) 
--Peter Seaton 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the tendency of the semiotic process to be open-
ended and relatively indeterminate, determination takes 
place all the time, has always taken place, and will always 
take place, over and above the efforts of individual 
thinkers .... The problem then becomes that of defining the 
conditions under which such a violent arrestation--in other 
words: institution--takes place. 
--Samuel Weber 
Today, how can we not speak of the University? 
--Jacques Derrida 
Given the incredible amount of critical work done on 
the subject, a study of "postmodernism" requires words of 
justification as much as it requires words of introduction. 
A good deal of literary critical ink has recently been 
spilled over each of the topics and writers I consider here: 
certainly Derrida, Foucault, Heidegger, and Pynchon are not 
new names to the discipline of literary criticism; and 
Sukenick, McElroy and "Language" poetry, while they may be 
new names to some, are likewise well commented upon. In 
fact, so much work has been done on these topics and authors 
that simply to add to the bibliography seems not only 
pointless, but also in some sense irresponsible--
irresponsible insofar as it surreptitiously feeds a growing 
institutional framework without questioning the processes of 
(that) institution, as well as their consequences. Hence my 
2 
study takes a different tack. Throughout, I will try to 
emphasize the role(s) of the discipline of literary 
criticism--and, by extension, the roles of the university--
in the production and control of meaning, while 
simultaneously trying to recognize and account for my own 
status as a literary critic, as a person who teaches and 
studies literature within an institution. This will 
necessarily entail, throughout, my engagement with what 
Jacques Derrida has called "a double gesture," a dual 
engagement which attempts to think the necessary, 
indispensable work of the university "even while going as 
far as possible, theoretically and practically, in the most 
directly underground thinking about the abyss beneath the 
university" (''Principle" 17). This double gesture will, 
hopefully, allow me to investigate important questions about 
postmodern literature and literary theory, but also to 
investigate the problems raised by the institutionalized 
nature of my own work. 
While scholarly work of all types should attempt to 
take account of the functions of institutionalization, it 
seems especially important when discussing the literary 
manifestations of "postmodernism" and "theory"--the two 
generic categories that this work most easily fits into, and 
the two topics it treats most closely. First, and most 
obviously, there quite literally would be no categories 
"postmodernism" and ''theory" if it were not for a 
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disciplinary apparatus that classifies phenomena in order to 
study them--a process, as Michel Foucault points out, which 
actually creates that which a discipline wishes to study by 
securing its proper object, its field of study. 1 It is 
important to note, though, a peculiar kind of doubling of 
this problem with respect to the institutionalization of 
postmodernism and theory. A seemingly obvious problem is 
created by the institutional character of postmodernism and 
theory: both postmodern literature and theory--if one could 
speak of their "generic" forms and put aside for the moment 
the questionable nature of that opposition--tend to 
emphasize the "open-ended and relatively indeterminate 
semiotic process" that Samuel Weber points out in one of the 
epigraphs to this chapter; but the process(es) of 
institution, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the 
"inevitable" closure of limits, the importance of 
determinate or determining institutional programs of 
decision-making or standard-setting. In other words, while 
the discursive claims and manifestations of postmodernism 
tend to emphasize the irreducibility of meaning and the 
inevitability of various kinds of indeterminacy, the 
processes of the institution and the functioning of the 
apparatuses of professionalism seem, for the most part, to 
1see The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 31/44ff. Here 
and throughout this work, wherever a translation and ,an 
original are both cited, I cite the translation page number 
first. 
remain undisturbed. One sees this especially (and 
ironically) in theoretical writing, where--to return to 
Weber's vocabulary--"individual thinkers'' of indeterminacy 
often suffer "violent arrestation" at the hands of fellow 
theorists, both "competing" theorists and well-meaning 
followers. Competing theorists are likely to "violently 
arrest" a text in order to reduce it to a determinate, 
criticizable or surpassable position, while sympathetic 
followers are more likely to arrest a theorist's work in 
transforming it into an interpretative grid, an aid to 
producing determinate readings. 
One might conclude from this paradox that the 
"practice" of criticism simply has not caught up with the 
"theory," and that what is necessary is some discussion 
concerning how to close the gap--to make theory more 
determinable in practice--or, in an anti-theory mode, a 
discussion of the inevitability of the gap between theory 
and practice.2 I defer these important and necessary 
discussions for the time being, to point out instead that 
what tends to go unexamined in such discussions is the 
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surreptitious forwarding of a certain institutional interest 
in determination itself, in arresting what purports to be an 
2one sees the former proposition played out in any 
number of theory-practice primers, from books as disparate 
as Eagleton's Literary Theory and Norris' Deconstruction: 
Theory and Practice. The latter "anti-theory" mode is found 
in the work of the "new pragmatists"--see Mitchell's 
Against Theory. 
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open-ended process in the service of "professional," 
institutional ends. As Paul Bove points out in 
Intellectuals in Power, even the most trenchant politically 
or theoretically oppositional criticism can serve to 
legitimate the hegemonic functions of the university through 
"the endless repositioning of intellectuals vis-A-vis other 
intellectuals in their battles for social rewards" (224). 
Determining the adequacy of competing critical positions 
tends to leave contemporary theorists in the uncomfortably 
Arnoldian position of moral judge or arbiter who can secure 
a position above the fray of mere opinion--a role, as Bove 
points out, which "is essentially a legitimation of status 
quo intellectual life" (223). Such determination and 
critic~l jousting can, in other words, serve to protect 
certain hegemonic power structures (both theoretical and 
institutional) while attempting simultaneously to criticize 
or undermine these structures. 
In "The Profession of Theory," 3 David Kaufmann 
summarizes the problems of institutionalization and theory 
when he writes that, despite the many important questions it 
poses, 
Recent theory ... has precipitated the latest in a 
century-long history of pseudocrises that have 
3It is important to note that this essay was published 
in a very noticeable place within the profession: an issue 
of PMLA devoted to "The Politics of Critical Language" (May, 
1 990) • 
functioned to protect the institutionalization of 
literature in the academy .... Theory--like its 
discontents--helps keep the world safe for lit. crit. 
[sic]" (522). 
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This, of course, creates a dicey problem for a study which 
would want to take account of the forces and problems of 
institutionalization vis-a-vis literary criticism; in the 
face of this insight--that simply criticizing a power 
structure may actually help it to perform its work--the 
question becomes, then, how to think against a structure 
while one is irreducibly within that structure--when there 
is no pure space "outside" from which one can criticize or 
judge? Or, to phrase the same problematic somewhat 
differently, how does one think "practice'' when it can no 
longer simply be governed (or have its results guaranteed) 
by a determinate or determining "theory"? The question 
becomes, in Reiner SchCrmann's words, what happens "once 
'thinking' no longer means securing some rational foundation 
upon which one may establish the sum total of what is 
knowable and once 'acting' no longer means conforming one's 
daily enterprises, both public and private, to the 
foundation so secured" (1)? This, I will argue, is the 
question of the postmodern: insofar as almost any notion of 
the postmodern is characterized by the absence of a pure, 
grounding "rational foundation," the question of how to 
proceed without this grounding purity shows itself to be the 
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most crucial question for a time or place we would call 
postmodern. Also~ it will be my contention throughout this 
work that the question of the postmodern is irreducibly both 
a systematic (philosophical or theoretical) and an 
institutional (pragmatic or worldly) question. I will take 
up the "systematic" aspects of this question beginning with 
chapter 2 and its examination of Derrida and literary 
criticism, and will focus primarily on the ''institutional" 
questions in this chapter--though this distinction will, 
hopefully, become more and more dubious as I proceed. 
Chapter 3 will continue to examine literary criticism as an 
institutional system in relation to Foucault's texts. I 
will hold in reserve the question of theories of the 
postmodern until chapter 4, at which time I will also broach 
the question of postmodern literature. Chapters 5 and 6 
will deal with the institutional and systematic problems 
raised by specific postmodern texts--Thomas Pynchon's 
Gravity's Rainbow and "Language" poetry, respectively. 
"In the Interest of Professionalism": 
Literary Criticism, Theory, and the Institutional 
Question of the Postmodern 
We have seen, then, that there is an initial tension 
between the ''interests" of institutionalization and those of 
postmodernism and theory--namely, institutionalization tends 
to undermine the openness that much postmodern theory calls 
for. As David Kaufmann continues in "The Profession of 
Theory," the upshot of this is that "literary critics are 
confronted by a series of interesting but ultimately 
frustrating aporias" (528), paramount among them the 
frustrating realization--similar to Bove's above--that 
theory "has militated against the tendencies of [academic] 
specialization at the same time that it has acted as their 
agent" (528). Kaufmann goes on to sum up the dilemma that 
these aporias leave to the literary critic: 
To practice theory is to help the very divisions and 
forms of domination that theory seeks to overcome. By 
the same token, however, to give up critical, truly 
critical thought in the academy would be to strangle 
such thought in the only cradle it has left and to 
sacrifice what we still have of our best hopes. (528) 
This is an eloquent phrasing of the disciplinary and 
institutional consequences surrounding what I have called 
the question of the postmodern: how does an oppositional 
critic proceed when no position "outside" can be secured, 
when theorizing in an attempt to undermine a system or 
institution runs the risk of actually "help[ing] the very 
divisions and forms of domination that theory seeks to 
overcome"? Certainly one cannot simply "give up critical, 
truly critical thought in the academy," but how do we make 
thought or action "truly critical" if the category which 
would ground such a criticism--truth--has withdrawn? 
Kaufmann--like so many others who formulate the question of 
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the postmodern--has no answers to these "ultimately 
frustrating aporias," precisely because they are, in his 
eyes, ultimately frustrating: that is, in the end, they are 
unsolvable dilemmas. His essay concludes: 
What remains, then, is hardly the stuff of heady 
perorations: the desire for an integrity that will 
sell itself neither cheaply nor easily and the hardened 
edge of an irony that, in the words of one of our less 
fashionable poets, "will not scare." (528) 
What remains, in other words, is an impasse: the desire to 
recuperate a grounding integrity "must constantly fail" 
(528)--dashed by the hardened (though, he seems to suggest, 
ultimately frivolous) edge of a theoretical irony which 
posits the impossibility of such a ground. 
Kaufmann's assessment of the paralyzed state in which 
the discipline of literary criticism finds itself is quite 
similar to Paul de Man's in "Shelley Disfigured," his essay 
on The Triumph of Life written for Deconstruction and 
Criticism. Toward the end of the essay, de Man takes stock 
of "our present critical and literary scene": 
It functions along monotonously predictable lines, by 
the historicization and the aesthetification of texts, 
as well as by their use, as in this essay, for the 
assertion of methodological claims made all the more 
pious by their denial of piety. Attempts to define, to 
understand, or to circumscribe romanticism in relation 
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to ourselves and in relation to other literary 
movements are all part of this naive belief. The 
Triumph of Life warns us that nothing, whether deed, 
word, thought, or text, ever happens in relation, 
positive or negative, to anything that precedes, 
follows or exists elsewhere, but only as a random event 
whose power, like the power of death, is due to the 
randomness of its occurrence .... [The Triumph of Life] 
also warns us why and how these events then have to be 
reintegrated into a historical and aesthetic system of 
recuperation that repeats itself regardless of the 
exposure of its fallacy. (68-9, my emphasis) 
De Man's focus here is "systematic" while Kaufmann's is 
primarily "institutional" (though already this distinction 
becomes problematic, since each is dependent on the other 
and both on a ground that seems to be eroding). But while 
de Man clearly has a different agenda than Kaufmann, they 
share a similar concern--the state of literary criticism in 
the absence of a transcendental ground--and a strikingly 
similar conclusion: in the absence of a "beyond" which 
could ground criticism, it is doomed to a "recuperation that 
repeats itself regardless of the exposure of its fallacy," 
destined to follow "monotonously predictable lines," 
endlessly concerning itself with Kaufmann's "interesting but 
ultimately frustrating aporias." In short, they both 
reiterate that the determinate and determining practice of 
criticism can never "catch up with" the indeterminacy 
posited by literary theory--that the impasse cannot be 
resolved, and we are left with no choice but to go on as if 
the problems, fallacies, chiasmi, and aporias revealed by 
theory could be put aside. They both seem to grant the 
undisplacable imminence of an inevitable, nihilistic impasse 
for the discipline of literary criticism--an impasse that 
locates itself at the site of the question of the 
postmodern. 4 
This widely recognized and discussed impasse, though, 
certainly has not curtailed the production of literary 
criticism and theory--quite the contrary. In fact, an 
entire "theory industry" has grown up around literature 
departments in the past 20 years, and with this industry has 
come the increasingly specialist professionalization of 
4It should be noted that de Man tends to see this 
impasse itself as a new rigor that "refuses to be 
generalized into a system" (69), but my point here is that 
this undecidable de Manian impasse becomes generalizable 
when it grants the imminence of the present system. De Man 
here does not attempt to displace what he feels is a bogus 
aestheticist/historicist opposition, but focuses on the 
undecidability brought about by this opposition in Shelley's 
Triumph, and then argues that this "process differs entirely 
from recuperative and nihilistic allegories of historicism" 
(69). I'm not so sure: while I have no problem with 
arguing that undecidability is unescapable, it seems 
precisely a "nihilist allegory" to grant the simple 
inevitability of the system which engenders this 
undecidability--to argue that this process is destined 
always and everywhere to fall short (which is why for de Man 
it is "historically more reliable than the products of 
historical archeology" [69]). See Chapter 2 for a more 
detailed discussion of this topic vis-a-vis Derrida's (much 
different) notions of undecidability and history. 
theory and interpretation. As Kaufmann points out, the 
impasse at or in which literary criticism finds itself has 
not had the cooling effect that one would expect on the 
profession(alization) of literature studies; rather, the 
impasse has fueled this profession(alization)--the most 
frustrating of Kaufmann's aporias--and given rise to a 
plethora of book series, journals, symposia, and 
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dissertations (like this one) in which "specialists" attempt 
to diagnose criticism's illness. 
The institutional metaphor of medicine here is, in some 
sense, unavoidable, as is the implicit disciplinary 
comparison. 5 While medical care and technology have 
certainly "improved" in the last 20 years (and continue to 
do so), the discipline has concomitantly gotten more 
specialized; and while medicine's improvements and 
discoveries have certainly had liberating effects (saving 
and improving the quality of patients' lives), they do 
continue to exercise a certain kind of (perhaps more 
insidious) control--a kind of "discursive" control begins to 
show itself as, for example, more and more tests as well as 
second and third opinions become "necessary."6 While 
5see Weber's "The Vaulted Eye: Remarks on Knowledge 
and Professionalism," where he makes several striking 
comparisons between medicine and teaching--which have 
surpassed the law as the "exemplary professions" (45). 
6This is, of course, not to mention the more obvious 
problem that medicine and the academy share: access 
(rather, the lack of access) for the underprivileged. 
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medical care generally improves as more specialized tests 
and more layers of interpretation are added to the process 
of diagnosis, these tests and layers of interpretation--both 
of which are applications of "progressive" methodologies 
discovered by the discipline--begin to exercise their own 
kind of control, and can lead to frustrating interpretative 
or diagnostic impasses. And while "progress" in the 
discipline of literary criticism certainly never saved or 
even necessarily improved the quality of anyone's life 
outside the discipline (as the progress made by the 
disciplines of social work, psychoanalysis, and even 
computer science could be said to have), I think the 
disciplinary comparison remains apt: literary. criticism, 
like medicine, has seen an unprecedented rise in 
specialization in the last 20 years, and while this rise 
most certainly has opened up (one could say "improved'') the 
theory and practice of both disciplines, it has also brought 
along with it a different kind of control--a "discursive'' 
control that, because it is difficult to recognize, often 
goes unanalyzed. I also stress the (seemingly outlandish 
and digressive) comparison between the disciplines of 
literary criticism and medicine to emphasize that, for 
either discipline, it is not simply or primarily a matter of 
going back to some pre-specialized "golden age"--even if 
such a regression were deemed possible or desirable. It 
would obviously be ludicrous to say, for example, that human 
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sciences like medicine have not "progressed''--that a cancer 
patient is not better off today than he or she was 20, 30 or 
so years ago. Likewise, in discussing the 
professionalization of literary criticism, it is not a 
matter of attempting to recuperate a picture of the critic 
akin to Norman Rockwell's series of general-practitioner 
paintings--a folksy generalist whose individualism would 
stubbornly keep him out of an institutional setting; nor, 
however, is it a matter of simply apologizing for the 
disciplinary progress that professional specialization seems 
to allow. I must reiterate here the importance of the 
double gesture in this analysis: it would obviously be 
disingenuous of me simply to criticize or undermine a 
profession to which I "belong" and in which I work; but it 
is not, within this same reiteration, exclusively a matter 
of accepting the status quo vision of professional life. It 
is rather a matter of asking how and why it is that this 
process of institutionalization and professionalization can 
seem to be inevitable--unable to be disrupted. If Kaufmann 
is correct when he asserts that "Professors of literature 
can neither submit to professionalization nor resist it" 
(528), this seems to beg certain questions: questions about 
submission and resistance from within, about the seemingly 
totalizing conditions of this institutional specialization, 
about how and why institution leads to a paralyzing impasse 
for those who would want to study or disrupt it--questions 
about, in other words, the institutionalization of theory 
and the institutionalization of the question of the 
postmodern. 
Kaufmann's, though, is certainly not the only version 
of the disciplinary role of theory within the university. 
Jonathan Culler, in Framing the Sign: Criticism and Its 
Institutions, puts forth a much more positive picture of 
contemporary theory within the academy. He characterizes 
theory as 
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anti-disciplinary, challenging not only the boundaries 
of disciplines, on whose legitimacy the university 
seems to depend, but also on these disciplines' claims 
to judge writing that touches their concerns. In 
practice, 'theory' contests the right of psychology 
departments to control Freud's texts, of philosophy 
departments to control Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. (24-
5) 
For Culler, theory, rather than adding to a kind of 
discursive disciplinary control, precisely disperses such 
claims of control by questioning the "disciplines' claims to 
judge writing that touches their concerns." For Culler, 
theory does not secure and protect a disciplinary knowledge, 
but rather it is the "subversion of the articulation of 
knowledge" (25), a subversion which leads to "changes which 
repeatedly transgress university boundaries" (25) and open 
up the disciplines. While this is certainly a more positive 
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picture of the role of theory in the university, it does not 
seem to silence Kaufmann's objections. Indeed, it seems to 
begin forwarding precisely what Kaufmann sees as an over-
enthusiasm concerning the "liberating'' role of theoretical 
discourse, as well as surreptitiously broaching the 
"unwanted" professionalization of thinking that inevitably 
comes with the institution of theory. 
In fact, Culler's discussion turns out to be a sort of 
hommage to the institution of theory--almost unbelievably 
so, especially given the way he traces the rise of literary 
professionalism. For example, in discussing the importance 
of the refereed journal in bringing about the institution of 
theory, he writes: 
One can argue that the system of publication exists not 
just to accredit professionals (a system of degrees 
would do that) but to distinguish those accredited from 
providers of services (such as nurses and school 
teachers), to accredit them as participants in an 
autonomous enterprise--a quest for knowledge--where in 
principle projects are not imposed by outside forces 
but flow from the critic's own curiosity or from the 
so-called 'needs' of the field itself. (29) 
While Culler is here simply summarizing the rise of literary 
professionalism, this certainly sounds like the beginnings 
of a theoretical and ideological critique of the 
professionalizing role of journals: they serve to 
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"distinguish" literary professionals from mere "providers of 
services," and foster what could only be called a mystifying 
and theoretically indefensible portrait of the critic as a 
kind of individualist genius whose "projects are not imposed 
by outside forces" or institutions, but rather "flow from 
the critic's own curiosity" in the name of "an autonomous 
enterprise," a seemingly disinterested "quest for 
know 1 edge. "7 
Indeed, Culler's summary of the rise of professionalism 
continues in such a way that a sort of demystifying reading 
of literary criticism's professionalist fictions seems both 
necessary and imminent. For example, still summarizing, 
Culler quotes Christopher Jencks and David Riesman's The 
Academic Revolution: "Professionalism, [they write], is 
'colleague-oriented rather than client-oriented'" (29). 
Culler does not comment on this quotation, but again 
criticism of it seems imminent, if for no other reason than 
such a claim--that literary criticism exists out$ide a 
commodity system--seems especially specious in the context 
of Culler's discussion of the professional centrality of 
journals, which rather obviously have to be "client-
oriented" in order to compete for a shrinking theory dollar 
7For just such a ideological critique of the role of 
the critic, see Said's The World, the Text, and the Critic--
especially the introduction, "Secular Criticism." 
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in an increasingly competitive market. 8 Likewise, when 
Culler notes that "In the academy, professionalism ties 
one's identity to an expertise and hence to a field in which 
one might be judged expert by one's peers" (29, my 
emphasis), it seems precisely a prolegomena to a sort of 
Foucaultian argument--perhaps like the one sketched out by 
Kaufmann above--concerning the processes by which the 
supposedly "liberating" discourses of theory lead to a 
proliferation of other (more insidious) means of control, 
the process by which "professionalism ties one's identity to 
an expertise. "9 
No such critique, however, is forthcoming from Culler. 
Rather, he celebrates professionalism precisely in the terms 
it seemed he was sure to undermine: 
The connection between criticism and the continuing 
professional evaluation on which promotions, grants, 
and prestige depend may thus generate a more 
specialized, yet more innovative criticism than would 
some other arrangement. The need to make an 'important 
8cf. Weber's discussion of Burton Bledstein's work on 
"the culture of professionalism": the professional seeks to 
define his services as having "predominantly a use-value, 
not an exchange value. It is precisely in the effort to 
distinguish himself from the businessman, on the one hand, 
and from the worker, on the other, that the professional 
finds it necessary to cultivate the professional ethos and 
'culture' ..... (Institution 27). 
9cf. "The Repressive Hypothesis" in The Foucault Reader 
(301-29). Also, as I think will become clear, I am not 
attempting to make an argument for Kaufmann as a 
Foucaultian. 
new contribution' is built into the American academic 
system .... (29-30) 
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Here Culler puts forth, in his own name, the benign vision 
of the university that it had seemed he was setting up to be 
criticized: he characterizes the academy as a place of 
innovation, where an "important new contribution" is 
graciously rewarded by "promotions, grants, and prestige." 
Specialization, he argues, is necessary to produce "a more 
innovative criticism." While he glances over it as self-
evident, the "innovative criticism" that he posits as 
literary studies' end (product) remains quite problematic--
seems to be precisely a version of the autonomous "critic-
as-genius" paradigm. Also, the imperatives of disciplinary 
self-protection (veiled in the terminology of progress) and 
the commodity fetish implied by emphasizing the "new and 
improved"--as well as the ways in which emphasizing critical 
"innovation" protects, promotes, and generates 
specialization--seem to be buried under a very rosy picture 
of personal freedom within the theoretical university. (In 
fact, one might note that Culler's vision of the theoretical 
humanities seems uncannily similar to the--supposedly 
outdated--vision of the academy in which the ends of a 
disinterested, appreciative Arnoldian criticism protect, 
promote, and generate the generalist--an irony to which I 
will return.) 
Culler continues to explain the virtues of this 
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professionalism: 
Professionalism makes a critic's career depend upon the 
judgments of experts in his or her own field: deans, 
departments, publishers and foundations have, in the 
interest of professionalism, increasingly relied on 
peer reviews in decisions to hire and promote, to 
publish books and arti~les, and to award grants. While 
reducing capriciousness and favoritism in important 
decisions, this progress of professionalism shifts 
power from the vertical hierarchy of the institution 
that employs a critic to a horizontal system of 
evaluation. (29-30, my emphases) 
It seems Culler here names not only a subversion of 
disciplinary knowledge strategies as the consequence of 
theory's professionalization, but also a shift of 
disciplinary power's axis from vertical to horizontal--
though, of course, the shifting of power becomes a goal in 
itself when one argues, as Culler does, that power cannot be 
simply undermined or subverted, that there is no simple 
liberation from institutions or power. 10 But what seems 
anomalous here is precisely Culler's forwarding of a kind of 
liberation that comes "in the interest of professionalism'': 
the "system of evaluation" which grows out of this shift 
helps in "reducing capriciousness and favoritism," a 
formulation which continues the liberationist metaphor that 
10see his discussion of Foucault in Framing (57-68). 
he develops throughout his discussion of the "progress of 
professionalism." But in shifting axes, one does not 
necessarily--or even primarily--reduce capriciousness or 
favoritism or in any way escape these undesirable by-
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products of the workings of an institution. In fact, given 
the polarization of theoretical camps in recent years, one 
could argue that specialization has increased capriciousness 
and favoritism rather than vice versa. 11 
But, to get back to the "original" question, what is 
the status or role of theory in all this? As he continues, 
Culler concretely ties his professional progress metaphor 
back to the question of theory in an absolutely astonishing 
way: 
we must assert the value not just of specialization but 
of professionalization also, explaining how 
professionalization makes thought possible by 
developing sets of questions, imposing norms which then 
have to be questioned and thereby promoting debate on 
key problems. (54, my emphasis) 
Professionalism here finds its denoument in Culler's 
argument not simply as an improved system of evaluation nor 
even as a bolstering of critical ends, but literally as a 
11 Given the plethora of theoretical stances, it seems 
unlikely that favoritism in publication is decreasing: 
would, for example, a deconstructive analysis be recommended 
for publication by a nee-Marxist; would a Habermasian-
recommend a Foucaultian analysis, or a new historicist 
recommend a new critical analysis? 
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transcendental--as that which "makes thought possible." 
This is, it seems to me, an absolutely chilling formulation, 
and not so simply because of the ominous consequences it 
seems to have for the hopes of "non-professionals" to think 
at all, but because thought or knowledge seems to be named 
here precisely and only in terms of its 19th-century 
disciplinary manifestation--as "developing sets of 
questions, imposing norms, and thereby promoting debate on 
key problems." Professionalism, as Culler defines it here, 
seems less what makes thinking possible than what makes the 
organization, control, and articulation of thinking 
possible--by deciding what sets of questions will be 
addressed, what norms imposed, and what problems deemed key. 
Here theory is made, quite literally (and paradoxically, 
given Culler's original formulation of the role of theory) 
into the discipline of professionalism--into a kind of meta-
discipline which takes the other disciplines as its object, 
and organizes them under its classifications and rules. 12 
12compare the institutional resonances of Culler's 
theoretician with the MLA's self-produced picture of the 
critic in its Introduction to Scholarship: "criticism 
assimilates the best findings of the other, partial 
disciplines ... and completes them by subsuming them in a 
final act of interpretation. Criticism gives meaning to 
literary studies; only when we, as critics, have performed 
our task have we fulfilled the purpose of understanding and 
placing the text .... [T]he view of critics as persons who 
complete the other disciplines also requires them to know 
the other disciplines. A superior position involves burdens 
as well as privileges. If literary studies stand atop a 
pyramid, perhaps that testifies not only to their elite 
situation but to the difficulty of the climb and the 
precariousness of keeping balance" (84-5). 
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For Culler, then, theory is a kind of new ground of the 
humanities, the privileged discipline because it affords to 
the professional the "critical or self-critical space within 
which discoveries and critiques take place" (54, my 
emphasis). The language of the so-called hard sciences fits 
well here with his call for innovation. 13 And it is 
perhaps here that an irony I noted earlier becomes most 
apparent: if the project of the humanities becomes a kind 
of scientistic innovation, then of course specialization is 
necessary; but this logic of the ends of the humanities is 
uncannily similar (in that it is dialectically opposed) to 
the conserving, Arnoldian paradigm which makes necessary the 
generalist. In fact, Culler sets up his argument in direct 
contradistinction to this generalist paradigm. He writes of 
the decision before us today: 
One can distinguish two general models at work .... The 
first makes the university the transmitter of a 
cultural heritage, gives it the ideological function of 
reproducing culture and the social order. The second 
model makes the university a site for the production of 
knowledge, and teaching is related to that function: 
in early years students are taught what they need to 
13 see Weber, who quotes Marx on the capitalist/ 
imperialist paradigm of the language of ''progress": "'the 
conquest of each new country signifies a new frontier' 
... [and] each new frontier signifies only a new country to 
be conquered" (Institution 148). 
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know in order to progress to more advanced work; in 
later years, they follow or even assist their teachers' 
work at the frontiers of a discipline. (33, my 
emphases) 
There seem to be several problems with Culler's formulation 
of the decision before us. First, we note that he has 
simply inverted the Arnoldian paradigm of the generalist: 
for the generalist, the tradition is the repository of real 
knowledge--episteme--while theory is the realm of merely 
ideological doxa. But Culler, without examining the dubious 
terms of this opposition, simply rearranges the terms to 
favor the specialist--who is now involved in the "production 
of knowledge" while the generalist is assigned the 
"ideological function of reproducing culture and social 
order." Certainly the ideology/knowledge opposition is ripe 
for deconstruction, and Culler even goes on to give us the 
ammunition to do so: how, we might ask, does teaching 
students "what they need to know to progress to more 
advanced work" escape the "ideological function of 
reproducing culture and social order"? Likewise, if 
students' goals are to get to the point where they may 
"follow or even assist their teachers' work at the frontiers 
of a discipline," one might ask how professionalist teaching 
escapes a paternalistic, appreciative model or fosters 
innovation? In any case, it seems that the theoretical 
professionalism which Culler calls for serves--just as 
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strongly as the paradigm it seeks to displace by inverting--
to conserve or protect the most traditional imperatives of 
the discipline. 14 And Culler admits that professionalism 
may have its problems, but he feels that they are outweighed 
by 
its compensating strengths--an encouragement of 
innovation, for example--and one must remind oneself of 
the alternatives which the opponents of professionalism 
promote: a vision of the humanities as repository of 
known truths and received values, which a dedicated 
non-professional corps of workers present to the young. 
(55) 
So, in the end, Culler sees professionalism as the only 
defense against a backslide to the bad old days of higher 
education as ideological indoctrination, carried out by 
functionaries for the state's interests, "a dedicated non-
professional corps of workers." 
For Culler, then, professionalism is, in the end, 
inevitable--it is absolutely necessary to avoid what he sees 
as the disastrous outcome of its denial. And, it should be 
noted, he is by no means the only high-profile theorist who 
is also an apologist for professionalism: Stanley Fish, 
writing from a new-pragmatist perspective that is 
14cf. Kaufmann's discussion of the Arnoldian strain of 
contemporary theory, 523ff. 
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particularly abhorrent to Culler, 15 comes to a similar 
conclusion about the necessity, value, and inevitablilty of 
professionalism. 16 He writes, about the hesitation that 
some of the contributors to The New Historicism collection 
express about the disciplinary consequences of their 
theoretical work: 
whatever the source of the malaise, I urge that it be 
abandoned and that New Historicists sit back and enjoy 
the fruits of their professional success, wishing 
neither for more nor less. In the words of the old 
Alka-Seltzer commercial, "try it, you'll like it," 
("Commentary" 315) 
Professionalism here is named as a possible cure for the 
"malaise"--the impasse--of a literary criticism robbed of 
its transcendental ground; even if professionalism is not 
exactly the cure, Fish suggests, at least it will allow the 
critic to forget or soothe the consequences of totalizing 
15culler vehemently attacks the new pragmatism, "whose 
complacency seems altogether appropriate to the Age of 
Reagan" (55). Curiously, though, he seems finally to 
envision the future of literary studies as a kind of Rortian 
conversation: "the future is perhaps best imagined as an 
ongoing debate" (56). 
16 Fish's "thesis"--reiterated in a series of essays on 
professionalism--is roughly the following: "My contention 
is that anti-professionalism, insofar as it imagines a 
position of judgment wholly uncontaminated by professional 
concerns, is incoherent, since in order to be heard as 
relevant, a critique must already be implicated in the 
assumptions and goals that define the profession" ("A Reply" 
125). This is precisely the dilemma to which the Derridean 
"double gesture" speaks and why this gesture is, to use a 
problematic but appropriate word, necessary. 
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over-indulgence. 17 And while Culler's professionalism 
cannot simply be conflated with the Fish's sloganeering, 
"don't-worry-be-happy" brand, they do both name 
professionalism as a valuable and necessary cure for the 
impasse of literary criticism--and it is also interesting to 
note that they do so from opposing sides of what would seem 
to be a ragingly discordant deconstruction/new historicism 
debate (a debate which I will discuss at some length in 
Chapter 3). What is particularly intriguing here, though, 
is that through Culler's and Fish's discussions of the 
necessity of professionalism it seems we are back--though we 
have taken an extremely circuitous route--to Kaufmann's 
assertion that the theory's professionalism can neither be 
affirmed nor denied in any consistent manner: its 
affirmation can be denied as an untheoretical acceptance, 
while even its denial--insofar as it comes irreducibly from 
within--can be shown to be a surreptitious affirmation. As 
a cure for criticism's malaise, then, professionalism seems 
also to be a poison: professionalism as pharmakon. 
The Institutional Pharmakon 
Pharmakon is one of Derrida's well-known 
"undecidables." In his analysis of the discourse on writing 
in Plato's Phaedrus, Derrida notes that Plato's text uses 
17Alka-Seltzer's other famous slogan, after all, was "I 
can't believe I ate the whole thing." 
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the same word--pharmakon--to characterize writing's 
seemingly dual and contradictory position vis-a-vis memory 
(see Dissemination 61-172). Socrates tells the story of two 
gods--Theuth, the inventor of writing, and Thamus, a ruler. 
Theuth comes to Thamus with his "elixir [pharmakon, remedy] 
of memory and wisdom" (274E); Thamus responds: 
you, who are the father of letters, have been led by 
your affection to ascribe to them a power opposite of 
that which they really possess. For this invention 
will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who 
learn to use it .... You have invented an elixir 
[pharmakon, poison] not of memory but reminding. (275A) 
The undecidable opposition inscribed in the very word 
pharmakon--poison or cure?--gives rise to a puzzling impasse 
in Plato's text: how can the necessary power of letters in 
memory and wisdom work as a cure if it is also a poison; how 
can writing be both an aid to memory and a subversion of 
memory? Indeed Plato himself here depends on this 
pharmakon, writing a didactic story that Socrates remembers 
he ''heard of the ancients" (274C); the nagging question · 
becomes: how can a pure knowledge be upheld or attained at 
all when following the necessarily discursive logic of 
knowledge leads inexorably to an impasse, to depending on 
that which should by rights be excluded, exiled to the realm 
of doxa? 
The ''systematic" situation of undecidability outlined 
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here (the ''cure" of knowledge also brings, at the same time 
and through the same word, the ''poison" of writing) quite 
closely resembles the "institutional" situation of the 
profession of theory: the cure of theory brings with it the 
poison of professionalism. In the language of 
deconstruction, perhaps one could say that the postmodern 
academy is in the position of Plato's pharmakon: 
undecidable, caught at or in what seems like an impasse. 
This impasse becomes all the more frustrating for the 
discipline of literary criticism because it seems to be a 
necessary, logical outcome of critical thinking itself: the 
thinking that is to uncover episteme uncovers only impasse. 
And though this impasse can likewise be ''explained" by 
critical thinking--it comes about precisely because in a 
postmodern epoch, the purity of knowledge has withdrawn, is 
not there, as Plato may have thought, to be uncovered--it 
seems to offer little solace, only adding to the slippage, 
leaving us inexorably, repeatedly within or at the impasse, 
blankly staring down Kaufmann's "ultimately frustrating 
aporias." The only tool we seem to have at our disposal to 
neutralize the impasse--critical thinking which could lead 
to critical action--is implicated as/in the "cause'' of the 
impasse itself. 
And this institutional impasse is, interestingly 
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enough, likewise inscribed in Plato's text. 18 Thamus 
continues on the poison of letters: 
You have invented an elixir [pharmakon] not of memory 
but reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance 
of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many 
things without instruction and therefore will seem to 
know many things, when they are, for the most part, 
ignorant and hard to get along with, since they are not 
wise, but only appear wise. (275A-B) 
The descent from knowledge to mere opinion that comes with 
writing likewise creates an institutional impasse--it makes 
Athens' students "ignorant and hard to get along with." In 
some sense, we postmoderns would want to cheer on this 
supposed amateurish "ignorance" in our students, thinking of 
it instead as a healthy and necessary skepticism concerning 
a received tradition. But there likewise seems a chiasmic 
reversal here in that this necessary skepticism must be 
learned, taught by a corps of professional teachers and 
scholars. We are back, again, at Kaufmann's impasse: 
theory--as truly critical thought--can neither be taught nor 
abandoned in the university; and it likewise seems that, as 
Stanley Fish writes, "Anti-professionalism is 
professionalism in its purest form" (''Anti-professionalism" 
106). 
18cf. Barbara Johnson's discussion of pedagogy and 
Phaedrus in A World of Difference (83-85). 
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So here we are left with a question; as Derrida asks, 
"If the same premises lead to evaluations that are 
apparently contradictory, what does that tell us about the 
system of reading and hierarchization at work?'' ("Age" 21 ). 
It is at this point, then, that it becomes necessary to 
rethink the path that leads to this impasse, to conceive of 
some way to rethink the impasse, somehow to think opposites 
together--theory and academy, poison and cure, thinking and 
acting--without falling into the spuriousness of simply 
neutralizing the differences within some "beyond," but 
likewise without giving in to the status quo of impasse: 
"to avoid both neutralizing the binary oppositions ... and 
simply residing within the closed field of these 
oppositions, thereby confirming it" (Positions 41); in other 
words, it is as this point that the double reading and 
writing of deconstruction becomes necessary. Necessary 
because deconstruction attends precisely to this impasse--
but attends to it as other than simply impasse or 
stagnation. Necessary because there seems to be no simple 
ground beyond these oppositions, but a difference, a 
displacement, a double bind between them--an "outside" or 
double that disrupts their functioning rather than 
guaranteeing it. As Derrida writes: "a repetition without 
identity--one mark inside and one mark outside the 
deconstructed system, should give rise to a double reading 
and a double writing" (Dissemination 4). For Derrida, one 
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move of this double reading is a thematizing or "critical" 
one, a repetitive reading of sorts done necessarily from 
within the confines of the system or institution, but the 
second move of this reading or writing goes back over 
itself, questions its own motives, attempts to attend to 
what was excluded--systematically or institutionally--in the 
first move; a double reading or writing tends to a kind of 
outside, not a stable ground but rather an exteriority which 
"can no longer take the form of a sort of extra-text which 
could arrest the concatenation of writing" (Dissemination 
5). This is what Derrida calls "out-work," the non-
dialectical "work" of the outside, the "work" of the 
undecidable. I will, as I promise above, take up the 
"systematic" aspects of double reading/writing in the 
following chapters, but I would like here to attempt to take 
up the institutional "necessity" of a deconstruction. 
The text that most trenchantly takes up this question 
of deconstruction and the academy is Weber's Institutions 
and Interpretation, a deconstructive analysis of the work of 
institution--the academy and the functioning of disciplines 
--and one that is notable in that it does not look primarily 
to Derrida's GREPH work for its institutional focus. 19 
19 see, for discussions of Derrida's GREPH [Groupe de 
Recherches sur l'Enseignement Philosophigue] work, Ulmer's 
Applied Grammatology, Culler's On Deconstruction, and 
Fynsk's "A Decelebration of Philosophy." See also Derrida's 
"The Principle of Reason," and "Sendoffs," a report written 
by Derrida on the International College of Philosophy. 
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Though Weber is at times critical of Derrida's inattention 
to institutional matters, he performs a kind of double 
reading--based, it seems, very much on Derrida's 
"systematic" work--of the functioning of the academic 
disciplines. According to Weber, the basic problem 
surrounding professionalism, especially within the 
university, is not that the liberating intentions of the 
disciplines or of theory have been or are inexorably 
destined to be betrayed by the limiting of institution, but 
rather that the disciplines do not continue to ask 
themselves ground-questions, do not attend to what is 
excluded in or through their analyses; as Weber writes, the 
academy has built itself on 
instituted areas of training and research which, once 
established, could increasingly ignore the founding 
limits and limitations of the individual disciplines. 
(32, my emphasis). 
Disciplines can posit innovative ends or lament unintended 
outcomes only if practitioners "ignore the founding limits 
and limitations" of the discipline--because those foundings 
are themselves impure, exclusionary, arbitrary and therefore 
cannot hope to lead to pure ends. According to Weber, any 
discipline, in order to perform its analyses, must cover 
over its founding problems, limits, and exclusions. 
Disciplines do so most often precisely by appealing to the 
"advance of knowledge" or the liberation which they 
~···---···;·-. 
34 
supposedly are to bring about: in short, disciplines--of 
whatever type--do not ask ground questions, they ask end 
questions. Ground questions lead to what disciplines read 
as an impasse because these "foundational" questions can 
upset the easy obtaining of an end: if a discipline 
seriously examines its ground, it will indeed "inexorably" 
lead to an impasse, precisely because the exclusions that 
work to constitute a discipline--its objects, its 
methodologies--are groundless. 
Deconstruction, however, reads this impasse--this 
withdrawal of ground--as the closure of a way of thinking: 
after the closure or withdrawal of a transcendental mode of 
thinking, attempting to think with transcendental categories 
will, of course, lead to an impasse--the guarantee of 
transcendental thinking's success having withdrawn in a 
postmodern epoch. 20 But, at the same time, there is no 
pure place post-closure. Hence the necessity of the double 
logic: both inside and outside the categories of the 
closure, inside and outside the academic institutions that 
base themselves on these categories. We need, in other 
words, to ''answer" the question of the postmodern, but, 
because of this double bind, the answer cannot be singular. 
As Derrida writes, 
Two logics, then, with an incalculable effect, two 
20 see my much more detailed discussion of this point in 
Chapter 4. 
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repetitions which are no more opposed to each other 
than they repeat each other identically and which, if 
they do repeat each other, echo the duplicity that 
constitutes all repetition: it is only when one takes 
into 'account' this incalculable double-bind of 
repetition ... that one has a chance of reading the 
unreadable text which follows immediately, and to read 
it as unreadable. (Post Card 352/373-4, translation 
modified) 
With the closure of metaphysics, something comes to thought 
which cannot be read or understood in the terms of that 
thought--for example, the "perfectly logical" impasse of 
knowledge and its institutions, the fact that one set of 
data can lead to two logical conclusions which radically 
exclude each other. This "unreadable" text, however, does 
follow a "logic," though not a determinate (and therefore 
not a simply indeterminate) one--rather, it "follows" the 
dual logic of the "incalculable double bind of repetition." 
And it is only when one takes this logic "into 'account'" 
(though, obviously, there is no simple accounting possible 
here) 21 that one has a chance of reading at all. It is 
only when one recognizes the "logic" of the impasse of 
unreadability that one has the chance of "accounting for" 
21 cf. Weber: "If 'account' ... is inscribed within 
quotation marks, it is to indicate that the double bind 
cannot simply be taken into account" (97). Also, I have 
modified the quotation above by consulting Weber's 
translation. 
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the unreadable as something other than the dialectical, non-
sensical opposite of the readable; likewise, it seems that 
it is only when one recognizes the determinate/determining 
logic that leads to the impasse of an institution or 
discipline--a way of thinking and acting that inexorably 
leads to nihilist reversals and hence to inaction--that one 
can attempt to account for this impasse as other than simple 
paralyzation or stasis, and other than simple obstacle to be 
overcome. It is this "logic"--which I will call the logic 
of the postmodern, inasmuch as it "answers" what I have 
called the "question of the postmodern"--that I will attempt 
to investigate and articulate throughout this dissertation. 
My approach throughout this work might be called 
"deconstructive" (though a good bit of this dissertation 
questions deconstruction as an institutional category), but 
I emphasize from the start that it is not a matter of 
distilling a determinate/determining logic out of Derrida's 
texts and applying it to a horizon of other philosophical 
and literary texts. Rather, it is a matter of marking and 
negotiating paths through specific texts and institutions--
in short, it is a matter of reading. I begin with the 
question of institutions because this question is 
inseparable from the more traditional systematic questions, 
and because the very question of the application of a 
methodology broaches inescapably institutional questions, 
question to which deconstruction can and does respond. As 
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Derrida writes in "Contest of Faculties": 
Precisely because it is never concerned only with 
signified content, deconstruction should not be 
separable from this politico-institutional problematic 
and should seek a new investigation of responsibility, 
an investigation which questions the codes inherited 
from ethics and politics. This means that, too 
political for some, it will seem paralyzing to those 
who only recognize politics by the most familiar road 
signs. Deconstruction is neither a methodological 
reform that should reassure the organization in place 
nor a flourish of irresponsible and irresponsible-
making destruction, whose most certain effect would be 
to leave everything as it is and to consolidate the 
most immobile forces within the university. (in Culler 
On 56) 
Deconstruction, however, has been and remains thematized 
precisely as "irresponsible and irresponsible-making 
destruction," and as a critical movement which "leave[s] 
everything as it is ... within the university." In order to 
pose a question to this dominant reading of deconstruction, 
I would like to move from here to examine the institutional 
rise and fall of deconstruction in North American literature 
departments. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE DISCIPLINE OF DECONSTRUCTION 
Deconstruction, it seems, is dead in literature 
departments today. Its death is usually attributed either 
to suicide--to its falling back into the dead-end formalism 
it was supposed to remedy--or to murder at the hands of the 
New Historicists, whose calls for re-historicizing and re-
contextualizing the study of literature have successfully 
called into question the supposed self-cancelling textualism 
of the deconstructionists. Consider the following fairly 
representative assessments--the first of the "suicide" 
theory, the second of the "murder" theory: 
deconstructive criticism, which, however important, is 
but an offspring of New Criticism, ... has done little 
more than apply what it takes to be a method for 
reading literary texts to the unproblematized horizon 
of its discipline. 
By neglecting the pragmatic and historical context of 
the utterance of what is dramatized in such a manner as 
to cancel it out, the criticism in question reveals its 
origins in Romantic (as well as, in a certain 
interpretation, Idealist) philosophy. It is a 
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suprahistorical criticism that pretends to speak from a 
position free of ideology--that is, from an absolute 
point of view. 
crit1cs of deconstruction will agree, I think, that these 
quotations well sum up the critiques which brought its 
short, happy life in American literature departments to an 
end. 
The first quotation puts forth the critique usually 
associated with, for lack of a better word, "skeptical" 
detractors of deconstruction--those who hold that while 
deconstructive reading claims to be something radically new, 
in actuality it is simply another version of New Criticism's 
traditional methodology of close reading, cloaked in a 
theoretical vocabulary and reapplied to a series of texts in 
order to yield "new" readings. 1 These detractors point to 
the way in which deconstructive readers of literary texts 
hunt for self-cancelling binary oppositions in the same 
(essentially unproblematic) way the New Critics hunted for 
themes and ironies. In addition, according to this line of 
reasoning, the end result of both readings is the same: a 
New Critical reading totalizes the text by offering an all-
1see, for example, Jane P. Tompkins' "The Reader in 
History'': "What is most striking about reader-response 
criticism and its close relative, deconstructive criticism, 
is their failure to break out of the mold into which 
critical writing was cast by the formalist identification of 
criticism with explication. Interpretation reigns supreme 
both in teaching and publication just as it did when the New 
Criticism was in its heyday in the 1940s and 1950s" (224-5). 
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inclusive meaning or interpretation, while a deconstructive 
reading totalizes the text in exactly the opposite way--
simply denying meaning or interpretation by showing how 
oppositions in the text cancel themselves out. For the 
skeptic, deconstruction committed suicide in literature 
departments after it realized it was unable to break away 
from the tradition it wished to supersede. 
The second quotation reflects the critique of 
deconstructive criticism generally advanced by those 
concerned about its political dimension--or rather, its lack 
of political dimension. Deconstructive readings are 
faulted, in this line of reasoning, primarily for 
"neglecting the pragmatic and historical context" of 
literature and the production of literature, thereby 
performing a "suprahistorical criticism that pretends to 
speak from a position free of ideology." Additionally, and 
perhaps more damningly, those concerned with the political 
dimension of literature studies point to the danger of the 
political despair inevitably fostered by these readings' 
notions of simple textual self-cancellation, the danger of 
fostering passive acceptance as the political result of a 
reactionary and nihilistic textual undecidability. 2 For 
2see, for example, Eagleton's assessment in Literary 
Theory: deconstruction "frees you at a stroke from having 
to assume a position on important issue, since what you say 
of such things will be no more than a passing product_ of the 
signifier and so in no sense to be taken as 'true' or 
'serious' .... Since it commits you to affirming nothing, it 
is as injurious as blank ammunition" (145). 
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the marxist, feminist, or (new) historical literary critic, 
deconstruction was murdered by a reorientation in literature 
departments toward the political and social dimensions of 
literary texts and of the discipline of literary criticism 
itself. 
In any case, the quotations with which I began are 
certainly representative of compelling critiques of the 
practice of deconstructive criticism from two distinct 
points of view--what I have called the skeptical and the 
political--which are at odds with deconstruction. It is 
indeed odd, then, that both of these critiques are quoted 
from a recent book which is an apology for deconstruction, 
Rodolphe Gasche's The Tain of the Mirror (quotations from 
255, 139). Gasche vehemently critiques a certain kind of 
deconstructive practice, but, unlike most of 
deconstruction's critics within literature departments, 
Gasche attacks and subverts this practice of deconstructive 
literary criticism in defense of deconstruction, in 'the 
name' of deconstruction, of "deconstruction, properly 
speaking" (135)--in defense of Derrida's thought against 
those who (ab)use it by turning it into an unproblematic, 
nihilistic method for reading literary texts. 
There are, then, different readings of the role or 
value of deconstruction at work for Gasche and for the 
skeptical or political critics of deconstruction I 
characterized earlier; yet somehow both Gasche--a defender 
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of deconstruction--and the skeptical and political critics 
of deconstruction can come to the same general conclusions 
about the inadequacy of deconstructive literary criticism as 
it was and currently is practiced in America, especially by 
the "Yale school" and its followers. Gasche, rather than 
dismissing deconstruction out of hand, as the skeptics and 
political critics often do, argues that Derrida's thought 
has been grossly misrepresented by his American disciples, 
and that there has never been a properly deconstructive 
criticism in America; in fact, Gasche argues that there is 
nothing inherent in Derrida's work which makes it applicable 
in any simple way to literary criticism. 3 For Gasche, 
Derrida is, like many before him, a philosopher who has an 
interest in literature, but Gasche argues that this interest 
in no way makes his thought readily or easily available to 
be taken up for use in traditional literary criticism. He 
writes, against deconstructive criticism, that "to quarry 
from Derrida's writings is not automatically to become 
deconstructive" (2); in fact, Gasche states, "the importance 
of Derrida's thinking for the discipline of literary 
criticism is not immediately evident" (255). 
Assuming that Gasche is correct--and I believe that, 
for the most part, he is--the question for those of us 
interested in deconstruction and literature then becomes: 
3Gasche made this point as early as 1979, in his 
"Deconstruction as Criticism." 
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what, if anything, can be made of--written of, thought of--
the relatio~ between a body of texts we call Derrida's 
philosophy and a body of texts we call literature? If we 
agree that, for the most part, what passed under the name 
"deconstruction" in literature departments in the 1970's and 
beyond had little to do with Derrida's thought, perhaps 
deconstruction needs to be reexamined. In short, it seems 
to me that now that the wave of deconstruction as a method 
for interpreting texts has crested and rolled back in 
literature departments, perhaps it can be reexamined as a 
philosophy, specifically a postmodern philosophy, a 
postmodern thinking, which is overtly interested in the 
literature and institutions of the postmodern world--or, 
more precisely, a philosophy which is interested in the 
process by which borders (the borders that separate 
literature and philosophy, texts and institutions, the 
modern and the postmodern) are assigned. I must stress that 
I am not interested here in aligning myself with those--
skeptics or proponents--who see postmodern thought as valid 
solely in relation to postmodern texts; but, at the same 
time, I would like to question the value of critical 
projects which aim at simply re-reading the tradition from 
another (in this case, deconstructive) point of view. Or, 
perhaps phrased more precisely, I would like to question a 
certain reading of deconstruction which would allow it a 
properly critical project or a kind of world view. I would 
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like, at this point, to examine the institutional rise of 
American deconstruction and its reading of Derrida, and then 
point out where I think this dominant reading--the reading 
upon which the skeptical and political critiques of 
deconstruction are based--fails to account for the 
complexities of Derrida's work. 
However, I run the risk throughout this argument of 
too-quickly totalizing the category "deconstructive literary 
criticism"; indeed, one of the key problems surrounding the 
reception of deconstruction in America is its thematization 
as a master term, something Derrida warns against: 
the word 'deconstruction' like all other words acquires 
its value only from its inscription in a chain of 
possible substitutions, in what is too blithely called 
a 'context.' For me, for what I have tried and still 
try to write, the word only has an interest within a 
certain context where it replaces and lets itself be 
determined by such other words as 'ecriture,' 'trace,' 
'supplement,' 'hymen,' 'pharmakon,' 'margin,' 
[etc.] .... " (in Bernasconi and Wood 7) 
I will try to honor the complexity within what may seem to 
be the monolithic category "deconstructive criticism"--a 
move which is, of course, necessary given the double bind I 
find myself in as someone who could quite easily be called a 
"deconstructive critic." There are, from the very 
"beginning," many deconstructions: the "rhetorical" 
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deconstruction of Paul de Man is different from the 
"pedagogical" deconstruction of Gregory Ulmer, which in turn 
is different from the "political" deconstruction of Michael 
Ryan, the "post-colonial" deconstruction of Gayatri Spivak, 
the "philosophical" deconstruction of Gasch~, or the 
"feminist" deconstruction of Barbara Johnson, and these 
differences must be attended to. I should make it clear, 
then, that most of my comments concerning "deconstructive 
literary criticism in America" will be directed toward a 
rhetorical or tropological brand of Yale school 
deconstruction, perhaps most clearly represented by de Man 
and J. Hillis Miller. I turn my attention here because it 
is this rhetorical mode that has offered the greatest 
possibility to read deconstruction as a critical method--as 
a discursive tool for producing readings, and thereby for 
bolstering the work of a discipline. 
The Commodification of Deconstruction 
in America 
Deconstruction in America has a well-known genealogy; 
it was, so the story goes, imported from France and received 
in an enthusiastic way by many scholars in American 
literature departments, most following the lead of the Yale 
critics. Deconstruction brought "theory'' to the foreground 
in the study of literature in America. Soon, theory classes 
in English graduate departments were a must, and a wave of 
deconstruction "handbooks" was produced to introduce 
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graduate students and interested faculty to the complexities 
of deconstruction in theory seminars. (Derrida's own 
writings were and still are, for the most part, scrupulously 
avoided in these classes because of their complexity and 
difficulty--again, or so the story goes.) Deconstruction 
was, to put it bluntly, commodified for an American market, 
simplified and watered down for use in how-to books which 
gave (and continue to give) an entire generation of 
literature students an overview of what was supposedly 
Derrida's work without a corresponding attention to 
Derrida's texts.~ For example, the following quotations 
were taken from two of the leading handbooks used to 
represent deconstruction in theory seminars--the first from 
Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction and the second from 
Christopher Norris' Deconstruction: Theory and Practice: 5 
In undoing the oppositions on which it relies and 
between which it urges the reader to choose, the text 
places the [deconstructive] reader in an impossible 
situation that cannot end in triumph but only in an 
outcome already deemed inappropriate: an unwarranted 
4This commodification, we should note, moves hand-in-
hand with the professionalizing of theory that I discuss in 
Chapter 1. 
5rhe title of Norris' book, with its dependence on the 
metaphysical ur-distinction between theoria and praxis--the 
very distinction with which philosophy first configures 
itself--shows that Norris hasn't the faintest idea of the 
stakes of Derrida's project. "Differance," Derrida w~ites, 
is "a system that no longer tolerates the opposition of 
activity and passivity" (Margins 16). 
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choice or failure to choose. (81)6 
To deconstruct a text in Nietzschean-Derridean terms is 
to arrive at a limit point or deadlocked aporia of 
meaning which offers no hold for Marxist-historical 
understanding. The textual 'ideology' uncovered by 
Derrida's readings is a kind of aboriginal swerve into 
metaphor and figurative detour which language embraces. 
(80) 
If we compare these handbook accounts of deconstruction with 
the characterizations of the skeptical and political 
critiques I began with, I think we can see that the 
critiques are right on the beam: in Culler's 
characterization, deconstruction is an essentially formalist 
reading method which emphasizes a pre-determined fall into 
meaninglessness resulting from the self-cancellation of 
oppositions in any text. 7 In Norris' view of 
6To be fair, this quotation from Culler comes in the 
context of his reading of de Man, but Culler effectively 
conflates his project with Derrida's, writing that 
deconstruction "emerges from the work of Derrida and de Man" 
( 228) . 
7This reading is so institutionally canonized~ in fact, 
that it has made it onto the GRE Literature in English Test. 
Sample questions 31-32 in the 1989-91 GRE Literature in 
English test booklet concern a passage comparing the new 
critic's "prior knowledge that all literature is 
paradoxical" to "the deconstructionists' foreknowledge that 
all texts are allegories of their own unreadability" (16). 
This is a point well taken, as I am arguing here. However, 
the GRE's question concerns the proper names of these 
movements. The answer: "(E) Cleanth Brooks and Jacques 
Derrida" (16). 
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deconstruction, we see the political implications of the 
"deadlocked aporia of meaning" which results from the 
deconstructive act--rather, we see precisely that there are 
no political implications, that the ideology uncovered by 
(and, presumably, championed in) Derrida's readings is 
indeed that we are trapped in a prison-house of language. 
That, however, is simply not the case in Derrida's own 
writings. Time and time again Derrida warns of the danger--
metaphysical and political--of simply neutralizing 
oppositions in the name of deconstruction. Derrida 
emphasizes that deconstruction involves a double reading, a 
neutralization and a reinscription. He writes, 
Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed 
immediately to a neutralization: it must, by means of 
a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, 
practice an overturning of the classical opposition and 
a general displacement of the system. It is only on 
this condition that deconstruction will provide itself 
the means with which to intervene in the field of 
oppositions that it criticizes, which is also a field 
of non-discursive forces. (Margins 329) 
For Derrida, contra many of his followers and critics, 
deconstruction is not a simple move toward neutralization. 
Derrida's thought does not move toward an end constituted by 
a "deadlocked aporia of meaning" which leads to "an 
impossible situation which cannot end in triumph"; rather, 
49 
this deadlock, this undecidability, this unreadability is 
only the first gesture in a double reading, the 
''overturning" gesture which shows the untenability of the 
"classical opposition," the fact that the privileged term in 
the opposition can only structure itself--in its presence--
with reference to the non-privileged term--in its absence--
leaving non-presence as a structuring principle of presence 
and calling into question the privilege of th~ master term 
over the subservient term. This is indeed first-level 
deconstruction, but it leaves the crucial operation of 
Derrida's thought unperformed: the displacement of the 
system and the reinscription of the opposition, the second 
move of a double reading in which "deconstruction will 
provide itself the means with which to intervene in the 
field of oppositions that it criticizes." For Derrida, 
deconstruction can intervene only by displacing the mode of 
thinking which leads precisely to these deadlocks, by 
calling for and attempting to make possible an other 
thinking. So, Derrida, in some sense, actually agrees with 
skeptical and political critics of deconstruction as 
literary criticism: deconstruction will not be able to 
intervene in the field of oppositions it criticizes until it 
goes beyond simple neutralization--that is, unless it makes 
this second move of double reading, a general displacement 
of that system whose logic leads it inexorably to these 
neutralizations, these pure negations. 
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Deconstructive literary criticism, as it is summed up 
by Culler and Norris and practiced in America, has yet to 
acknowledge the importance of this displacement in Derrida's 
thought. Derrida writes, 
deconstruction involves an indispensable phase of 
reversal [i.e. first level deconstruction]. To remain 
content with reversal is of course to operate within 
the imminence of the system to be destroyed. But to 
sit back ... and take an attitude of neutralizing 
indifference with respect to the classical oppositions 
would be to give free rein to the existing forces that 
effectively and historically dominate the field. It 
would be, for not having seized the means to intervene, 
to confirm the established equilibrium. (Dissemination 
6) 
If deconstruction as literary criticism limits itself to 
neutralization, to first level deconstruction, Derrida here 
agrees that it is then politically impotent and even 
reactionary; simple "neutralizing indifference" gives "free 
rein to the existing forces that effectively and 
historically dominate the field" leaving the field of 
oppositions--a field which Derrida emphasizes is made up of 
both discursive and non-discursive forces--itself 
undisrupted. To fail to make the second move of the double 
reading would be simply "to confirm the established 
equilibrium." This, in Derrida's own words, is the 
unfortunate status of deconstructive literary criticism in 
America. 
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The reason deconstructive criticism has yet to make the 
second move of the double gesture can, I think, be traced to 
the Yale school's influential (mis)reading of Derrida's 
notion of "undecidability," the notion that the majority of 
critiques of deconstruction attack most stringently: the 
skeptic sees the deconstructive critic's notion of 
undecidability as the simple opposite of decidability--
making undecidability quite decidable; while the political 
critic sees undecidability as spelling out a dead end of 
futility for political action--as a notion which cannot help 
but bolster the social status quo. Deconstructive 
criticism, as Gasche has shown, often mistakes the inability 
to decide brought about by oppositions cancelling themselves 
out--what deconstructive critic par excellence Paul de Man 
calls "unreadability"--for Derrida's notion of 
undecidability; they are, however, not the same. According 
to de Man, "A text ... can literally be called 'unreadable' in 
that it leads to a set of assertions that radically exclude 
each other" (Allegories 245). This, as we have seen in 
Chapter 1, would hold for Derrida also, but only as a first 
level deconstruction; textual assertions cancelling each 
other out are, for Derrida, a sign that a certain totalizing 
way of reading is experiencing its closure, a sign that this 
way of reading (thinking) must be radically displaced--its 
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grounds must be rethought carefully and the opposition must 
be reinscribed in a system which respects separation, which 
stands on a discontinuous, withdrawing ground. 
For Derrida, the closure of this objectifying system--a 
system which always privileges identity over difference--
entails a distinctly ethical imperative to rethink decision 
carefully and problematically. 8 For de Man, however, the 
upshot of this self-cancellation is that texts "compel us to 
choose while destroying the foundations of any choice" 
(Allegories 245, my emphasis). The undecidability fostered 
by unreadability, then, is the lesson, the end, the telos of 
deconstruction for de Man, 9 just as deconstruction names 
the negative movement which founds or constitutes the 
text. 10 And this genesis-to-revelation movement of de 
Manian deconstruction allows quite nicely a critical or 
institutional project for deconstruction; note, for example, 
de Man's comments about deconstructive reading, a reading 
8As Bernasconi has pointed out, there is no ethics 
without undecidability, i.e. if a totalizing system is your 
guide, decision is not a problem because the system has, by 
definition, all the answers. See his "Deconstruction and 
the Possibility of Ethics" (especially 135). See also 
Derrida very clearly making this point in his Afterword to 
the Limited Inc. texts (116). 
9see above my discussion of de Man's "Shelley 
Disfigured" as a nihilistic allegory of recuperation. 
10 cf. "Semiology and Rhetoric": "The deconstruction is 
not something that we have added to the text; it constituted 
the text in the first place" (138). For an excellent 
discussion of de Man and Derrida on this point, see Irene 
Harvey's "The Differance between Derrida and de Man." 
that inexorably ''ends up in indetermination": 
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"We seem to 
find ourselves in a mood of negative assurance that is 
highly productive of critical discourse" (''Semiology" 137). 
Highly productive indeed; since deconstruction in a de 
Manian sense can be said both to constitute the text (as a 
system of rhetorical or thematic patterns) and likewise to 
predict the text's productive end (its assured 
indetermination), it becomes the ultimate critical discourse 
to which literature can be and should be submitted. De Man, 
in fact, makes a claim very much like this concerning the 
response of Proust's texts to the critical project of 
deconstructive reading: 
The whole of literature would respond in similar 
fashion, although the techniques and patterns would 
have to vary considerably, of course, from author to 
author. But there is absolutely no reason why analyses 
of the kind here suggested for Proust would not be 
applicable, with proper modifications of technique, to 
Milton or to Dante or to Holderlin. This in fact will 
be the task of literary criticism in the coming years. 
("Semiology" 138, my emphasis) 
For de Man, then, deconstruction is the critical project par 
excellence, the determination (as indetermination) which no 
text can escape. Of course, to reiterate, this determining 
of the whole of literature as simply unreadable make~ it 
possible to thematize deconstruction as a "new new 
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criticism," 11 a criticism which reveals the meaning of 
literature as/in its unreadability. And this unreadability, 
in turn, allows the reader "to see that failure lies in the 
nature of things" (Blindness 18). 
This is, however, not so for Derrida, who touches on 
the question of unreadability in his treatment of Blanchot's 
L'arr~t de mort: 
If reading means making accessible a meaning that can 
be transmitted as such, in its own unequivocal, 
translatable identity, then this title is unreadable. 
But this unreadability does not arrest reading, does 
not leave it paralyzed in the face of an opaque 
surface; rather. it starts reading and writing and 
translation moving again. The unreadable is not the 
opposite of the readable, but rather the ridge that 
also gives it momentum. movement, sets it in motion. 
("Living On" 116, my emphasis) 
For Derrida, the unreadable or the undecidable is not the 
revelation of a "failure [that] lies in the nature of 
things," as unreadability is for de Man; rather, for 
Derrida, the unreadable is the "place" where deconstruction 
11 In fact, de Man has no trouble thematizing his 
project in this way: "I don't have a bad conscience when 
I'm being told that, to the extent that it is didactic, my 
work is academic or even, as it is used as a supreme insult, 
it is just more New Criticism. I can live with that very 
easily, because I think that only what is, in a sense, 
classically didactic, can be really and effectively 
subversive" ("Interview" 306). 
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becomes most enabling, most aware of the need to displace 
the system which leads to such an impasse. For Derrida, 
undecidability is a condition of possibility for reading; 
reading's impossibility--the impossibility of totalizing 
reading, of self-identical meaning--makes it possible for 
reading to be set in motion in other ways, makes it possible 
for readers to ask questions other than the metaphysical 
question, what is it, what is its truth?12 Undecidability, 
for Derrida, is the undecidability of this question--what is 
it?--coupled with the imperative to ask different questions, 
to displace the force of this metaphysical question. De Man 
and many other deconstructionist literary critics do not, 
for the most part, see undecidability this way. For them, 
the impossibility of reading is the telos of deconstruction 
--it is what deconstructive readings seek to reveal. 13 It 
seems clear that this impossibility--if taken as a simple 
impossibility, as a "failure" or simple lack of possibility 
--can be seen as, in Derrida's words, the "unequivocal, 
translatable identity" of the text, of any text, for the 
12 For an excellent discussion of Derrida's relation to 
the Aristotlean question "what is it?," see Gasche's Tain, 
especially pages 79 and 283. 
13 The notion that indecision is the telos of 
deconstruction is consistently attributed to Derrida as well 
as to deconstructive criticism. See Jonathan Arac: "De Man 
and Derrida scrupulously, brilliantly, pointed out others' 
errors and incidentally suggested whole new dimensions of 
the texts they read. There they stopped, Derrida with a 
question and beyond that an impasse, de Man with a paradox 
that rescued him from arrogance" (Critical 100). 
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deconstructive critic. A reading which concludes on the 
simple impossibility of reading is, in fact, a totalized 
reading; in other words, the deconstructive critic 
definitively--or, one could say, decisively--continues to 
answer the totalizing question "what is it?" when he or she 
contends that the truth of the text lies in its 
undecidability. 
This move toward totalization in deconstructive 
literary criticism is not particularly surprising however, 
because literary criticism, as such, has always depended on 
a notion of decidability, of totalizing readability--even if 
the totality is thematized as absence, unreadability; the 
notion of decidability is necessary to isolate a text and 
then to produce a "reading" of it. Decidability, it seems, 
is a notion necessary for any literary criticism--even 
deconstructive literary criticism. For example, J. Hillis 
Miller writes in "The Critic as Host" (which was written for 
the famous "deconstructive manifesto'' Deconstruction and 
Cr i tic i sm) : 
"deconstruction," which is analytic criticism as such, 
encounters always, if it is carried far enough, some 
mode of oscillation. In this oscillation two genuine 
insights into literature in general and into a given 
text in particular inhibit, subvert, and undercut one 
another. This inhibition makes it impossible for 
either insight to function as a firm resting place, the 
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end point of analysis .... "undecidability" names the 
experience of a ceaseless dissatisfied movement in the 
relation of the critic to the text. 
The ultimate justification for this mode of 
criticism, as of any conceivable mode, is that it 
works. ( 252) 
Here we see Miller giving an account of deconstruction 
similar to de Man's: deconstruction is a method which, if 
taken far enough, reveals the self-cancellation of binary 
oppositions in a text. What this movement finally affirms 
is the text's fall into a ceaseless undecidability 
predetermined by its--for the most part unconscious--self-
subversion through its employment of figural language. This 
is, by now, familiar ground, but what is particularly 
interesting to me in Miller's notion here is his 
"justification" of deconstructive criticism; he writes that 
deconstructive criticism's justification, as the 
justification of any conceivable mode of criticism, is that 
it works. Miller here thematizes two contradictory modes or 
premises of deconstructive criticism: it must be 
"undecidable" as deconstruction; but, at the same time, it 
must "work" as literary criticism--it must decide 
for/in/about the text. 
The paradigms of literary criticism do indeed "work"; 
they throw themselves into the dialectical process which i~, 
which defines, work--work as movement toward decidability, 
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toward meaning, work that shows itself in literary criticism 
as the production of an interpretation of a text, a polished 
"reading" of a text, a decision about the meaning of a 
text.a As Miller writes in the same essay, 
"Deconstruction" is neither nihilism nor metaphysics 
but simply interpretation as such, the untangling of 
the inherence of metaphysics in nihilism and of 
nihilism in metaphysics by way of the close reading of 
texts. ( 230) 
For Miller, deconstruction is "simply interpretation as 
such"; it is part and parcel of the "untangling" work of 
traditional criticism. In short, deconstructive criticism 
here is explicitly tied to decidability, the work of--what 
works in--traditional literary criticism. According to 
Miller, the recognition of an interpretative undecidability 
is, then, the "work" of deconstructive criticism, what it 
reveals as a transhistorical principle in its readings. 
This notion of undecidability as a principle--as the meaning 
of texts, of all texts--is, as I have argued above, 
essentially the same as traditional criticism's 
14 Fish aptly summarizes this type of literary critical 
work when he writes, "theories always work and they will 
always produce exactly the results they predict .... Indeed, 
the trick would be to find a theory that didn't work" ·(Is 
There? 68). Deconstruction, I will argue, is precisely such 
a "theory." 
59 
transhistorical notions of meaning and/as decidability. 15 
Derridean deconstruction, though, always problematizes 
this decidability--though not in any simple, dialectical 
way; hence, a relation between Derridean deconstruction and 
literary criticism is not readily apparent--that is, a 
relation other than one in which literary criticism is a 
discipline to be deconstructed. Derrida writes: 
Deconstruction is not a critical operation. The 
critical is its object; the deconstruction always 
bears, at one mement [sic] or another, on the 
confidence invested in the critical or critico-
theoretical process, that is to say, in the act of 
decision, in the ultimate possibility of the decidable. 
("Ja, ou le faux bond," 103; trans. and cited in 
Culler, 247) 16 
15According to Miller, for example, texts deconstruct 
themselves, uniformly and without reference to--or 
differentiation among--historical circumstances: 
"logocentric metaphysics deconstitutes itself, according to 
a regular law which can be demonstrated in the self-
subversion of all the great texts of Western metaphysics 
from Plato onward" (228). Likewise for de Man, who actually 
mentions this point as the principal difference between 
Derrida and himself: "I would hold to that statement that 
'the text deconstructs itself, is self-deconstructive' 
rather than being deconstructed by a philosophical 
intervention" ("Interview" 307). Cf. David Carroll's 
critique of this notion in Paraesthetics: "This 
indeterminacy or undecidability of art must, in each 
instance, ... be argued anew and meticulously analyzed, rather 
than simply declared" (187, my emphasis). 
16cu11er, rather bafflingly, lets this quotation ,from 
Derrida stand virtually without comment--in a section 
entitled "Deconstructive Criticism." He does, though, gloss 
Derrida's quotation with the following from de Man: "'A 
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Derrida here argues that criticism--critique, the 
dialectical movement of affirmation, negation, and synthesis 
on the way to a totalized realization of truth--is the 
object of deconstruction, that-which-is-to-be-deconstructed. 
This notion of knowledge as critique can be read in the 
movement of the history of philosophy, with the great 
system-builders criticizing those before them and replacing 
the old systems with new and improved systems on the way to 
or in the name of synthesis, identity, and the realization 
of truth. But this movement of critique is also the 
movement of literary criticism, insofar as literary 
criticism is tied to a search for the meaning of texts, to 
the decidability of texts, to synthesis, to "transcendental 
reading, in that search for the signified" (Grammatology 
160). As Derrida writes in "The Double Session," "The 
critical desire--which is also the philosophical desire--can 
only, as such, attempt to regain ... lost mastery" 
(Dissemination 230) .11 
deconstruction,' writes de Man, 'always has for its target 
to reveal the existence of hidden articulations and 
fragmentations within assumedly monadic totalities'" (Culler 
247, my emphasis). When he uses de Man to gloss Derrida 
here, Culler sums up two of my arguments in a nutshell: 1) 
de Man "always" wishes to reveal a certain undecidability as 
the end of his project; and 2) the project of deconstructive 
criticism is consistently conflated with Derrida's--here in 
Culler's book, as it is in a great deal of secondary 
literature. 
17cf. earlier in "the Double Session" where Derrida 
argues that his "undecidables"--hymen, pharmakon, 
suppl~ment, etc.--"mark the spots of what can never be 
mastered, sublated, or dialectized" (Dissemination 221 ). 
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Arguing for the transhistorical principle of the 
undecidability of texts is deconstructive criticism's move 
to regain this lost mastery over texts, to re-empower 
literary criticism. In fact, a re-empowering of literary 
criticism is overtly mentioned by Geoffrey Hartman as one of 
the "shared set of problems" facing those writing in 
Deconstruction and Criticism. He writes in his Preface: 
These problems center on two issues that affect 
literary criticism today. One is the situation of 
criticism itself, what kind of maturer function it may 
claim--a function beyond the obviously academic or 
pedagogical. While teaching, criticizing, and 
presenting the great texts of our culture are essential 
tasks, to insist on the importance of literature should 
not entail assigning to literary criticism only a 
service function. Criticism is part of the world of 
letters, and has its own mixed philosophical and 
literary, reflective and figural strength. (vii) 
Hartman here seems to begin with an interesting notion of a 
possible "function beyond the obviously academic or 
pedagogical" (perhaps a function beyond the 
"professionalism" that I discuss above) for criticism, but 
ends up simply wanting to have criticism recognized for its 
"figural strength"--the strength it gains from its 
recognition of and use of a privileged figural langua~e-­
within "the world of letters." Again, this seems to leave 
the door open for deconstruction to be read as a 
traditional--even traditionalist18 --thematized reading 
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method, one which assigns and removes mastery from texts by 
the single criterion of their employment of figurative 
language. But it seems to me that if there is to be a 
relation between deconstruction and literary criticism, if 
deconstruction is to be "useful" at all to literary 
criticism, if there is a "lesson to be learned" from 
deconstruction, it is that literary criticism must face up 
to the questions posed by deconstruction: it must do 
something other than provide a method to produce thematized 
readings--to reassert mastery over texts--which, 
unfortunately, is what most of the deconstructionist critics 
in America have done with Derrida's texts. 
Undecidability, Structure, Institution 
"Yale" deconstructive criticism has, from its inception 
in America, certainly been characterized by its proponents 
as a sort of criticism which does something other than 
provide such thematized readings; as I argue above, it fails 
because it finds the same rock-bottom simple undecidability 
18 For example, Hartman's notion that "teaching, 
criticizing, and presenting the great texts of our culture 
are essential tasks" is debatable on many fronts: who is 
the "we" implied by "our culture"; to whom are these tasks 
"essential"; what are (the stakes of assigning the status 
of) "great texts"? In the end, it seems that all of this 
quite clearly reinforces a notion of criticism as simply and 
"obviously academic and pedagogical." 
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in all texts as the nature of literature. For the 
deconstructionist critic, undecidability is a function of, 
is grounded in, the irreducibly rich signification of 
literary language; Hartman writes that all deconstructors 
are interested in "figurative language, its excesses over an 
assigned meaning" (vii). The undecidability of a text is 
the product of the figural, metaphoric language always at 
play within the text's attempted constitution of scientific, 
objectified truth. As Miller writes, "Deconstruction is an 
investigation o~ what is implied by this inherence in one 
another of figure, concept, and narrative" (223). In other 
words, because figurative language, which is irreducibly 
rich in significance or signification, is part of the 
constitution of--part of the ground for--the notions of 
concept and narrative, these notions cannot be made 
univocally significant: for Miller, the "concept" 
literature and the specific text's "narrative" remain 
undecidable because of the inherence of "figure"--figurative 
language--within their make-up. Thus, the ground of 
deconstructive literary criticism's notion of undecidability 
is specifically the undecidability of figurative 
1anguage. 19 
19cf. Mi 11 er' s "The Search for Grounds in Literary 
Study," in which he states that a double emphasis on the 
tropological and narrative (taken together, figural) nature 
of language in a story is both "the underlying logos or 
Grund and at the same time [that which] interrupts or 
deconstructs that story--this double emphasis tends to break 
down generic distinctions and to recognize, for example, the 
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This realization of the figural or metaphoric nature of 
all language is generally taken to be something that 
deconstructive criticism has lifted right out of Derrida, as 
an important component of his work. As Norris writes about 
Derrida's work, "deconstruction finds its rock-bottom sense 
[in] the irreducibility of metaphor, the differance at play 
within the very constitution of 'literal' meaning" (66). 
Here Norris characterizes a turn to the irreducible richness 
of metaphorical or figurative language (against the 
univocality of literal language, against philosophy) as the 
thrust of Derrida's work, especially in his famous text on 
metaphor, "White Mythology." This, again, is not the case 
in Derrida's work; he writes, against those who take "White 
Mythology" to be a text about the privilege of metaphor over 
metonomy, 
the whole of "White Mythology" constantly puts into 
question the current and currently philosophical 
interpretation of metaphor as a transfer from the 
sensible to the intelligible, as well as the privilege 
accorded this trope in the deconstructi0n of 
metaphysical rhetoric. ("Retrait" 13) 
For Derrida, metaphor is not a trope which can have a 
privileged place in the disrupting or deconstruction of 
metaphysical rhetoric because it is part and parcel of this 
fundamental role of tropes in novels" (Rhetoric and Form 
34). 
rhetoric, a ground-concept of metaphysics. He writes in 
"White Mythology, 0 
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Above all, the movement of metaphorization (origin and 
then erasure of the metaphor, transition from the 
proper sensory meaning to the proper spiritual meaning 
by means of the detour of figures) is nothing other 
than the movement of idealization .... Each time a 
philosophy defines a metaphor it implies not only a 
philosophy but a conceptual network in which philosophy 
itself has been constituted. (Margins 226, 230) 
For Derrida, a turn to metaphor, an affirmation of figural 
or metaphoric language, is a metaphysical move par 
excellence; the concept of metaphor--the sensible standing 
in for the intelligible by means of tropes--is the movement 
of metaphysics, of idealization, so it could hardly function 
as the ground for a concept of undecidability which could in 
some way disrupt this movement. 
Undecidability, for Derrida, has nothing to do with the 
semantic, metaphorical richness of figural language; he 
writes, in his discussion of the undecidability of hymen in 
Mallarm~, "'Undecidability' is not caused here by some 
enigmatic equivocality, some inexhaustible ambivalence of a 
word in a 'natural' language" (Dissemination 220). It is 
not the richness of figural language which brings 
undecidability about for Derrida, but the structure of the 
field itself--a field which engenders undecidability as a 
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symptom of the closure of a certain totalizing way of 
thinking, of the need for the displacement of such a system. 
He writes, 
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not 
because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered 
by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but becausa 
the nature of the field ... excludes totalization. 
(Writing and Difference 289, my emphasis) 
For Derrida, it is the nature or structure of the field--of 
systematicity or metaphoricity in genera1 20--rather than 
some sort of inherent ambiguity in a certain tropic use of 
figural language which is the ground of undecidability. 
According to Derrida, the nature of the field--a field 
which, he emphasizes, is made up of both discursive and non-
discursive forces--inscribes difference within the heart of 
identity. 
This can best be explained, I think, in terms of 
Derrida's interest in Saussurian linguistics, wherein the 
systematicity of language is accounted for solely in terms 
of "differences without positive terms" (Course 120); for 
Derrida, undecidability is a consequence of the functioning 
20 structure cannot be thought here as origin, ground, 
or limit; as Derrida writes, "Here structure means the 
irreducible complexity within which one can only shape or 
shift the play of presence or absence: that within which 
metaphysics can be produced but which metaphysics cannot 
think'' (Grammatology 167, my emphasis). This discussion is 
very much indebted to Gasche's discussion of structure and 
systematicity in Tain (especially 143 ff.). 
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of the general system, a system which is grounded in 
difference rather than identity, a system which cannot purge 
the difference--the non-presence--which is part of its very 
structure. As Gasche writes, 
[For Derrida,] since concepts are produced within a 
discursive network of differences, they not only are 
what they are by virtue of other concepts, but they 
also, in a fundamental way, inscribe that Otherness 
within themselves. (Tain 128, my emphasis) 
Undecidability is brought about because of this irreducible 
otherness which is inscribed in each concept--because of its 
necessary inclusion in a systematicity which forces the 
concept to constitute itself in/by relation to a chain of 
other terms. One term cannot function as a master term--
rule the system from without--because it is configured in 
and it functions within a system always already in place. 
There is no pure, positive term constituted (from) without a 
system. The upshot of all this for deconstructive 
criticism's reading of undecidability, then, is that for 
Derrida this undecidability cannot be a "positive" 
consequence of the richness or ambiguity of figural language 
for the same reason that a signified cannot be a "positive" 
consequence of a signifier for Saussure: systematicity 
excludes the possibility21 of a positive master term ruling 
21 As a kind of ground, it also engenders this 
possibility, making Derrida's notion of ground quasi-
transcendental, giving simultaneously conditions of 
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within a field. Hence, the inability to totalize--the 
undecidability--that Derrida speaks of is not the "positive" 
consequence of a certain sort of tropic language use: 
rather, it is conditioned by the nature of the system: it 
is due to the always already fact of systematicity at work 
in the very constitution of supposedly pure, "origin-al" 
concepts, concepts that wish to rule the chain, assure its 
decidability--concepts such as deconstructive criticism's 
transcategorial, transhistorical notion of simple 
undecidability. In short, a systematic rather than figural 
or rhetorical notion of "undecidability" separates Derrida 
from deconstructive criticism. 
But perhaps I paint here an overly deconstructive 
picture of Saussure's systematic linguistics. An emphasis 
on systematicity is certainly no unproblematic buffer 
against decidability. Saussure, in fact, never quite goes 
as far as to allow the end-less chain of substitutions that 
would necessarily accompany a linguistics in which the 
signified was impure--tainted to the point of being "just" 
another signifier. As Derrida points out, Saussure has 
several mechanisms built into his linguistics which 
precisely allow decidability and maintain the sovereignty of 
the signified--most notable among them is the voice, 
Saussure's insistence on the properly spoken character of 
possibility and impossibility. Cf. Dissemination p. 166-68 
and Tain pp. 316-18. See the more detailed discussion of 
ground in Chapter 4. 
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language. 22 As Samuel Weber notes, in order to protect 
meaning, "What Saussure does is simply to replace the notion 
of 'pure difference' with that of 'opposition' in order then 
to derive the structure of what he calls the 'totality of 
the sign.'" (Institution 146). On the level of system, 
then, Saussure protects meaning by introducing "opposition" 
(and hence dialectical sublation) into a system that would 
otherwise be characterized by "pure difference," a move 
which Derrida analyzes in terms of the opposition 
speech/writing. 23 But, as Weber points out, there is 
another way that Saussure arrests the chain of 
significations and assures meaning--through the very work of 
the discipline of linguistics: 
this 'totality' [of the sign] is, in turn, the product 
of what in a strange and revealing equivocation he 
calls the 'linguistic institution,' whose task is 'to 
maintain the parallelism between these two orders of 
difference,' that is, between signifier and signified. 
The equivocation of the term 'linguistic,' which can 
refer here to either language or to linguistics, is 
revealing inasmuch as it suggests that the 
22 saussure writes, "Language and writing are two 
distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole 
purpose of representing the first" (23); of course, language 
for Saussure is not simply equal to speech, but speech is 
language's proper articulation (see Chapter 3, "The Object 
of Linguistics"). 
23see "Linguistics and Grammatology" (27-65) in 
Grammatologx. 
70 
establishment and maintenance of the object of a 
discipline--language as a system--is a task that only 
the discipline itself, qua institution--that is, 
linguistics--can perform. (Institution 146) 
Weber here points out that Saussure guarantees meaning not 
only through the protection afforded the system of language 
by the signified, but through the protection afforded the 
entire enterprise of language study by the 
institutionalization of its discipline. Here "linguistic 
institution" is both the institution (establishment, 
organization) of meaning through the system of language and 
the protection of this entire apparatus of meaning through 
the institution (institutionalization) of the discourse 
known as linguistics. 
Weber, as I noted above, is somewhat critical of 
deconstruction's lack of attention to such matters; he 
argues that Derrida's focus on "the conditions of 
possibility and impossibility of systematic thought ... has 
tended to downplay the forces and factors that always 
operate to institute and to maintain certain sets of 
paradigms" (19). Weber, it seems, would criticize Derrida 
for deconstructing only the ''systematic" aspect of 
Saussure's thought, and not its inevitable--and perhaps more 
sinister and pervasive--institutional manifestations. 24 
24 one could also note here that Saussure's lingui~tics 
is the paradigmatic "science" for structuralism, certainly 
the most powerful cross-disciplinary institutional movement 
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This is, as I suggest from the beginning of this study, a 
point well taken-~one which I have already touched upon and 
which I will examine at some length in the following 
chapters. However, it is interesting to note here, as I 
have noted above, that Weber's argument against the single-
mindedly systematic nature of deconstruction depends quite 
heavily on what could be called the systematic terms and 
strategies of deconstruction. Weber's argument concerning 
the functioning of institutions, for example, follows quite 
closely the argument I have been making for the prominence 
of the inscription of otherness in Derrida's "systematic'' 
writings. In fact, Wlad Godzich paraphrases Weber's 
argument in strikingly similar terms; he writes, ''In its 
day-to-day functioning, the institution manages to ignore 
this constitutive otherness within itself, and yet it cannot 
forget it since it stands as its foundational moment" (157). 
As I note in Chapter 1, Weber argues throughout his analyses 
that disciplines can only do their work it they forget that 
they are founded on exclusion--that a (groundless) exclusion 
defines the very field of a discipline, and if this 
exclusion were taken into account, it would inexorably 
disrupt the smooth functioning of the institutional 
apparatus. It should be noted, however, that this is 
precisely the logic that a ''systematic" deconstruction 
follows--is precisely Derrida's analysis of the work qf 
of this century. 
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metaphysics. Following Weber, I likewise have argued that 
the only way deconstruction can become criticism--can be 
institutionalized as/in a method--is through forgetting this 
"foundational moment" of alterity, though this foundational 
moment is, strictly speaking, neither a foundation nor a 
moment. It is through a discussion of this (non)founding 
"moment" of otherness that I hope to develop the question of 
the postmodern--how to think and act without a determinate/ 
determining foundation--but I digress here to re-emphasize 
that, from the "start," this will have been an institutional 
as well as a systematic question. From here, I would like 
to move on to discuss Foucault and the problem of 
institutionalization--both his work on institutionalization 
(especially insofar as it can be brought to bear on 
deconstruction) and the institutionalization of his work 
(especially insofar as it mirrors and comments on the 
commodification of deconstruction). 
CHAPTER 3 
EXTERIORITY AND APPROPRIATION: 
FOUCAULT, DERRIDA, AND THE DISCIPLINE OF LITERARY CRITICISM 
In the past decade, Michel Foucault's thought has been 
gaining increasing currency in literature departments in the 
United States. If one were to plot schematically the rise 
and fall of theories in literature departments, one could 
rather easily tie the rise of Foucault's genealogical 
discourse to the fall of another contemporary French 
discourse, Derrida's deconstruction; in fact, Foucault's 
thought first comes on the American literary critical scene 
thematized as a socially and institutionally engaged 
alternative to what many politically oriented critics saw as 
the paralyzing textualism of Derrida and his disciples at 
Yale. Raman Selden gives a representative account of the 
debate in A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory: 
There is another strand in post-structuralist thought 
which believes the world is more than a galaxy of 
texts, and that some theories of textuality ignore the 
fact that discourse is involved in power .... [For 
Foucault] it is evident that real power is exercised 
through discourse, and that this power has real 
effects. (98) 
73 
74 
Thus, Foucault is brought to bear on deconstruction in order 
to re-orient literary criticism to the real world, to the 
workings of "real power" in discourse and history. In fact, 
a whole school of criticism has sprouted up around 
Foucault's texts, "new historicism," which takes from a 
reading of Foucault its ground notion that "discourse is 
like everything else in our society: the object of a 
struggle for power" (Harari 43). 
In this chapter, I would like to take issue with the 
terms of this debate--specifically with the notion that 
Foucault is somehow a champion of historical praxis over 
Derrida's purely textual theoria. But I would like to do so 
not in order presumptuously to expose misreadings of either 
Foucault or Derrida in the service of a better understanding 
of their relationship to literary criticism, but, rather, in 
order to say some things about the discipline of literary 
criticism itself. In other words, I am interested less in 
exposing supposed "misreadings" of either thinker's work 
within this second-hand debate than I am in examining the 
institutional and disciplinary imperatives which make these 
misreadings possible--in fact, I will argue that a certain 
economy of misreading is even necessary if literary 
criticism is to "use'' either Foucault or Derrida at all. 
And attempt to use them it does. The discipline of 
literary criticism is hungry for paradigms--hungry for new 
readings and new methods. The theory explosion of the 
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1970's brought with it an entire "theory industry" within 
and around literature departments; the backbone of this 
industry is the theoretical guidebook: there are evaluative 
studies like the aforementioned Reader's Guide, Terry 
Eagleton's Literary Theory: An Introduction, much of 
Jonathan Culler's early work, or Frank Lentricchia's After 
The New Criticism; and there are essay collections, like 
Donald Keesey's Contexts For Criticism, Josue Harari's 
Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Poststructuralist 
Criticism or H. Aram Veeser's The New Historicism. Books 
such as these are a major source of "theory" for many 
literary critics, and they present to the profession various 
methods or strategies for reading texts, for producing 
critical analyses. 1 As Harari writes in his hugely 
successful collection Textual Strategies, "method has become 
a strategy" (72), and for Harari, the future of literary 
criticism is to be a struggle among these critical 
strategies, these truth-strategies: 
I have presented the various critical struggles at play 
among contemporary theorists. It remains to inscribe 
these strategies in a more global framework, to put 
them in the ring of criticism as it were, and to 
determine how the rounds are to be scored. (69) 
1These types of books are, of course, especially 
prevalent--and, I hasten to add, important--for introductory 
courses in graduate curricula, where the traditional 
"Bibliography and Methods" course is quickly metamorphosing 
into a theory course. 
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Harari here invokes a perhaps all-too-familiar picture of 
the literature department--indeed of "pluralistic" society 
on the whole--as engaged in a violent struggle for the 
truth, for truth as strategic "victory," for truth as 
appropriation. 2 Such a conception, unfortunately, seems to 
replicate rather than displace the violent will-to-truth 
which is in question in many of the theoretical discussions 
he presents. Also, Harari's notion of truth as critical 
struggle rather problematically recuperates thinking such as 
Foucault's or Derrida's within an institution--it names and 
preserves the interior, protected space of the university as 
the nexus of discourse's truth, the ''ring" where various 
truth strategies will be tested and a winner declared. 
The notion of a "ring of criticism" is particularly apt 
here because the space of interiority suggested by the image 
of a ring is precisely what literary criticism has to secure 
for itself in order to isolate its object and to perform its 
work. If a truth about a text is to be revealed and 
preserved in criticism, then there must be a protected 
interior space where this truth can lie: the structure of 
2In fact, Harari gleefully celebrates criticism as 
violent appropriation: "all criticism is strategic. To the 
question: how should the critic approach knowledge? I know 
of only one answer: strategically, The power and 
productivity, the gains and losses, the advances and 
retrenchments of criticism are inscribed in this term: 
strategy, reminding us of its obsolete--obsolete?--
definition: 'A violent and bloody act.' In the game.of 
knowledge, method has become a strategy: the 'violent and 
bloody' agent by which criticism executes the work and in so 
doing, paradoxically, canonizes it" (72, his emphasis). 
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the work, the biography of the author and its relation to 
his or her other works, the relation of the work to its 
historical circumstances, and so on. But any such notion of 
interiority--a place protected from the play of a larger 
network, a place where meaning can rest unmolested--is 
precisely one of the things in question in many of these 
"critical strategies," in thinking like Foucault's or 
Derrida's. 3 For example, in "What is an Author?," an essay 
anthologized (I am tempted to say canonized) in Harari's 
collection, Foucault calls for a writing about literature 
which is not based on the accepted interior unities of the 
author or the book; rather, he speaks of the possibility of 
a topology of discourse based on statements, positivities 
which "cannot be constructed solely from the grammatical 
features, formal structures, and objects of discourse" 
(157). Statements cannot be expected, contra Harari's hope, 
to stay in one place and fight it out in the ring of 
criticism because, as Gilles Deleuze notes, "each statement 
is itself a multiplicity, not a structure or a system" (6)--
3Foucault and Derrida do, of course, perform "readings" 
of texts, philosophical and literary, but their readings are 
different from the majority of literary critical 
thematizations because of a certain exterior or reflexive 
moment in their readings: crudely put, there is the 
genealogical moment in Foucault, where the will to truth 
puts itself in question; and for Derrida, there is the 
second move of the double reading, which is a displacement 
and reinscription of the opposition uncovered in the first 
reading. Literary criticism attempts to reproduce these 
reflexive moments, but generally preserves an interiority of 
meaning through a valorization of the reflexivity itself as 
the meaning of all reading, all texts. 
each statement is exterior, diffused, overflowing the 
totality of interiority. 
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It is precisely here, with the exteriority of the 
statement, that Foucault poses his most dangerous question 
to literary criticism; he writes in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge: "Language, in its appearance as a mode of being, 
is the statement [l'enonce]: as such, it belongs to a 
description that is neither transcendental nor 
anthropological" (113/148). 4 He goes on to explain: 
... the analysis of statements treats them in the 
systematic form of exteriority. Usually, the 
historical description of things said is shot through 
with [tout entiere traversee par] the opposition of 
interior and exterior; and wholly directed by [tout 
entiere commandee par] a move from the exterior--which 
may be no more than contingency or mere material 
necessity, a visible body or uncertain translation--
towards the essential nucleus of interiority. 
(Archaeology 120-21/158-59) 
This formulation of the "historical description of things 
said" also holds, I think, for the literary critical 
description of things said: literary criticism moves from 
the exterior (the other, the untranslatable, the 
unthematized) to the interior (the same, the translation, 
the theme). Foucault challenges the (possibility of such a) 
4r continue to cite translation page numbers first. 
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totalizing impulse in the human sciences, and outlines a 
thinking whose task is "to describe a group of statements 
not with reference to the interiority of an intention, a 
thought, or a subject, but in accordance with the dispersion 
of an exteriority" (Archaeology 125/164). 
Notions such as dispersion and exteriority pose serious 
problems for literary criticism, whose traditional field 
enables it to explain what is inside a text by putting to 
work certain notions from outside a text, from a constructed 
place of critical privilege such as the author, reader, 
structure, or historical circumstances of the text. 
Paradoxically then, in the literary critical model, 
"outside" the text becomes another name not for an 
exteriority which would disperse the text's meanings, but 
rather for another--perhaps more pernicious--interiority 
which could protect and preserve the text's meanings; in 
other words, for criticism, the "outside" of the text is 
simply another name for an interior space--a space which can 
maintain its purity because it is beyond the play of the 
textual network. For example, in "What is an Author?" 
Foucault takes up the problem of the text's relation to the 
author--"the manner in which the text points to this 
'figure' that, at least in appearance, is outside it and 
antecedes it" (141)--and argues that the author is one such 
privileged space of interiority that is outside the text: 
[The author] is a certain functional principle by 
which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and 
chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free 
circulation, the free manipulation, the free 
composition, decomposition, and recomposition of 
fiction. (159) 
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Foucault here points out that criticism employs the notion 
of the author to preserve a space of meaning, an interiority 
which can arrest the exterior hazards of signification. But 
it is problematic--if not impossible--to locate and maintain 
such spaces of interiority because, as Foucault notes, 
the margins of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the 
title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond 
its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it 
is caught up in a system of references [un systeme de 
renvois] to other books, other texts, other sentences: 
it is a node within a network. (Archaeology 23/34, 
translation slightly modified) 
For Foucault, the book exists in an exterior network of 
statements where the interiority of totality is always 
dispersed; hence, there is no protected interior space 
within this network which could rule the entire network. 
Likewise, there is no place above or below the surface of 
discourse--no "outside," no pure interior space beyond the 
reach of the exterior network's effects--which could explain 
discourse, which could force discourse to render up a" secret 
truth. This is what he calls the flattening of discourse: 
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all discourse is on a flat surface; therefore no instance of 
discourse can claim to rule from outside--above, below, or 
from a protected interior space upon--the surface, can 
explain or ground the entire chain nor preserve an instance 
of determinate meaning within the network. He writes, 
"There is no sub-text [Il n'y a pas de texte d'en dessous]. 
And therefore no plethora. The enunciative level is 
identical with its own surface" (Archaeology 119/157). 
At this point, we may have to circle back to where we 
started this chapter, with literary criticism's recent 
romancing of Foucault at the expense of Derrida--to Raman 
Selden, who goes on to write in his Reader's Guide: "Like 
other post-structuralists, Foucault regards discourse as a 
central human activity, but not as a universal, 'general 
text,' a vast sea of signification" (98). This would seem 
to be the party line on the huge difference between 
Foucault's thought and Derrida's: Foucault's thought is 
interested in active power and history, Derrida's in passive 
thought and textuality. 5 But I would like to step back and 
5Foucault is, of course, more than partially 
responsible for this thematization of his thought vis-a-vis 
Derrida's, but I am not considering in this essay his rather 
vitriolic--and, it seems to me, unfair--response to Derrida 
in "My Body, This Paper, This Fire." This may seem like an 
outrageous avoidance on my part, but I justify it on two 
counts: 1) Foucault's text consists almost entirely of a 
point-by-point refutation of Derrida's reading of Descartes 
on the dreamer and the madman, something which does not 
directly concern me here (Foucault's infamous remarks " 
concerning the metaphysical and pedagogical danger of "there 
is nothing outside the text" are dealt with below); 2) 
Foucault himself later criticizes Historie de la folie, as I 
try to read Derrida and Foucault together. Strangely 
enough, I would like to read them together at the point 
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where they seem farthest apart, at that "place" in Derrida's 
text that a whole host of his critics (including Foucault) 
have pointed to as the metaphysical Achilles' heel of 
deconstruction: Derrida's notion of "general text," which 
Selden glosses above as a totalizing "universal" that denies 
the world and history in favor of a "vast sea of 
signification."6 
As I argue above, with his notion of general text 
Derrida is not attempting to cast the text and the world in 
what Foucault calls "the gray light of neutralization" 
("Author?" 145), but rather to complicate notions of 
exterior and interior--not attempting "to extend the 
reassuring notion of the text to a whole extra-textual realm 
and to transform the world into a library by doing away with 
all boundaries, all framework, all sharp edges," but rather 
also outline below, for its naive notions of the 
metaphysical "experience" of madness--a criticism which, to 
a great extent, actually agrees with Derrida's: "everything 
[in Historie de la folie] transpires as if Foucault knew 
what 'madness' means. Everything transpires as if, in a 
continuous and underlying way, an assured and rigorous 
precomprehension of the concept of madness, or at least of 
its normal definition, were possible and acquired" ("Cogito" 
41). For an excellent discussion of the conflict, see Geoff 
Bennington's "Cogito Incognito," a brief but insightful 
introduction to his translation of Foucault's essay. 
6The secondary sources for such a reading of Derrida 
are too numerous to mention--it has become critical 
commonplace; so, instead, let me cite a book concerning 
Derrida and criticism that doesn't contain such a reading of 
general text: Gasche's The Tain of the Mirror. 
83 
"to work out the theoretical and practical system of these 
margins, these borders, once more, from the ground up" 
("Living On" 84). Derrida's notion of text, then, seems to 
have at least this much in common with Foucault's notion of 
the exteriority of a network of statements: both notions 
posit a discursive field or network in which no term can 
rule from a privileged place of interiority; 7 and both 
share what Foucault calls a "limit-attitude" 
("Enlightenment?" 45), an interest in re-working thought's 
borders in the wake of the Enlightenment. 
But it is at this limit that the dominant literary 
critical-political reading of. Foucault triumphs over 
Derrida; Foucault, given this reading, is interested in 
"reference and reality," with the "world of institutions and 
action" CArac "To Regress" 250, 243), 8 while Derrida 
reinscribes everything within the rigid limit of the prison 
7rn fact, one could gloss Derrida on the undecidability 
of text by quoting Foucault on the network of statements: 
"there is no statement in general, no free, independent 
statement; but a statement always belongs to a series or a 
whole, always plays a role among other statements, deriving 
support from them and distinguishing itself from them: it 
is always part of a network of statements" (Archaeology 99). 
8Arac's "To Regress·From the Rigor of Shelley," a 
review of Harari's Textual Strategies and Deconstruction and 
Criticism, champions the essays in the Harari collection 
which have an overt historical or political agenda, but does 
not question the institutional imperatives which might give 
rise to such collections; he seems, on the contrary, to 
toast these imperatives. He writes, building on an image 
from Shelley: "The 1970's have experienced critical 
fermentation, following the notable effervescence that began 
the decade" (242). 
house of language. Again, I think this is an inadequate 
reading of both thinkers. Derrida sums up the relation 
between text and limit or context like this: 
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I set down here as an axiom and as that which is to be 
proved that the reconstitution cannot be finished. 
This is my starting point: no meaning can be 
determined out of context, but no context permits 
saturation. What I am referring to here is not 
richness of substance, semantic fertility, but rather 
structure: the structure of the remnant or of 
iteration ("Living On" 81); 
while Foucault writes, 
A statement always has borders [marges] peopled by 
other statements. These borders are not what is 
usually meant by 'context'--real or verbal--that is, 
all the situational or linguistic elements, taken 
together, that motivate a formulation and determine its 
meaning. They are distinct from such a 'context' 
precisely in so far as they make it possible 
(Archaeology 97-8/128-29). 
Here again it seems that we see Foucault and Derrida in 
general agreement against traditional and critical notions 
of context: one cannot appeal to (historical or extra-
textual) context to rein in the significations of a 
statement or a text; a space of interior privilege ca~not be 
maintained ''outside the text." In fact, both Derrida and 
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Foucault seem to agree that context cannot rule text--a 
place of interiority cannot be maintained in an exterior 
field--precisely because context is not really "outside" the 
text at all. Quite the contrary: both text and context are 
engendered or made possible in the same field, under the 
same conditions--for Foucault this field is the "flat" 
network of statements, for Derrida it is the "structure of 
the remnant or of iteration." 9 Both notions serve to make 
it impossible for literary criticism to preserve a space of 
interiority by which it could construct a critical system--a 
saturated critical context above, below, or outside the 
text--to reveal and protect meaning. 
This, it seems to me, is precisely why many literary 
critics simply have to read Derrida and Foucault as they do 
--Derrida as the last in a transcendentalist philosophical 
line and Foucault as the last in a materialist historicist 
line, as the founders of a "textual" deconstructive 
criticism and a "worldly" new historicism. Such readings 
are necessary if literary criticism is to continue as an 
autonomous discipline, because if literary criticism accepts 
a notion of exteriority, it not only has to face the problem 
of doing something other than revealing a meaning in the 
9cf. Carolyn Porter's "After the New Historicism," in 
which she tries similarly to read Derrida and Foucault 
together: "to say that there nothing outside the text 
because there is no transcendental signified is precisely to 
cancel depth in order to foreground a signifying process 
which operates in and constitutes a horizonless plane" 
( 266). 
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text, it has the much more pervasive problem of actually 
isolating its object, of separating inside- from outside-
text, texte from hors-texte. Again we see the institutional 
imperative for literary critics to read Derrida's famous 
phrase "il n'y a pas de hors-texte" as "there is nothing 
outside of the text": if everything can be found within 
texts or textuality, and critics read texts for a living, 
then obviously the place or role of criticism is secured. 
However, if one translates this phrase as "there is no 
extra-text [literally, out-text]," it brings out a much 
different reading: a network of exteriority (here named 
''text") is given--has no determinable origin or telos--and 
no one term or discourse can claim privilege over another 
within this field; no space can be protected from the play 
of the network. Obviously, while the latter reading is 
positively disastrous for literary criticism's project, the 
former interpretation allows a continued central role for 
criticism: as I argue above, it allows critics to produce a 
deconstructive methodology and apply it to the whole of 
their field--revealing that, indeed, there is a nothing 
outside the determinate text precisely by applying a 
deconstructive methodology from this ultra-privileged site 
of the outside. 
This easy methodologizing is one of Foucault's central 
critiques of Derrida's thought; Foucault argues that certain 
notions of the intransitivity of literature, extracted from 
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the work of Barthes and Blanchet, "are quickly taken up in 
the interior of an institution ... : the institution of the 
university" (Foucault Live ~14). But, as we have seen, it 
is only given a certain (rather suspect) reading of 
Derrida's thought that it can be taken up for such 
institutional imperatives--and, as is becoming clear in the 
movement or methodology called new historicism, Foucault's 
is no less prone to hypostasization. One might profitably 
object here that Foucault's work has no essential relation 
to new historicism--as we have seen Gasche argue concerning 
Derrida's relation to deconstructive criticism--but there is 
no denying the perceived influence of Foucault's work on new 
historicism, both in the texts of new historicists and 
critics of new historicism alike. Foucault's perceived link 
to new historicism is so strong, for example, that Frank 
Lentricchia's essay in The New Historicism, "Foucault's 
Legacy: A New Historicism?," does not quote one word of 
Foucault's text; granted, the original printing of 
Lentricchia's essay places it after his long and involved 
discussion of Foucault in Ariel and the Police, but when 
Lentricchia turns specifically to discuss new historicism, 
he mentions Stephen Greenblatt throughout in the same breath 
as Foucault, reinforcing the widespread belief that new 
historicism is simply a translation of Foucault--that 
because "Foucault's key obsessions and terms shape 
Greenblatt's argument" (242n), the relation between 
Foucault's texts and new historicism is an unproblematic 
one. 10 This claim, in fact, could be said to comprise the 
"dominant'' reading of new historicism--it supposedly takes 
directly from Foucault its ground notion, its "key 
obsession": a discontinuous power that moves through 
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everything. For example, Carolyn Porter reads Greenblatt's 
assertion that "theatricality ... is not set over against 
power but is one of its essential modes" as a translation of 
Foucault's claim that power "induces pleasure, forms 
knowledge, produces discourse" (262). In a crowning irony, 
one can now find Foucault being referred to as a 
practitioner of Berkeley new historicism, 11 just as Derrida 
was or is thought of as a Yale critic. 
Insofar as Foucault (infamously) criticizes Derrida's 
thinking as "a historically well-determined little pedagogy" 
("My Body" 27), all of this institutional attention creates 
10 rt should be noted that Greenblatt is scarcely 
responsible for such a reading; in fact, Greenblatt 
stubbornly refuses to offer a methodologization of Foucault 
--he cites Foucault quite sparsely, only twice in 
Shakespearean Negotiations--and refuses to offer a ready-
made method for his own project, defining cultural poetics 
rather open-endedly as the "study of the collective making 
of distinct cultural practices and inquiry into the 
relations among these practices" (5). Likewise, Greenblatt 
stresses the institutional focus of cultural poetics, 
especially in essays like "Shakespeare and the Exorcists." 
11 see Richard Lehan's "The Theoretical Limits of New 
Historicism," where, citing Hayden White, he attacks "the 
logic of new historicism, at least as practiced by Foucault" 
(540). Lehan goes on to name Foucault's thinking the~ 
dominant component of "a theory that has now fashionably 
emerged as the representation school" (540). 
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something of a problem for him, though it seems fairly easy 
to locate the beginning of a Foucaultian response to his own 
methodization: power produces, an institutional discipline 
produces, and it consistently needs new processes by which 
to produce new objects of study or new thematizations; in 
short, a discipline like literary criticism needs 
determinate--and determinin.g--methodologies. New 
historicism, then, takes Foucault's exterior notions of 
power and discontinuity in historical analysis and turns 
them into usable, interior, ontological notions: new 
historicism often analyzes texts by studying the slippery 
relations of power in texts and in history. This 
historicism is "new" in that it takes into account the 
discontinuity of history, but it can quickly become ''old" 
again when it takes up a notion of discontinuity as a 
simple, declarable discontinuity: studies are produced 
which tell us that while we used to think history was 
continuous, it was in fact discontinuous. For example, in 
Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance (Volume 13 of 
Greenblatt's New Historicism series), Debora K. Shuger takes 
up "[t]he new historicist critique of traditional 
formulations of Renaissance thought" (1 ); she writes: 
Investigation of these habits of thought in the 
dominant culture of the English Renaissance yields 
surprising results. Despite their general agreement on 
doctrinal matters, the figures studied present an 
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unexpected and sometimes drastic ideological pluralism. 
Instead of a monologic world view, one uncovers complex 
and divergent assumptions .... The [Renaissance] impulse 
to define and distinguish ... results from a prior sense 
of confusion and lack of demarcation. (9-10, my 
emphases) 
For Shuger, new historicism uncovers the "complex and 
divergent assumptions" which underlie a supposedly or 
traditionally "monologic world view"; in fact, she seems to 
argue that behind any historical or intellectual order(ing) 
there is a prior sense of confusion and lack of 
demarcation." She concludes her introduction with what 
seems to be an apt formulation of the new historicist 
critique: "Renaissance works noticeably lack a systematic 
coherence, their discontinuities instead exposing the 
struggle for meaning that fissures the last premodern 
generation" (16, my emphasis). 
If this is the case, then the place or value of 
Foucault in new historicism is his discovery or exposure of 
the disorder which lies under or behind the supposed order 
of history--that behind what seems to be a historical 
continuity, one can always and everywhere find or uncover 
discontinuity. However, we have already seen Foucault 
problematizing this language of depth and his skepticism 
about "exposing'' hidden origins (whether they be origins of 
order or disorder); likewise, such a reading of Foucault 
precisely allows the easy methodological 
institutionalization which he criticizes Derrida for 
promoting--allows discontinuity to lie behind every 
continuity, and allows for the exposure of this 
discontinuity as/in the end of a discipline or method. 
Foucault responds to such a fetishizing of discontinuity: 
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My problem was not at all to say, 'Voila, long live 
discontinuity, we are in the discontinuous and a good 
thing too,' but to pose the question, 'How is it that 
at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, 
there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of 
evolution, these transformations which fail to 
correspond to the calm, continuist image that is 
normally accredited?' (Power/Knowledge 112) 
For Foucault, it is not a matter of offering a choppy, 
discontinuist image of history to combat the "normally 
accredited" image of calm continuity, but rather a matter of 
attending to the disruptions themselves. Discontinuity, as 
a declarable historical or philosophical principle, can and 
does lead back to a totalizing image or picture of the 
historical "orders of knowledge"--is part and parcel of a 
very continuous institutional and methodological project. 
As Foucault writes about historical discourse at the end of 
the 18th century: "the regular historians were revealing 
continuities, while the historians of ideas were liberating 
discontinuities. But I believe that they are two 
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symmetrical and inverse effects of the same methodological 
renewal of history in general" (Live 47, my emphasis). 
The methodological problematic Foucault outlines here, 
no doubt, doubles my own: I do not wish simply or primarily 
to offer a "symmetrical and inverse picture" of Foucault and 
Derrida--to say, 'Voila, literary criticism misreads 
Foucault and Derrida, and here is the correct way to read 
them'--but to try to ask how or why it is, in some sense, 
inevitable that they will be misread by a discipline, and to 
ask if there is a mechanism in either thinker's text for 
explaining this appropriation--perhaps also complicating it 
--and to locate difference(s) through this operation. As I 
state above, I am less interested in "exposing" poor 
readings and misappropriations (though there is obviously a 
necessarily critical or polemical tone to parts of my text) 
than I am in tracing the institutional and systematic 
imperatives of these appropriations. The question at hand 
becomes, then, can Foucault and/or Derrida provide a 
rationale for their own appropriation by the discipline of 
literary criticism--can their thinking of the reflexive 
moment of exteriority explain its own, for lack of a better 
word, re-interiorization within an institution or a method, 
within "new hi stori ci sm" or "deconstruct i ve er it i ci sm" ? 12 
12rt is interesting to note here Gayatri c. Spivak's 
provocative comments on her position in the new historicism/ 
deconstruction debate: she writes, citing Derrida, that 
"the conflict between New Historicism and deconstruction can 
now be narrowed down to a turf battle between Berkeley and 
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Perhaps tracing out possible answers to this question will 
help bring out important differences which, so far at least, 
I have been at great pains to collapse. 
As I argue above, Foucault's explanation for his own 
appropriation would revolve around the problematics of 
power, and the way in which instances of power tend to move 
the exterior toward the interior--that even institutional 
studies which liberate in some way also create a new object 
or topic for discourse or study, a new subject(ification). 
Foucault puts it quite succinctly in "La folie, l'absence 
d'oeuvre," an appendix to the second edition of Historie de 
la folie: 
[Someday,] everything that we experience today in the 
form of a limit or as foreign or insupportable, will 
have taken on the serene characteristics of what is 
positive. And what for us today designates this 
Exterior risks one day designating us. (trans. and 
cited in Carroll 76) 
Later in his career, Foucault criticizes Madness and 
Civilization for its naive notions of power (Power/Knowledge 
118-19) and of "experience" (Archeology 16/27, where the 
translation incorrectly renders "experience" as 
Irvine, Berkeley and Los Angeles .... At any rate, since I 
see the new historicism as a sort of media hype mounted 
against deconstruction, I find it hard to position myself in 
its regard" (280). 
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"experiment"), 13 but this "early" quotation seems to be 
consistent with "late" Foucaultian interest in "a form of 
power which makes individuals subjects ... a form of power 
which subjugates and makes subject to" ("Subject and Power" 
212). Every liberation (of a cause, a discourse, a group, 
especially of an "individual" like the madman liberated from 
his madness) can and will transform into a type of 
subjugation--into a subject for definition--and subsequently 
into the conditions of emergence for later definitions, 
later designations. 14 The exterior does not remain 
exterior; it "risks one day designating us. Through this 
formulation, Foucault names the logic by which his thought 
is brought into an institution. He offers no "counter-
formulation" precisely because he does not want to play into 
the hands of this logic by designating alternative 
conditions of possibility; his texts do not attempt to 
theorize or "ground" an outside precisely as a buffer 
against a totalizing logic which could then subsume or 
sublate it. He refuses to play the game on the terms of 
transcendental/dialectical philosophy, on Hegel's terms. 
Indeed, Hegel is the thinker who poses the greatest 
13 see David Carroll's excellent discussion of this 
problem in Paraesthetics (53-67); I must also credit him 
with drawing my attention the mistranslation (57n). 
14cf. Deleuze: "From Madness and Ci vi 1 i zation on, 
Foucault analyzed the discourse of the 'philanthropist' who 
freed madmen from their chains, without concealing the more 
effective set of chains to which he destined them" (54). 
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question to thinking in our "postmodern'' epoch (insofar as 
he is the thinker of the completion or totalization of the 
modern): how does one think against a Hegelian system which 
is fueled by negation, which diffuses contradiction or 
opposition by consuming it as merely a higher form of the 
system's own truth? As Derrida summarizes Hegelian 
sublation, "The Hegelian Aufhebung is produced entirely 
within discourse, from within the system or the work of 
signification. A determination is negated and conserved in 
another determination which reveals the truth of the former" 
(Writing 275). All critical discourse, then, risks playing 
directly into Hegel's hand, "risks agreeing to the 
reasonableness of reason, of philosophy, of Hegel, who is 
always right, as soon as one opens one's mouth in order to 
articulate meaning" (Writing 263). For Foucault, this 
question of Hegel is perhaps the most important question for 
postmodern thought: 
truly to escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of 
the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. 
It assumes that we are aware of [suppose de savoir] the 
extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to 
us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to 
think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. 
We have to determine the extent to which our anti-
Hegel ianism is possibly one of his tricks directed 
against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, 
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waiting for us. (Discourse 235/74-5) 
Here Foucault takes up the question that Hegel poses to 
contemporary thought: how to think against a structure that 
anticipates or negates such thinking, that in fact thrives 
on determinate negations? And it is precisely because of 
his suspicion of Hegelian sublation that it is difficult to 
read Foucault as ideology critique--as, for example, 
Habermas would like to read him. 15 Ideology critique 
depends on a moment of liberation through reason, on the 
demystification of ideology in order to unmask knowledge. 
As Louis Althusser writes, ideology critique moves in the 
service of "scientific knowledge, against all the 
mystifications of ideological 'knowledge.' Against the 
merely moral denunciation of myths and lies, for their 
rational and rigorous criticism" (Lenin 11). But, for 
Foucault, "criticism"--as an attempt to stake out a more 
excellent reason or ground--guarantees that the winner has 
already been declared: Hegel in a unanimous decision; the 
dialectic continues undisrupted; reason is reassured. As 
Foucault writes, "'Dialectic' is a way of evading the always 
open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a 
Hegelian skeleton" (Power/Knowledge 114-5). 
15Habermas' first lecture on Foucault in Modernity is 
entitled "An Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Foucault," 
and while he clearly sympathizes with the "critical" side of 
Foucaultian analyses, he cannot agree with Foucault's 
genealogical analyses in that they deny the moment of 
"liberating'' knowledge that ideology critique seeks. 
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The overarching criticism of Foucault's work in 
literary critical circles revolves around his refusal to 
acknowledge a moment of liberation through reason. For 
example, Edward Said, while sympathetic to components of 
Foucault's work, refuses to accept the notion that there is 
no space or end of liberation in criticism, or that a 
discipline like literary criticism necessarily creates a 
kind of subjugation as it studies phenomena; he writes, 
criticism must think of itself as life-enhancing and 
constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny, 
domination, and abuse; its social goals are noncoercive 
knowledge produced in the interests of human freedom. 
(World 29, my emphasis) . 16 
While these certainly are reassuring sentiments, for 
Foucault reassurance is precisely the problem here: a 
"belief in non-coercive human community'' (246) is a claim 
for the self-evidence of the critical project--is ultimately 
a justification that cannot be examined or questioned, just 
as the ideological justifications for the political powers 
Said would wish to demystify ultimately protect themselves 
from examination. Likewise, it seems that the most 
16cf. Merod's The Social Responsibility of the Critic, 
where he writes, on the Chomsky/Foucault debate that Said 
(246) makes much of: "Chomsky stresses 'the normal 
creativity of everyday life' which prompts the emergence of 
language, culture, and both individual and societal 
practices that cannot be thought of as regulatory or . 
repressive in any systematic way, but rather as life-giving 
and constructive. genuinely experimental" (168, my 
emphasis). 
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traditional critic could see his or her project in Said's 
f o rmu 1 at ion: "noncoe re i ve know 1 edge" seems precise 1 y a 
translation of ''disinterested knowledge," and as such serves 
to protect the institutional interests of criticism all the 
more strongly. 17 For Foucault, there is no simple 
"liberation" through knowledge; as he writes, "knowledge is 
not made for understanding; it is made for cutting" 
(''Nietzsche" 88). The "knowledge" produced by the human 
sciences cannot move away from its origins as/in a kind of 
violence--and literary criticism (in both its institutional 
and systematic functions) is implicated in the movement of 
"liberation" through the subjugation of knowing: a 
discipline makes a new object to be studied out of the 
liberation itself, thereby reasserting reason's control. 
Liberation is confronted at its end by the smiling figure of 
Hegel, who has been there all along. 
But this does not lead Foucault to a kind of stagnation 
or silence. The absence of a determinate methodology in his 
work and his denial of liberation within a discourse--so 
frustrating and ultimately paralyzing to some--have 
certainly not curtailed his production of important studies: 
17see Paul Bove's insightful discussion of Said and 
Foucault in chapter 5 of Intellectuals in Power, where he 
writes: "My objection ... to Said's position is that it 
leaves this regime [the regime of truth] unchanged insofar 
as it validates the traditional role played by the leading 
intellectual who, above all, will not call into question his 
or her own interests in exploiting the ability to imagine 
and promote 'alternatives' continually in order to maintain 
or achieve authority and identity in society" (234). 
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studies of the madhouse, the prison, the clinic, sexuality. 
But, one might profitably ask, why does Foucault produce 
studies if they do not lead to the Enlightenment goals of 
heightened understanding or liberating knowledge? Why go 
on? As he takes a chair at the College de France, he 
discusses his "projects": 
the analyses I intend to undertake fall into two 
groups. On the one hand, the 'critical' group which 
sets the reversal-principle to work. I shall attempt 
to distinguish forms of exclusion, limitation and 
appropriation .... I shall try to show how they are 
formed, in answer to which needs, how they are modified 
and displaced, which constraints they have effectively 
exercised, to what extent they have been worked on. On 
the other hand, the 'genealogical' group, which brings 
the other three principles [chance, discontinuity, and 
materiality] into play: how series of discourse are 
formed, though, in spite of, or with the aid of these 
systems of constraint: what were the specific forms 
for each, and what were their conditions of appearance, 
growth, and variation. (Discourse 231-32/61-2) 
Foucault's answer is necessarily double, thinking 
necessarily both inside and outside a system that is to be 
interrogated. For Foucault, like Derrida, analysis begins 
with an indispensable "critical" or polemical phase of 
reversal, a phase which attempts "to distinguish forms of 
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exclusion, limitation and appropriation." But, and this is 
the crucial point (as it is with Derrida), Foucault's 
analysis does not stop here with an overturning; if it does, 
it cannot truly escape Hegel--it is doomed to repeat the 
exclusions it uncovers. The overturning or uncovering 
itself must be subjected to an examination, but one which 
brings a sort of indeterminacy to bear on the overturning, 
on its emergence among various possibilities, chances, and 
discontinuities. Contra many of his critics, Foucault 
certainly does recognize a kind of "progress" in or through 
disciplines and the human sciences, 18 but it is necessarily 
a progress that leads to other--though, admittedly, often 
more humane or palatable--forms of exclusion and 
subjugation, not to a space of unproblematic, reassuring 
freedom. The progress of knowledge is itself a Hegelian 
ruse, and for Foucault, it is only if one takes into account 
a certain exteriority in the conditions of emergence for a 
discourse--thereby refusing an alternative, determinate 
ground or higher knowledge--that one has the chance of 
denying Hegel his otherwise predetermined victory by 
refusing to play the game of knowledge on his terms. 
18cf. Rorty's critique in "Foucault/Dewey/Nietzsche," 
where he writes: "We liberals in the USA wish that Foucault 
could have managed, just once, what ... he always resisted: 
'some positive evaluation of the liberal state.' ... You 
would never guess, from Foucault's account of the changes in 
European social institutions during the last three hundred 
years, that during that period suffering had decreased 
considerably, nor that people's chances of choosing their 
own styles of life increased considerably" (3). 
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This is perhaps where we see the major point of 
conflict between Foucault and Derrida: Derrida, rather than 
refusing to play on Hegel's terms, attempts to beat Hegel at 
his own game; he encounters transcendental/dialectical 
philosophy and tries to disrupt it by theorizing its 
conditions of possibility--which must, he argues, be 
partially non-transcendental, impure. This gives us a way 
of offering what might be Derrida's answer to the question 
of his appropriation by criticism: a transcendental or 
critical discourse will, to be sure, expel the otherness 
within it--the dialectic will totalize, will bring becoming 
into being--but for Derrida, an otherness still remains. He 
writes, 
There is no choosing here: each time a discourse 
contra the transcendental is held, a matrix--the 
(con)striction itself--constrains the discourse to 
place the nontranscendental, the outside of the 
transcendental field, the excluded, in a structuring 
position. The matrix in question constitutes the 
excluded as transcendental of the transcendental, as 
imitation transcendental, transcendental contra-band. 
The contra-band is not yet dialectical contradiction. 
To be sure, the contra-band necessarily becomes that, 
but its not-yet is not-yet the teleological 
anticipation, which results in it never becoming 
dialectical contradiction. The contra-band remains 
something other than what, necessarily, it is to 
become. 
102 
Such would be the (nondialectical) law of the 
(dialectical) stricture, of the bond, of the ligature, 
of the garrote, of the desmos in general when it comes 
to clench tigh~ly in order to make be. Lock of the 
dialectical. (Glas 244a) 
Derrida offers a logic of his own appropriation which is at 
once very similar to Foucault's and at the same time 
radically different. Derrida's text can explain its 
interiorization in terms of the violence of dialectical 
thinking: the violence of the dialectical stricture "when 
it comes to clench tightly in order to make be"; the need 
within dialectical thinking (which is also critical 
thinking) for definition, synthesis; critical thinking's 
necessary interiorizing of an outside in order to cover up 
the structuring (literally transcendental) position of an 
outside within that thinking. Derrida attempts to disrupt 
this movement of making be by thinking the "transcendental 
of the transcendental," the structuring principle of the 
transcendental which the transcendental itself cannot think 
--that is, if it is to do the work of a traditional 
transcendental. 
So perhaps we have come to the point where Derrida's 
thinking and Foucault's most radically part company: for 
Foucault, the ''transcendentalist" emphasis of Derrida's work 
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is simply unacceptable, too prone to become a new orthodoxy. 
For all the similar effects and attributes of a Foucaultian 
network of statements and Derridean general text, perhaps 
the overriding difference is that "for statements it is not 
a condition of possibility but a law of coexistence" 
(Archaeology 116/153). 19 For Foucault, Derrida's 
involvement with a transcendental vocabulary allows the 
possibility that a transcendental space of interiority 
can be purified in the problematic of trace, which, 
prior to all speech, is the opening of inscription and 
the difference of deferred time [ecart du temps 
differe]; it is always the historico-transcendental 
theme that is reinvested. (Archaeology 121/159, 
translation modified) 
Such a potential for reification, according to Foucault, 
plays into the hands of institutional, status quo thinking. 
But it seems, in the wake of Hegel, that these are the risks 
of thinking itself--the risks of thinking or speaking at 
all . 2° Foucault's disruptive materialist discourse is no 
less difficult to take up for institutional uses than 
Derrida's disruptive transcendental discourse. And Derrida, 
for his part, is acutely aware of the institutionalization 
of undecidability or unreadability as a reading method in 
19see Dreyfus and Rabi now, who make much of this · 
distinction (52-58). 
20cf. Derrida's "The Principle of Reason" (17ff.). 
American literary criticism; Derrida writes his essay in 
Deconstruction and Criticism with this caveat concerning 
Maurice Blanchot's L'Arrat de mort: 
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The readability of unreadability is as improbable as an 
arrat de mort. No law of (normal) reading can 
guarantee its legitimacy. By normal reading I mean 
every reading that insures knowledge transmittable in 
its own language, in a language, in a school or 
academy, knowledge constructed and insured in 
institutional constructions, in accordance with laws 
made so as to resist (precisely because they are 
weaker) the ambiguous threats with which the arr~t de 
mort troubles so many conceptual oppositions, 
boundaries, borders. The arr~t de mort brings about 
the arr~t of the law. ("Living On" 171) 
This arr~t, this interruption, this gap, this falling out of 
(the dialectical movement of) work, lives on and remains un-
institutionalizable, untranslatable, impossible to 
legitimize, precisely because it disrupts the laws by which 
it could be institutionalized, defined, or legitimated. 
Even after its seeming sublation, for Derrida the arr~t 
remains. 
And perhaps it is here that Derrida and Foucault can be 
thought together again; they both attempt to bring about and 
attend to a certain absence of work, an arr~t, a break, a 
fissure, a discontinuity of /at/on/in the otherwise smooth, 
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confident flow of dialectical thinking. Whether this break 
is located at a transcendental or emergent level seems, to 
me anyway, not as important as the insistence on the break 
or hesitation itself, the moment of exteriority that poses a 
very difficult question for critical thinking--including 
literary critical thinking: can this hesitation, this 
otherness, be attended to "critically," that is thematically 
or in a revelatory discourse, one which attempts to uncover 
a determinate truth? Or does it require what Derrida calls 
a "thinking altogether differently" ("Sending" 326)? It 
very well may. Perhaps Foucault puts the question--the 
question to critical thinking that both he and Derrida, in 
different ways, pose--most succinctly: 
There are times in life when the question of knowing if 
one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive 
differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if 
one is to go on looking and reflecting at all .... what 
is philosophy today--philosophical activity, I mean--if 
it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear 
on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the 
endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be 
possible to think differently, instead of legitimating 
what is already known? (The Use of Pleasure 8-9) 
But how, one might ask, does one think differently, 
especially if one cannot simply escape a certain thinking of 
the same? What exactly does "postmodern" mean in the 
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context of this questioning? How can it be thematized? 
What do the necessarily "double" analyses of the postmodern 
look like, and what do they accomplish? Likewise, after 
three chapters, we must at long last broach the question of 
the specificity of literature in or for this thinking 
differently. 
After discussing for three chapters philosophies of 
borders and withdrawing grounds, perhaps we also need to ask 
why such questions become pressing at a particular 
historical space or time we call postmodern. Why, in other 
words, do these questions and problems arise "now''? Why 
would the questions posed to critical thinking by notions 
like general text or the statement come on the scene at all, 
much less at this postmodern "now"? Perhaps, as much 
postmodern discourse suggests, we are indeed at the end of 
something--the end of the subject, the end of art, the end 
of history--but what does or can "end'' mean in this 
displaced postmodern context? In the following chapters, I 
will attempt to take up these topics--to perform, for lack 
of another word, "positive" analyses of postmodern thought 
and literature. 
CHAPTER 4 
THINKING\WRITING THE POSTMODERN 
Criticism, if it is called upon to enter into explication 
and exchange with literary writing, some day will not have 
to wait for this resistance first to be organized into a 
"philosophy" which would govern some methodology of 
aesthetics whose principles criticism would receive .... But 
this enterprise is hopeless if one muses on the fact that 
literary criticism has already been determined, knowingly or 
not, voluntarily or not, as the philosophy of literature. 
--Derrida 
Theorizing the Postmodern, 
At the End of Metaphysics 
Theorizing the postmodern has become a full-time 
profession for a cross-disciplinary army of thinkers. 
Generally speaking, defining the postmodern has become a 
vexing problem which has led to widely varying critical 
positions on the matter; however, the one thing that various 
postmodernisms and postmodernists seem to have in common is 
their assertion that a stable, knowable, transcendental 
notion of "truth" has become impossible to ground. From 
there, agreement ends, though at the risk of being 
reductive, I will venture to say that thematizations of the 
postmodern among literary critics tend to fall into two 
camps: those who define postmodernism as a stylistic or 
systematic phenomenon and those who define it as a 
historical phenomenon. Both kinds of definition have proven 
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problematic. For example, if postmodernism is a stylistic 
phenomenon (defined by a system of features such as 
playfulness, open-endedness, discontinuity, self-conscious 
reflection on the production of literature, excess, reader 
participation, etc.), 1 then why isn't, for example, 
Tristram Shandy postmodern? Tale of a Tub? Chaucer? Ovid? 
Why not Milton, for that matter?2 Defining the postmodern 
as a stylistic phenomenon tends to rob it of any historical 
significance or specificity--in fact, at its strongest this 
notion tends to reduce the complex play of the history of 
literature to the transhistorical battle of postmodernism 
and its other by turning postmodernism into a kind of Geist 
which animates the whole of literary history. 3 
1see, for example, Lodge, who discusses "the formal 
principles underlying postmodernist writing" (228ff.), among 
them contradiction, permutation, discontinuity, randomness, 
excess. See also Hassan's "Toward a Concept of 
Postmodernism," where he offers a conveniently dialectical 
list of the features of modernism and postmodernism (91-92). 
2For just such a treatment of Milton--and an impressive 
one at that--see Herman Rapaport's Milton and the 
Postmodern. While I find his reading of Milton compelling, 
I wonder whether it doesn't fall into the de Manian 
problematic I discuss in Chapter 2--where all literature 
becomes fodder for a method or discipline. For example, 
Rapaport writes that in composing the book he "was 
interested in attempting to use Milton as a test case for 
poststructuralist reading" (xiii). 
3This is especially true in the work of Hassan; in 
"POSTmodernISM" he writes, "there is enhancement of life in 
certain anarchies of the spirit, in humor and play, in love 
released and freedom of the imagination to overreach itself, 
in a cosmic consciousness of variousness as unity. I_ 
recognize these as the values intended by Postmodern art, 
and see the latter as closer, not only in time, but even 
more in tenor, to the transformation of hope itself" (45). 
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Historical characterizations of postmodernism seem to 
offer an escape from the totalizing or generalizing problems 
inherent in a more descriptive or systematic theory, but 
even these characterizations often end up trapped in a kind 
of historical determinism which is a version of the 
transcendental truth postmodernism wants to question: if 
postmodernism is primarily a paralogistic reaction to a 
monologic modernism, 4 or is inexorably brought about by 
determining societal factors (such as the emergence of "late 
capitalism"), 5 then how can it escape having its truth 
given by a kind of lock-step, determining Hegelian 
historicism--where the truth of postmodernism is secured and 
guaranteed through the work of dialectical opposition and 
sublation? The vexing problem--made all the more difficult 
both by the complexity of the issue and the sheer volume of 
critical material on the subject--becomes, then, where to 
situate oneself in this discussion about the postmodern, at 
the impasse between system and history. Rather than argue 
for one side in this complex and far-ranging argument, I 
would like to step back and investigate the terms of the 
opposition itself. In general, my question here will be: 
what is the status or force of the opposition between 
history and system in a postmodern "context"? To anticipate 
4see Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition. 
5see Jameson's "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism." 
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a bit, it will be my contention that an engagement between 
the postmodern and literary criticism must go ''through" the 
discourse of philosophy--especially the ''problem" of 
philosophy's closure or end--because, as Derrida notes in 
the epigraph to this chapter, "literary criticism has 
already been determined, knowingly or not, voluntarily or 
not, as the philosophy of literature" (Writing 28). Any 
criticism presupposes a theory, and literary theory is first 
and foremost a philosophy of literature. Because literary 
criticism and theory are bound to philosophy in this way, it 
seems necessary to examine or reevaluate criticism and 
theory in--to use an incredibly ironic term--the "light" of 
philosophy's closure. Such an examination is, it seems, 
doubly pressing in relation to the postmodern, insofar as 
the closure of philosophy and the concomitant withdrawal of 
a stable ground for critical thinking is precisely what 
gives rise to what I call the question of the postmodern. 
But rather than trying to construct a historical or 
systematic narrative leading up to postmodernism's 
withdrawal of truth, I will attempt briefly to outline the 
genealogy of this withdrawal--to trace a path back to this 
"event." 
To find this "event" named, one need look no further 
than Nietzsche's texts--and perhaps most succinctly his 
(in)famous phrase ''God is dead," by which a Madman 
pronounces the withdrawal of transcendental ground with a 
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kind of terrifying simplicity. One is tempted to say that 
this phrase, and the ethos that surrounds it, ushers in the 
era of ''ends" that is so familiar to the postmodern: the 
end of metaphysics, the end of religion, the end of history. 
But, while this phrase certainly does not instigate these 
ends as a "cause"--the Madman's remark, remember, is already 
directed at "those who did not believe in God" (181)--one 
could argue that it certainly does name or mark the "logic'' 
of these ends: metaphysics, religion, and history terminate 
with the death of God precisely because each of them--
whether they are conceived of as disciplines, belief 
systems, or both--had lived on the promise of meaning in an 
end or telos; each organized itself around the guarantee of 
meaning beyond the physical realm which is inscribed in the 
very word meta-physics. So, if metaphysics is first 
philosophy--the discipline or belief system which can secure 
the ground for all others--it is clearly terminated if first 
principles are deemed to be "dead'': arbitrary, fictional, 
"merely'' invented, impossible to ground as transcendental: 
One can certainly recuperate these principles or mourn their 
loss--what else characterized the literary period known as 
"modernism," and continues to animate many critiques of the 
postmodern?6--but after the death of God, it can no longer 
6rhe dominant critique of postmodernism, in whatever 
form, is that it does not attend to such a metaphysical or 
historical "real." See, for example, Graff, who writes that 
the upshot of a Derrida's work--and postmodernism in 
general--is "the absence of any reality or meaning in life 
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be a matter of simply asserting the self-evidence of ground. 
The very fact that a stable ground must be recuperated or 
argued for at all attests to the impact of what Nietzsche's 
thought names: thinking can no longer be self-grounded in 
reason, subjectivity, method, history, God. As Reiner 
SchUrmann writes, with the "death of God," 
The schema of reference to an arche then reveals itself 
to be the product of a certain type of thinking, of an 
ensemble of philosophical rules that have their 
genesis, their period of glory, and that today perhaps 
are experiencing their decline. (4) 
When reason has to defend itself or attempt to ground itself 
as reason--when the category can no longer be taken for 
granted or a ground for it secured--a certain kind of 
thinking begins to draw to a close: when speculation must 
ask about the value of speculation (as when Warhol's Brillo 
box poses the question, "Why is this not art?''), 7 a 
category--indeed, an entire system of thinking through which 
one constructs categories and defines the world--begins to 
experience its closure. But, as Scharmann reminds us, this 
closure is not simply a matter for thought--a systematic or 
idealist problem; it is both a systematic and historical 
closure: 
to which effort might be directed" (62). 
7cf. Charles Bernstein's discussion of Arthur Dante's 
reading of Warhol in ''Critical Excess (Process)" (846-49). 
113 
This hypothesis functions doubly (even though the 
opposition between system and history will eventually 
fall victim to that same hypothesis): it is a 
systematic closure, inasmuch as the norms for action 
'proceed from' the corresponding first philosophies; 
and it is a historical closure, since deconstructionist 
discourse can arise only from the boundary of the era 
over which it is exercised. (4) 
At the closure, then, thinking runs up against a systematic 
and historical limit within itself: when metaphysical 
thinking shows itself to be "historical"--when thinking as 
reference to stable ground can be thematized as a kind or 
~ of thinking rather than as thinking itself--it also 
runs up against certain debilitating "systematic" 
consequences. In other words, the historical closure of 
metaphysics is itself systematic, and vice versa: the cause 
and effect categories by which one could name the prior or 
proper origin are rendered problematic by the closure 
itself--by the inability to secure a ground outside the 
closure by which it could be judged in a summary fashion, or 
upon which a narrative historical account of it could be 
rendered. The peculiar and pernicious problem in all this, 
though, is that the notion of ground and the concepts of 
philosophical thinking cannot simply be abandoned; as 
Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe writes, "We are still living .on 
philosophical ground and cannot just go and live somewhere 
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else" (Heidegger 3). 
Metaphysical thinking, then, finds itself at an impasse 
at the closure, the death of God, the loss of a stable 
ground--an impasse we began to examine above in terms of the 
nihilist reversals to which it inevitably leads: truth 
shows itself to be a lie, critical thinking can neither be 
affirmed nor denied, anti-professionalism shows itself to be 
professionalism, and so on. In the face of this impasse, 
the recuperation of a kind of metaphysical ground is 
certainly possible (at least discursively, rhetorically or 
pragmatically), but this shows itself not necessarily to be 
desirable because, from its "end," metaphysical thinking 
also shows itself to have been grounded in a kind of violert 
exclusion--a grounding exclusion which must efface its other 
to preserve its purity, eliminate difference to preserve the 
same. So, in the nihilist reversals that signal the closure 
of metaphysical thinking, we see a kind of cruel joke played 
out: nihilism, rather than helping to displace the 
privilege of the same, protects it all the more greedily--
bringing, with its reversals, literally more of the same. 
From its "end," then, as Heidegger notes, the history of 
this thinking shows itself--in the triumph of will to power 
and the age of technology--precisely to be the history of 
this nihilism: nihilism as metaphysics' final and most 
glorious moment in the control and elimination of its ~ther. 
And, in the most chilling of reversals, the legacy of this 
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thinking reveals itself (often brutally) in twentieth-
century history. Lacoue-Labarthe summarizes the legacy left 
to our age, the age of technology: 
There is a kind of 'lethal' essence of technology, 
which means that its 'everything is possible' does in 
fact end up introducing, that is to say bringing about, 
if not the impossible, then at least the unthinkable 
(Extermination or genetic manipulation--and the latter 
is still on the agenda today). (Heidegger 69) 
The "unthinkable" former, extermination, has indeed been 
brought about--in the holocaust; and Lacoue-Labarthe argues 
that the holocaust is "a phenomenon which follows 
essentially no logic (political, economic, social, military, 
etc.) other than a spiritual [metaphysical] one .... In the 
Auschwitz apocalypse, it was nothing less than the West, in 
its essence, that revealed itself" (35) . 8 
8ro many critics of the postmodern, this seems an 
outrageous claim. For example, Huyssen writes, "Auschwitz, 
after all, did not result from too much enlightened reason--
even though it was organized as a perfectly rationalized 
death factory--but from a violent anti-enlightenment and 
anti-modernity effect, which exploited modernity ruthlessly 
for its own purposes" (203, last 2 emphases mine). For 
Huyssen (citing Habermas), the Enlightenment, as the 
strictly benign or progressive movement of reason, is 
"exploited" by the evil of Nazism in the holocaust; this, of 
course, allows reason to emerge safe, having banished terror 
once more by explaining it away. However, it seems 
astonishing that reason can emerge unscathed from the 
"perfectly rationalized death factory'' that was Auschwitz. 
Huyssen is forced to refer to a pure, benign intentio~ to 
salvage reason here, and in the process ironically offers 
what he accuses the postmoderns of supplying: "too limited 
an account of modernity" (203). 
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For Lacoue-Labarthe the holocaust is both a 
horrifyingly "logical" extension of metaphysical logic and 
an absolutely unique event (an event that shatters any 
possibility of "explanation," any attempt to account for it 
within a larger, ultimately reassuring narrative). 9 In 
fact, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that the holocaust cannot 
sufficiently be explained in terms of scapegoating or any 
other narrative which makes the Jews remotely "sacrificial" 
--as having died to bring about some greater revelation; 
even "holocaust" is the wrong word: 
[it] was a pure and simple elimination. Without trace 
or residue. And if it is true that the age is that of 
the accomplishment of nihilism, then it is at Auschwitz 
that that accomplishment took place in its purest 
formless form. God in fact died at Auschwitz. (37) 
For Lacoue-Labarthe, the completion of metaphysics in the 
death of God can be "read" in the holocaust: a wholly 
bankrupt way of thinking and acting burns itself up in 
attempting to exterminate its other, but leaves no 
possibility for a Phoenix-type rising from among the ashes. 
The ''formless form" of the holocaust is nonetheless quite 
9rnsofar as the holocaust can be spoken of as a "unique 
event," this does not imply that it is somehow more horrific 
than the Stalinist purges or the Cambodian genocide--that 
the violence against the Jews was so much more violent that 
it remains unique. Rather, the status of genocide as _an 
"event'' precisely suggests that no comparision is possible, 
no simple accounting can be rendered which would allow us to 
say that one genocide was "worse" or ''better" than another. 
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concrete; it is an irreducible event in that it cannot be 
reassuringly reduced to a logic which can be said to have 
brought it about. It remains simply too horrific to be 
adequately explained or--in a philosophical phrase with a 
chilling body-count resonance--"accounted for." This, of 
course, does not mean that there are no historical and 
systematic reasons or precedents for the holocaust--a long 
historical tradition of anti-Semitism and its theoretical 
defenses certainly cannot be simply ignored. However, the 
holocaust remains an event that a rationalist history cannot 
explain within its own logic--insofar as that logic is 
itself implicated in the event; 10 as Lacoue-Labarthe 
writes, 
And this event, we must admit, is historical in the 
strongest sense, i.e. in the sense that it does not 
simply arise from history, but itself makes history, 
10 Lacoue-Labarthe gives 2 reasons for the essential 
irreducibility of the "event'' of the holocaust's genocide: 
1. Jews posed no threat to the Nazis, had no 
revolutionary social cohesion, "were not in 1933 agents of 
social dissension (except of course in phastasy)" (36); 
2. also, the means used in the slaughter of the Jews 
were not of an essentially police or punitive nature; though 
police tactics were indispensable in rounding the Jews up, 
there were no confessions to be forced, etc: "None of the 
'machines' invented to extract confessions or remorse or to 
mount the edifying spectacle of terror, was of any use. The 
Jews were treated in the same way as industrial waste of the 
proliferation of parasites is 'treated' .... As Kafka had 
long since understood, the 'final solution' consisted in 
taking literally the centuries-old metaphors of insult and 
contempt--vermin, filth--and providing oneself with the 
technological means for such an effective literalizati6n" 
(37). 
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cuts into history and opens up another history, or else 
unmakes all history. (5) 
The holocaust, as an irreducible "event," precisely shatters 
any possibility of accounting for it in what is 
traditionally called historical terms--a notion of history, 
as the destinal story of a people, certainly cannot remain 
unimplicated in this event. Rather, this event "opens up 
another history, or else unmakes all history"; this event, 
in unmaking history and the systematic thinking upon which 
it depends, perhaps opens up the history of the other, the 
history of that which or those who would disrupt the purity 
of meaning upon which history depends. As Derrida writes, 
the very concept of history has lived only upon the 
possibility of meaning, upon the past, present, or 
promised presence of meaning and of truth. Outside 
this system, it is impossible to resort to the concept 
of history without reinscribing it elsewhere, according 
to some specific systematic strategy. (Dissemination 
184). 
Given the realization of the exclusionary violence of a 
will-to-wholeness, the postmodern project cannot be a 
properly "historical" nor "systematic" one. It perhaps 
becomes a matter, as Derrida suggests here, of constructing 
logic that "works" without working in the Hegelian sense of 
coming to an Aufhebung of wholeness--rather, a project of 
reinscribing "the possibility of meaning" as other than "the 
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past, present, or promised presence of meaning and of 
truth." This is, I have suggested, a necessary project at 
the closure of metaphysics, insofar as ignoring this closure 
leads inexorably to nihilistic impasses. Traditional 
thinking, then, must always fail to ''work" because it cannot 
account for a "founding moment" otherness, and it is this 
"moment," as we saw in Chapter 1, which must be taken into 
account "according to some specific strategy." As Foucault 
phrases the problematic, "we must elaborate--outside 
philosophies of time and subject--a theory of discontinuous 
systematisation," (Discourse 231/60) outside transcategorial 
and transhistorical systems. 
Derrida and the Postmodern 
Despite the problems we have raised with the concept of 
history and the furor raised by many of Derrida's critics 
over his lack of attention to history, 11 it seems to me 
that he is careful to historicize his thought precisely to 
avoid its being taken as such a transcategorial and 
transhistorical system; he historicizes it as postmodern, 
situates it at the historico/systematic closure of 
metaphysics. He does this--often quite subtly--in virtually 
all of his texts; take, for example, this above-cited 
quotation from Writing and Difference, this time with a 
11 For such a criticism of Derrida as ahistorical, see 
Said's readings in The World, the Text. and the Critic, 
especially Chapter 9. 
120 
different emphasis: 
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not 
because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered 
by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because 
the nature of the field ... excludes totalization. 
(Writing 289) 
Note, here, the first part of the sentence, in which--
without absurdly over-reading a simple adverbial clause--
Derrida addresses some issues that he is often criticized 
for neglecting: first, totalization has had meaning, was 
possible to think given certain societal and historical 
circumstances which, at the closure of metaphysics, no 
longer exist; also, totalization may still have meaning (he 
writes "if totalization no longer has any meaning") but any 
meaning it has is radically altered by a contemporary--dare 
I say "postmodern"--notion of the conditions of possibility 
(and impossibility) for any kind of totalization. 
Derrida sets out to historicize--and we have, 
hopefully, managed to complicate this word--his thought most 
overtly in "No Apocalypse, Not Now," his essay on nuclear 
society, on living after the holocaust, under the shadow of 
the bomb. He writes of the (im)possibility of nuclear 
holocaust: 
The hypothesis of this total destruction watches over 
deconstruction, it guides its footsteps; it becomes 
possible to recognize, in the light, so to speak, of 
121 
that hypothesis, of that fantasy, or phantasm, the 
characteristic structures and historicity of the 
discourses, strategies, texts, or institutions to be 
deconstructed. That is why deconstruction, at least 
what is being advanced today in its name, belongs to 
the nuclear age. And to the age of literature. (27, my 
emphasis) 
The possibility of apocalypse without revelation is what 
makes it possible for deconstruction to take notice of "the 
characteristic structures and historicity of the discourses, 
strategies, texts, or institutions to be deconstructed." 
How so? Derrida writes, "As you know, Apocalypse means 
Revelation, of Truth, Un-veiling" ("No Apocalypse" 24); but, 
of course, at the closure or end of metaphysics, there is no 
determinate ''revelation" of truth, but only its withdrawal--
not truth but impasse. Again, the "structure" of 
metaphysics shows itself to have a (debilitating) 
historicity. Likewise, the historical situation of nuclear 
society is infused by the structure of a nuclear logic of 
apocalypse with no revelation--the impossible possibility of 
a horrifying telos without an accompanying revelation of the 
meaning of history. Given these historical anp systematic 
conditions, the stakes of a writing, the stakes of truth, 
the stakes of living at the closure, in a nuclear logic, are 
irreducibly different: these stakes are not reducible to a 
thinking of the same, to a thinking based on the assumption 
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of wholeness in a beginning or an end, to a thought based on 
revelation of truth or meaning, to a thinking which can 
confidently answer the metaphysical question ''what is it?". 
But what are we to make of Derrida's claim for this 
apocalyptic age as the age of literature? Surely there is 
an entire history of apocalyptic literature, and it is by no 
means a recent arrival. But the apocalyptic tradition is 
one that is firmly based on a coming revelation; the Books 
of Daniel and Revelation, for example, are firm calls for 
the end as a revelation and a remedy in times of crisis. 12 
Literature, though, seems to be that body of texts which is 
in some way enabled by the relation between thought and this 
postmodern notion of apocalypse--as apocalypse without 
revelation, end without summary--and deconstruction belongs 
to this age, adopts its peculiar kind of postmodern 
apocalyptic tone, the tone which recognizes today, in 
Derrida's words, 
the apocalyptic structure of language, of writing, of 
the experience of presence, in other words of the text 
or of the mark in general: that is. of the divisible 
dispatch for which there is no self-presentation nor 
assured destination. ("Apocalyptic Tone" 28, Derrida's 
12cf. Derrida's summary of the onto-theological notion 
of apocalypse: "Truth itself is the end, the destination, 
and that truth unveils itself is the advent of the end. 
Truth is the end and the instance of the last judgment. The 
structure of the truth here would be apocalyptic. And that 
is why there would not be any truth of the apocalypse that 
is not the truth of the truth'' ("Apocalyptic Tone" 24). 
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emphasis) 
Thinking has, up until the nuclear age of its closure, 
proceeded for the most part under the impression that it can 
reveal truth, it can totalize, it can assure its 
destination; even the skeptical tradition works under the 
auspices of revealing a truth--the truth that there is no 
truth or that truth is unknowable. The postmodern epoch, 
though, is conditioned by this apocalyptic--in this 
postmodern sense of the word--structure "of the text or of 
the mark in general," a structure which frustrates the 
arrival of truth, the structure of what Derrida calls 
elsewhere "general text." 
This notion of the text or general text is the most 
criticized and misunderstood component of Derrida's thought; 
it is often read as Derrida's attempt to turn the world into 
a text, and in the process effectively to diffuse the real, 
historical problems of political and social existence by 
treating them as mere textual conundrums. 13 This is, 
13 This is a very popular misconception, and one that 
came to a head in the pages of Critical Inquiry 13 (1) 1986, 
where Anne McClintlock and Rob Nixon took Derrida to task 
for stepping out of his hermetically sealed textual world to 
write about apartheid. He replies: "Text, as I use the 
word, is not the book. No more than writing or trace, it is 
not limited to the paper which you cover with your graphism. 
It is precisely for strategic reasons ... that I found it 
necessary to recast the context of text by generalizing it 
without any limit .... that is why there is nothing 'beyond 
the text.' That's why South Africa and apartheid are, like 
you and me, part of this general text, which is not to say 
that it can be read the way one reads a book. That is why 
the text is always a field of forces: heterogeneous, 
differential, open, and so on .... That's why I do not go 
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however, simply not the case; as I argue in Chapters 2 and 
3 1 for Derrida, general text is not the text, the book, but 
rather a realm of mediation, something of a phenomenological 
life-world, the "given" network or chain that possibilizes 
discourse--in the broad sense of the word as a place where 
things are mediated--but at the same time makes it 
impossible for this discourse to arrive at any ontologically 
determinable destination, any telos. With his notion of 
general text, Derrida works out the consequences of "the 
apocalyptic structure of language," where nothing outside 
the differential network--general text--can guarantee 
meaning or arrest the chain of referrals; there is, in this 
sense, no extra-text, no term which could rule, organize, or 
regulate the system from without the system, precisely 
because the supposed master term must constitute itself 
within this network of referrals--by "referring endlessly to 
something other than itself." 14 There is no simple outside 
or beyond the closure. 
It is crucial here to note, also, that general text is, 
despite the flood of claims to the contrary, a historical 
formulation. "There is no extra-text," the infamous phrase 
by which Derrida supposedly kills history, is itself an 
'beyond the text,' in this new sense of the word text, by 
fighting and calling for a fight against apartheid" (166-7). 
14 For the latest instance of Derrida discussing--or 
should I say defending?--general text, see the Afterword to 
Limited Inc. (136-7, 148). 
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irreducibly historical formulation, situated at the 
historical site of the closure. Derrida's, in other words, 
is a postmodern thought, conditioned by a postmodern world 
which lives after Auschwitz, after Hiroshima, always under 
the shadow of an apocalypse without revelation; in fact, for 
Derrida the postmodern world is conditioned not so much by 
living, but by 
LIVING ON, the very progression that belongs, without 
belonging, to the progression of life and death. 
Living on is not the opposite of living, just as it is 
not identical with living. The relationship is 
different, different from being identical, from the 
difference of distinctions--undecided (135). 
Here we see most clearly the "worldly'' aspect of Derrida's 
thought; it is concerned not simply with texts and their 
internal workings, but it grows out of a postmodern 
consciousness: a consciousness of being a survivor, a 
consciousness of living on rather than simply living or 
dying, of living on in the undecided--of not closing off 
possibility (difference) in favor of actuality (sameness), 
that determining closure being a necessary prerequisite to 
violence--beyond (which is to say between, as there is no 
simple beyond) the oppositions or hierarchies which have 
allowed and validated the horrors of the twentieth 
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century . 15 
Living on in the between, in the undecided, at the 
limits, disrupting the will to sameness or truth (as I state 
above, disrupting the metaphysical question "what is it?'') 
is something which is "characteristic" of writing the 
postmodern; as Julia Kristeva writes, 
postmodernism is that literature which writes itself 
with the more or less conscious intention of expanding 
the signifiable and thus human realm. With this in 
mind, I should call this practice of writing an 
I 
"experience of limits," to use Georges Bataille's 
formulation: limits of language as a communicative 
system, limits of the subjective and naturally the 
sexual identity, limits of sociality .... Never before 
in the history of humanity has this exploration of the 
limits of meaning taken place in such an unprotected 
manner, and by this I mean without religious, mystical, 
or any other justification. ("Postmodernism" 137, 141) 
This questioning of the will-to-truth through an examination 
of the limits of truth is "characteristic" of postmodern 
writing and reading--where this interruptive questioning is 
15 As Andrew McKenna writes, "The question of the 
postmodern in its most far-reaching implications, which are 
nonetheless the most concrete, is the question of survival, 
of living on after the dead. A postmodern consciousness is 
indissociable, for demonstrable, concrete reasons bearing on 
the recent past as they affect the possibility of a future, 
from the consciousness of being a survivor, of living on" 
( 229) . 
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done, as Kristeva notes, in an unprecedented, "unprotected 
manner," without a traditional ontological justification. 
Here, though, we should be careful of a kind of privileging 
historicism slipping in the back door. There are, of 
course, writers previous to the postmodern or nuclear age 
who deal with the "problem" of end without revelation 
(Cervantes, Mallarme, Joyce, Sterne, Kafka, Woolf, Chaucer) 
as well as contemporary writers (even writers referred to as 
"postmodern") 16 who do not. But this postmodern 
questioning of limits--including a notion like general text, 
which Derrida explicitly ties to the question of limits--is, 
in a certain way, impossible to think outside a "postmodern" 
culture. This is, though, not to say that certain remark 
and supplementarity structures cannot be found at work in 
texts written previous to the nuclear age, but rather that 
it is precisely this nuclear logic which allows us to think 
these structures, to read their "work"--and its suppression 
16 Take, for example, the group of American poets known 
as "the postmoderns"--a broad term used to refer to the 
Beats, San Francisco Renaissance, Projectivists, New York 
School, and Confessional poets--whose aesthetics are summed 
up by Charles Altieri: "postmodern poets have been seeking 
to uncover the ways man and nature are unified, so that 
value can be seen as the result of immanent processes in 
which man is as much object as he is agent of creativity" 
(608). The revelation of meaning is taken here "directly 
from experience, in fact from the fundamental experiences of 
human life like eating and making love, and does not require 
a mediating mythology" (635). 
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--in a tradition. 17 
This reevaluation of the stakes of the assignment of 
limits and quasi-ethical imperative to expand the realm of 
the signifiable--which grows, in Kristeva's reading, out of 
an experience of limits brought about by undecidability of 
the postmodern writing/reading of texts--is finally, I 
think, where deconstruction can be put into a relation with 
writing which we would call literary, that is if this 
distinction between thinking and writing even holds at this 
point in the discussion. The undecidability or 
unthematizability of texts--brought about by the structure 
of the postmodern field (the societal and textual conditions 
equally) in which they exist--represents, in a certain way, 
the limits from which discourse becomes possible in a post-
modern context: and these limits have dire consequences for 
the totalizing impulse of the discourse of literary 
criticism, based as it is on the discourse of philosophy. 
17 As Derrida writes concerning the seemingly ignored, 
disruptive work of writing in a tradition, "it is a 
peculiarity of our epoch that, at the moment when the 
phoneticization of writing--the historical origin and 
structural possibility of philosophy as of science, the 
condition of the episteme--begins to lay hold on world 
culture, science, in its advancements, can no longer be 
satisfied with it. This inadequation had always already 
begun to make its presence felt. But today something lets 
it appear as such, allows it a kind of takeover without our 
being able to translate this novelty into clear cut notions 
of mutation, explication, accumulation, revolution, or 
tradition. These values belong no doubt to the system whose 
dislocation is presented today as such, they describe styles 
of an historical movement which was meaningful--like the 
concept of history itself--only within a logocentric epoch" 
(Grammatology 4, my emphasis). 
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As Gasche writes, 
If, in the last resort, the unthematizable because 
undecidable agencies of modern literary texts--agencies 
that are not of the order of image or concept, content 
or form, but that are textual structures--radically 
subvert the possibility of literary hermeneutics, it is 
because they represent the limits from which 
understanding and knowing become possible. (Tain 267) 
It is in the exploration of these limits from which 
understanding and knowing become possible in a postmodern 
context that I see a possible relation between 
deconstruction and postmodern literary texts. By 
"postmodern literary texts" I mean a certain body of 
contemporary "literary" writings which explores the limits 
and possibilities of writing and thinking difference rather 
than sameness, writing which can account for the possibility 
of apocalypse without revelation--writing which frustrates 
the metaphysical question of truth, the question "what is 
it?". However, I must stress again that it is highly 
problematic to "define" this writing simply in ":.erms of its 
features or historicity; the disruptions or transgressions 
of postmodern literary texts are necessarily written or 
performed--are part and parcel of the reading and writing 
process--or else they fall back into a such a descriptive 
category or theory. Such a writing then reinscribes within 
itself those marginalized differences, categories, excesses, 
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remains, groups, institutions and discourses which are 
excluded and then forgotten by a history of thought that 
raced toward totalized identity, revelation, wholeness, 
sameness, and meaning at the expense of all else. It is 
here, at or from the place called the closure of 
metaphysics, that relation between deconstruction and 
literature--as, crudely, a postmodern thinking and a 
postmodern writing--could begin to be thought, and it is 
around this set of concerns that I will examine postmodern 
thinking and literature in subsequent chapters. To begin to 
work toward some kind of specificity for these notions of 
postmodern thinking and writing, I would like to turn now to 
discuss the "problem" of representation in postmodern 
literature. This, it seems, is a crucial problem for 
postmodern writing, insofar as any disruptions it would 
perform or bring about must, in some way, go "through" 
representation--must be represented--even while 
representation experiences its closure. 
1 31 
Representation, End, Ground, Sending 
He knew but must say. To say, he must start, but this could 
never be the start, for he could never see or have seen the 
start. He could go on, only, and in pieces, pieces that did 
for him, or that is, pieces that would do. But as he did, 
he felt divided and redoubled into several places of 
himself, inside and out. How did he focus? There wasn't 
one center. 
Everything comes to pass in retraits. 
--The Post Card 
So I want to write about representation and postmodern 
literature, but I have a difficulty from the very beginning 
of this inquiry: there is a certain way in which I can 
write about nothing but representation, because a 
metaphysical structure governed by a privilege of 
representation is what makes it possible for me to say 
anything at all. Foucault thematizes this difficulty: 
the human sciences, when dealing with what is 
representation (in either conscious or unconscious 
form), find themselves treating as their object 
what is in fact their condition of possibility. 
They are always animated, therefore, by a sort of 
transcendental mobility .... They proceed from that 
which is given to representation to that which 
renders representation possible, but which is 
still representation. (Order 364, my emphasis) 
There is, then, no way I can place my two concerns in a 
simple relation and discuss one vis-a-vis the other---
something like "The Problem of Representation in Postmodern 
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Literature"--because there is no "place" outside 
representation from which to speak about it or about 
whatever "postmodern literature" might be; to do so would be 
to treat as the object of my discourse that which, in fact, 
constitutes the very conditions of possibility for discourse 
in general: a representative metaphysical structure--
characteristic of the epoch of modern subjectivity--that 
partially dictates what can be said and the ways in which it 
can be said. The only way to speak about this system, then, 
is from within; the only way to deconstruct the system is by 
thinking the system's ground--its conditions of possibility 
--carefully and problematically. This is not a prime 
directive, but rather a recognition of what Derrida calls "a 
necessary dependency of all destructive discourses: they 
must inhabit the structures they demolish" (Writing 194). 
Discussions of representation, then, are rendered 
highly problematic by their "necessary dependence" on the 
structure of representation itself. Much discussion of 
postmodern thought and literature centers around what 
theorists perceive to be postmodernism's critique and/or 
outright rejection of representation; many such readings 
presuppose, in fact, that postmodern texts are in a simple 
oppositional relation with representation--postmodernism 
against representation. 18 It seems to me that the question 
18see, for example, Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature: "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey are 
in agreement that the notion of knowledge as accurate 
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is much more complicated than that. As Derrida writes in 
his essay "Sending: On Representation," 
Today there is a great deal of thought against 
representation. In a more or less articulated or 
rigorous way, this judgment is easily arrived at: 
representation is bad. And this without being 
able to assign, in the final analysis, the place 
and necessity of that evaluation .... And yet, 
whatever the strength and the obscurity of this 
dominant current, the authority of representation 
constrains us, imposing itself on our thought 
through a whole dense, enigmatic, and heavily 
stratified history. It programs us and precedes 
us and warns us too severely for us to make a mere 
object of it, a representation, an object of 
representation confronting us, before us like a 
theme. It is even difficult to pose a systematic 
and historical question on the topic (a question 
representation, made possible by special mental processes, 
and intelligible through a general theory of 
representation, needs to be abandoned" (6); cf. Huyssen's 
After the Great Divide, where he characterizes postmodernism 
as a brand of decadent modernism "confident in its rejection 
of representation and reality" (209). For an excellent 
discussion of representation and postmodernism, see Arac's 
introduction to Postmodernism and Politics, in which he 
addresses the reception of Derrida's work in the United 
States, especially the mistaken notion that his work is 
essentially epistemological and that it is characterized by 
a "rejection of representation" (xxiv). I must also credit 
Arac for drawing my attention to the opening quotation from 
Foucault. 
of the type: "What is the system and history of 
representation?") now that our concepts of system 
and history are essentially marked by the 
structure and the closure of representation. (304) 
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In this section, I would like to discuss representation in a 
postmodern context, to work out "the place and necessity" of 
representation "now that our concepts of system and history 
are essentially marked by the structure and the closure of 
representation"--to paraphrase, I would like to discuss what 
it might mean to come to the limits of the structure of 
representation (the limits of modern subjectivity) and begin 
to recognize aporias, gaps, fissures at its limits, but 
still to inhabit a discourse possibilized by the traces of 
this structure. I will draw here on Heidegger's reading of 
the rise of representational thinking in modern philosophy 
and Derrida's reading of this concept's "fall" in postmodern 
thought. This fall brings about the closure of 
representation and in some sense makes possible an 
investigation of modern philosophy's ground, as it affects 
both philosophy and literature after subjectivity. In 
broaching the question of the literary, I will pay 
particular attention to Joseph McElroy's Plus and Ronald 
Sukenick's The Endless Short Story. 
Already, though, I encounter any number of problems, 
not the least of which is keeping my own analysis from 
simply replicating the dialectical movement of critique, 
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which is the mainspring of representation. Likewise, here 
we need to confront the disciplinary slippage created by 
employing the sense of the words "modern" and "postmodern" 
across two different disciplines where they carry different 
significations: modern philosophy designates the 
philosophies of the subject, or a period in the history of 
Western philosophy running from Descartes to Hegel; whereas 
modernism in literature studies designates a movement among 
artists at the beginning of this century. However, I want 
to suggest here, as I argue above, that postmodernism in 
literature and the arts must confront postmodernism in 
philosophy, that the postmodern in any discipline or form 
must confront the "problem" of thinking after 
representation. However, that having been said, more 
problems are created than solved: the disciplinary 
periodizing (modern/postmodern) and genre distinctions 
(literature/philosophy) that my argument seems to take for 
granted are rendered problematic by the closure of 
representation. Hence, my argument has both to trace the 
closure of representation and to recognize that the argument 
itself is subject to this very closure and the slippage it 
engenders. Thinking\Writing the postmodern must account, in 
some way, for its own status as an other discourse--a 
discourse both inside and outside the problematics of 
representation. As Derrida writes, 
This other discourse doubtless takes into account the 
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conditions of ... classical and binary logic, but it no 
longer depends entirely upon it. If the proponents of 
binary opposition think that the "ideal purity" to 
which they are obliged to appeal reveals itself to be 
"illusory," ... then they are obliged to account for this 
fact. They must transform concepts, construct a 
different "logic," a different "general theory," 
perhaps even a discourse that, more powerful than its 
logic, will be able to account for it and reinscribe 
its possibility. (Limited Inc. 117). 
It is this different logic, a logic of the postmodern that 
can reinscribe the very function of logic, which 
thinking\writing the postmodern calls for--a logic that can 
think representation, end, and ground along a different way, 
a way which Heidegger and Derrida call, among other names, 
sending. 
In his essay "The Age of the World Picture, "19 
Heidegger ties the rise of representational thinking to the 
rise of modern philosophy and its notion of the subject or 
Cartesian cogito. For Heidegger, thinking in this 
subjectivist mode literally becomes re-presenting in that 
19 The German, "Die Zeit des Weltbi ldes" from Holzwege, 
has been translated as "The Age of the World View." The 
title seems better translated as "The Age [or Epoch] of the 
World Picture" for at least two reasons: 1) Bild is clearly 
"picture," not "view"; and 2) "world view" confuses this 
analysis of the rise of the subject with Heidegger's much 
earlier analysis of Jaspers' Weltanschauung philosophy· in §2 
of the Introduction to Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 
Throughout, I wi 11 render "Bild" as "picture." 
137 
everything which presents itself must be referred or re-
presented to the normativity of the human subject; he 
writes, 
To re-present here [in the modern period] means to 
bring what is present before one [Vorhandene] as 
something confronting oneself, the person 
representing it, and to force it back into this 
relation to oneself as the normative area. 
(350/84) 
This notion of re-presenting is impossible without modern 
philosophy's notion of the subject--the subject as that 
which must filter all things confronting it through its 
subjectivity, in turn forming the basis or ground for "this 
relation to oneself as the normative area. "2° For 
Heidegger, this privilege of the subject leads to a 
humanistic notion of the world as totalizing subjectivist 
world picture with man as the absolute mean or measure for 
all things; he writes that in the epoch of re-presentational 
thinking, "man fights for the position in which he can be 
that existent which sets the standard for all existence and 
forms the directive for it" (353/87). 
But what happens to this ground of subjectivist re-
20 cf. Derrida's reading of Heidegger's notion here: 
"It is only the rendering available of the human subject 
that makes representation happen, and this rendering 
available is exactly that which constitutes the subject as 
subject. The subject is what can or believes it can offer 
itself representations, disposing them and disposing of 
them" ("Sending" 309, my emphasis). 
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presentation when man, as that which would serve as the mean 
for all other things and the ground for all determinations, 
shows itself to be a problematic category--to paraphrase 
Foucault, an invention of modern times which is fast 
approaching its end?21 When man approaches its end, these 
modern times--or, better, the time of philosophical 
modernism--and their dominant modes of thinking also 
approach their end. And this means, in a certain way, the 
end of the absolute privilege of re-presentation as well as 
the end of metaphysics, because, as Heidegger notes in "The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," "Metaphysics 
thinks beings as being in the manner of representational 
thinking" (374/62). But here the analysis moves all too 
quickly, without asking what it might mean to come to the 
end of philosophy, the end of metaphysics, the end of 
representation. In Heidegger, this notion of end cannot be 
read in the traditional, metaphysical manner--as a simple 
limit. He writes, "We understand the end of something all 
too easily in the negative sense as a mere stopping, as the 
21 of course, representation itself plays a large role 
in this "death of man"; as Foucault notes, because "man" 
cannot be both that which gives representations and that 
which is represented, it must withdraw as a category. Cf. 
Derrida's "Sending": "The subject is no longer defined only 
in its essence as the place and the placing of its 
representations; it is also, as a subject and in its 
structure as subjectum, itself apprehended as a 
representative. Man, determined first and above all as 
subject, as being-subject, finds himself interpreted 
throughout according to the structure of representation" 
(314). 
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lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence" 
("End" 374/62). For Heidegger, we cannot--without overtly 
and simplistically playing metaphysics' game--understand the 
end of re-presentative thinking (the end of philosophy) as a 
simple limit which stifles progress; such a thinking of end 
remains metaphysical, remains a representation. But, and 
perhaps more importantly, neither can we thematize this end 
as the precondition to a simple breakthrough where the 
ground of metaphysical thinking is no longer problematic. 
The question(s) of ground(s) is and will be crucial for 
postmodern thinking--thinking after modern subjectivity; 
rather than seeing the end of philosophy as the place where 
the question of grounds can be abandoned and the tradition 
simply left behind or overcome--thinking end as a simple 
limit or boundary--Heidegger sees the end of metaphysics as 
that place where these questions become most crucial, most 
problematic, and perhaps most enabling. He writes, "The end 
of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of 
philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme 
possibility" ("End" 375/63). This characterization of end 
as radical possibility rather than simple limit calls for a 
rethinking of the tradition and the question of grounds. 
There is, then, the task of rethinking modern 
philosophy's conception of representation as ground rather 
than simply thematizing representation as "bad" and/or 
thinking that we can simply move beyond it; we must try to 
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think its possibility as a condition of possibility. The 
modernist philosophical schema of representation cannot 
simply be criticized and replaced with another, equally 
problematic interpretative metatheory--to do so is to fall 
back into the metaphysical trap of representational, 
subjectivist, dialectical thinking; but neither can the 
problem of representation simply be left behind. As Derrida 
writes, 
We might say in another langauge that a criticism 
or a deconstruction of representation would remain 
feeble, vain, and irrelevant if it were to lead to 
some rehabilitation of immediacy, of original 
simplicity, of presence without repetition or 
delegation, if it were to induce a criticism of 
calculable objectivity, of criticism, of science, 
of technique, or of political representation. The 
worst regressions can put themselves in service of 
this anti representat i ona 1 prejudice. ( "Sending" 
31 1 ) 
For Derrida, it is fruitless to "criticize" representation 
in any traditional way, because such a notion of "criticism" 
presupposes a displacement of representation and its 
replacement by another system on the way to a more objective 
or scientific understanding of truth. 22 A criticism based 
22 This is not, as many critics would have it, to say 
that deconstruction is an inherently status-quo thinking 
which merely stands impotent before oppositions or simply 
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on an "antirepresentational prejudice" remains naive--and, 
essentially, representational--if it attempts to recuperate 
another simply non-representational ground for 
interpretation, if it simply pushes representation to the 
margins and moves another notion to the center. Such a 
criticism ends up simply recuperating a representational, 
metaphysical world view or hermeneutic in the name of an 
antirepresentational thinking. 
How, then, are we able to think this ground of 
representation, if we cannot overcome it or leave it behind 
in any simple way, but neither can we think in opposition to 
it in any simple way? Perhaps what we must do in a post-
modern epoch is to think ground differently, to think the 
conditions of possibility for thinking in a different way, 
to ask questions other than "how do we criticize this 
position or overcome this opposition"? As Derrida writes, 
all this "is difficult to conceive, as it is difficult to 
conceive anything at all beyond representation, but [it] 
commits us perhaps to thinking altogether differently" 
("Sending" 326). Neverthe 1 ess, the question remains, 
insistent: how can we conceive of a relation to this 
philosophical ground, these conditions of possibility, which 
might possibilize a "thinking altogether differently"? 
neutralizes them. As I argue throughout, criticism--as the 
overturning or neutralizing of oppositions--is a crucial 
part of deconstruction, but it does not constitute the "end" 
of a deconstructive analysis. 
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In "Sending: On Representation," Derrida develops 
Heidegger's notion of the "sending" of being as a possible 
postmodern relation to philosophy's status as ground for 
thinking, as conditions of possibility. Heidegger refines 
his notion of sending in the late lecture series "On Time 
and Being"; he writes, 
In the beginning of Western thinking, Being is 
thought, but not as the "It gives'' [Es gibt] as 
such. The latter withdraws in favor of the gift 
which It gives. That gift is thought and 
conceptualized from then on exclusively as Being 
with regard to beings. A giving which gives only 
its gift, but in the giving holds itself back and 
withdraws, such a giving we call a sending [das 
Schicken]. According to the meaning of giving 
which is to be thought in this way Being--that 
which It gives--is what is sent. Each of its 
transformations remains destined [geschickt] in 
this manner .... to giving as sending there belongs 
keeping back--such that the denial of the present 
_and the with ho 1 ding of the p resent____g_l ay within the. 
gjving of what has been and what will be. (8,22/ 
8,23 my emphasis) 
For Heidegger, this peculiar sort of ground-as-sending both 
gives or sends itself (offers conditions of possibility) and 
holds itself back (withdraws); it is not a traditional, 
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metaphysical notion of ground in that it does not offer the 
gift of presence in its sending--its withdrawal of presence 
as it simultaneously offers the conditions of possibility 
for presence makes simple notions of presence impossible to 
ground: hence, "to giving as sending there belongs keeping 
back--such that the denial of the present and the 
withholding of the present play within the giving of what 
has been and what will be." This notion of simultaneous 
withdrawing and offering from a shifting ground--which he 
names Ereignis--allows Heidegger to thematize the epochs of 
Being in an other-than-positivistic way; he writes, 
To hold back is, in Greek, epoche. Hence we speak of 
epochs of the destiny of Being [Eoochen des 
Seinsgeschickes]. Epoch does not here mean a span of 
time in occurrence, but rather the fundamental 
characteristic of sending, the actual holding back of 
itself in favor of the discernability of the gift. 
(9/9) 
For Derrida, Heidegger's notion of sending is a place 
to begin to think a postmodern (post-subjectivist) ground, a 
quasi-transcendental ground which is no longer a 
traditional, simply transcendental or immanent ground, but 
which continues to function as that which gives a peculiar 
kind of universality through offering conditions of 
possibility. Gasche explains this notion: 
The quasitranscendentals upon which philosophy's 
universality is grounded are no longer simply 
transcendentals, for they represent neither a 
priori structures of the subjective cognition of 
objects nor the structures of understanding of 
Being by the Dasein. The quasitranscendentals 
are, on the contrary, conditions of possibility 
and impossibility concerning the very conceptual 
difference between subject and object and even 
between Dasein and Being. (Tain 317) 23 
For Derrida, there is a certain sort of 
quasitranscendentality in Heidegger's notion of sending--
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especially in ground's giving and simultaneously taking away 
conditions of possibility ("conditions of possibility and 
impossibility"), but Derrida maintains that Heidegger's 
notion remains haunted by the specter of teleological 
thinking in that sending is "destined" [geschickt] from 
ground to thinking in various epochs of Being. 24 Also, it 
seems suspect to Derrida that there could be a pure gift of 
time or Being, a giving prior to a system(aticity) that 
always already makes pure giving--giving without some kind 
of reciprocation, giving (from) without a system, "the 
23cf. Limited Inc. pp. 127ff. 
24 cf. "On Time and Being": "What is historical in the 
history of Being is determined by what is sent forth in 
destining, not by an indeterminately thought up occurrence 
[Das Ge sch i cht 1 i che der Gesch i chte des Se ins best i mmt ·s i ch 
aus Geschickhaften eines Schickens, nicht aus einem 
unbestimmt gemeinten Geschehen]" (8-9/ 8-9, my emphasis). 
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actual holding back of itself in favor of the discernability 
of the gift" -- i mposs i b 1 e. 25 
Given Derrida's reading, Heidegger's epochs of Being--
the epoch of representation, for example--are destined or 
given from the ground of Being to arrive at certain points 
in the history of Being. To bolster this reading, Derrida 
turns to "The Age of the World Picture'' and Heidegger's 
discussion of the vast difference between the Greeks' notion 
of truth as unconcealment or aletheia and the modern 
conception of truth as re-presentation. Heidegger concludes 
that "in Greece the world cannot become a picture"; but he 
hastens to add: 
On the other hand, the fact that for Plato the 
existent is determined as eidos (appearance, view) 
is the presupposition, coming far in advance [weit 
voraus geschickte] and for a long time acting 
secretly and indirectly, for the eventual 
transformation of the world to a picture. (351/84) 
Derrida quickly picks up on this notion of Heidegger's, 
arguing that such Heideggerian sendings and transformations 
are "fated, predestined, geschickte, that is to say, 
literally sent, dispensed, assigned by a fate as a summary 
of history" ("Sending" 311). For Derrida, such a notion of 
sending presupposes that ground was, is, or could be present 
to itself, able to give the gift of presence but unwilling 
'~ 
'"Cf. Glas, 242-244a. 
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to do so--instead, working "secretly and indirectly" to 
shape the history of Being. But, Derrida asks, what if this 
ground is always already divided, never present to itself, 
discontinuous, unable to gather itself and unable to send to 
a specific destination, unable to secure the history of 
Being: 
Wherever this being-together or with itself of the 
envoi of being divides itself, defies the legein, 
frustrates the destination of the envoi, is not 
the whole schema of Heidegger's reading challenged 
in principle, deconstructed from a historical 
point of view? If there has been representation, 
it is perhaps just because the envoi of being was 
originally menaced in its being-together, in its 
Geschick, by divisibility or dissension (what I 
would call dissemination). (323) 
This quasitranscendental ground that Derrida posits--this 
ground which itself is subject to dissemination and trace--
cal ls for a different kind of thinking of ground: a ground 
"older" than any philosophical distinction, but one which in 
no way offers a pure origin or beginning point to validate 
the traditional work of these distinctions; a ground which 
could not assure the arrival of a sending, which could not 
determine "positive," inexorable circumstances and thereby 
function metaphysically. Rather, in Derrida's notion of 
sending as envoi, 
The envoi is as it were pre-ontological, because 
it does not gather itself together or because it 
gathers itself only in dividing itself, in 
differentiating itself, because it is not original 
or originally a sending-from (the envoi of 
something-that-is or of a present which would 
precede it, still less of a subject, or of an 
object by and for a subject), because it is not 
single and does not begin with itself although 
nothing precedes it; and it issues forth only in 
already sending back; it issues forth only on the 
basis of the other, the other in itself without 
itself. Everything begins by referring back, that 
is to say, does not begin ... from the very start, 
every renvois, there is not a single renvois but 
from then on, always, a multiplicity of renvois, 
so many different traces referring back to other 
traces and to traces of others. (324) 
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Such a notion of ground as discontinuous and never present 
to itself--as ground which issues forth only by issuing back 
to "itself" which is already plural--necessitates that the 
envoi be at the same time "a multiplicity of renvois," an 
unsheltered origin which cannot master that which it 
engenders; this ground--which respects the unthematizability 
of the Other and moves through the entre of difference 
rather than the binary oppositions of sameness--may be a way 
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to conceive of the thinking differently about representation 
that the postmodern calls for. 
But perhaps Derrida has all-too-hastily denied 
Heidegger's Ereignis such a status as withdrawing, 
postmodern ground. Derrida often calls attention to 
Heidegger's continued claim that the essence of important 
terms in his thinking (technology, representation, Ereignis) 
does not belong to those terms: so the essence of 
technology is nothing technological, 26 the essence of 
representation is not a representation ("Sending" 314), and 
Ereignis (which makes the history of Being as sending 
possible) is itself unhistorical. About this move in the 
Heideggerian text, Derrida writes, "It is in any case by a 
gesture of this type that Heidegger interrupts or 
disqualifies, in different domains, specular reiteration or 
infinite regress [renvoi a l'infini]" ("Sending" 314). 
Derrida argues that when Heidegger removes the "essence'' of 
his terms from the field(s) they engender, he shelters this 
grounding function--precisely protecting ground from the 
play of the network, protecting ground from the potential 
slippage of dissemination and thereby guaranteeing the 
arrival of Being's sending. For Derrida, Heidegger's 
withdrawal of ground serves primarily to protect ground's 
purity more rigorously. 
26on this point, see a brief question-and-answer 
exchange between Derrida and Geoff Bennington in "On Reading 
Heidegger" 175-76. 
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Derrida's reading, though, can be complicated 
considerably by closely examining Heidegger's notion of the 
"grounding" function of Ereignis. In "On Time and Being," 
for example, Heidegger insists that Ereignis, not Being, is 
the matter for thinking--that "Being, which lies in sending, 
is no longer what is to be thought explicitly"; he 
continues: 
Thinking then stands in and before that which has sent 
the various forms of epochal Being. This, however, 
what sends as Ereignis, is itself unhistorical 
[ungeschichtlich], or more precisely without destiny 
[geschicklos] .... With the entry into Ereignis, its own 
way of concealment proper to it also arrives. Ereianis 
[appropriation] is itself Enteignis [expropriation]. 
(42/44) 
Here we see Heidegger performing the very move which Derrida 
thematizes as a protective one: Heidegger seemingly removes 
Ereignis from the history of Being which it renders 
possible, thereby mystifying Ereignis by attempting to seal 
it hermetically, beyond the reach of contamination. But 
what are we to make of Heidegger's claim that the thinking 
of Ereignis "stands in and before [in und vor] that which 
has sent the various forms of epochal Being"? It would seem 
that Ereignis is already divided as a ground, standing not 
simply before what it engenders (as an a priori ground 
would), but both in and before--an already double(d) mark at 
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the origin. Also, here Heidegger refines the "unhistorical" 
essence of Ereignis not as a transhistorical grounding 
function that fatalistically determines the field it makes 
possible, but as the ground of a history that is itself 
without destiny--a Geschick that is, in and by its 
"essence," geschicklos. Top this off with Heidegger's 
insistence that the "concealment proper'' to Ereignis is 
itself Enteignis--expropriation, dispersion, one could name 
it "dissemination"--and we would seem to be a long way from 
the sheltered ground and the assured sending and arrival of 
Being that Derrida reads in Heidegger's texts. And, one 
could further ask, even if Derrida's deconstruction of 
Heidegger's grounding function is on the mark, what is to be 
said about differance--which, it has been argued, is clearly 
heterogeneous ("literally neither a word nor a concept" 
("Differance" 3]) to the field which it makes possible, and 
therefore precisely the sort of ground-beyond-question that 
Derrida accuses Heidegger of producing. 27 Derrida responds 
that differance is not an essence or origin--that 
undecidability does not exist in general as a sort of 
negative ground. 28 He argues that deconstruction is a 
27 See, for examp 1 e, John Bo 1 y' s "Deconstruction as a 
General System": "Differance is a mystified concept, an 
absolute, all-inclusive origin that is strategically, 
conveniently put beyond analytical reach" (201). 
28see "Differance," esp. pp. 26-27. 
r. 
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situation, not an essence. 29 The same argument, however, 
can be (and has been) 30 made in favor of Heidegger. And so 
on ... in a sort of renvoi a l'infini. 
I let citations stand in place of arguments here not 
because, as Habermas' infamous phrase would have it, 
postmodernists "[do] not belong to those philosophers who 
like to argue" ( 193) , 31 but because an extended discussion 
of the "Who's-more-metaphysical?" type would ultimately 
prove unsatisfying and would remain (rather overtly) within 
the bounds of representation as critique. Rather, I step 
back and hesitate, pointing out that the critico-
interpretative vertigo I outline above is part and parcel of 
the problematic I am discussing under the rubric 
thinking\writing the postmodern: there is no guaranteeing 
the arrival of a message--the economies of (mis)reading 
between and among Heidegger, Derrida, and their readers can 
be accounted for by the very "theory" under consideration 
here. This accounting for non-plenitude, non-arrival, and 
29see Limited Inc., pp. 115ff. 
30see Reiner SchUrmann's Heidegger on Being and Acting: 
From Principles to Anarchy: "In reading Heidegger from 
beginning to end ... the practical implications of his 
thinking leap into view: the play of a flux of practice, 
without stabilization and presumably carried to the point of 
an incessant fluctuation in institutions, is an end in 
itself. The turn beyond metaphysics thus reveals the 
essence of praxis: exchange deprived of a principle" (18). 
31This charge is specifically leveled against Derrida; 
see his response to Habermas in a long footnote to Limited 
Inc. , pp. 1 56-58. 
152 
errancy in an other-than-negative way is part of the 
"project" of thinking\writing the postmodern: these texts 
are--if my "argument is correct"--in-scribed within the 
network(s) they de-scribe, and are subject to its play. Or, 
as Derrida writes about Heidegger's attempt to tell the 
story of Being, 
As soon as there are renvois, and that is always 
already, something like representation no longer 
waits and we must arrange to tell this story 
differently, from renvois of renvois to renvois of 
renvois, in a destiny which is never certain of 
gathering itself up, of identifying itself, or of 
determining itself. (325) 
Perhaps this postmodern call "to tell this story 
differently"--to tell a story which does not move toward a 
transcendental signified--allows us to bring the question of 
literature onto the scene, as a challenge to the 
philosophical, representational mode of story telling. 
Joseph McElroy's Plus takes up this challenge by trying 
to think these problematic postmodern relations--by trying 
to think the status of the representing subject after the 
"death" of the subject and of representation. Plus is a 
different kind of science fiction story about a disembodied 
human brain called Imp (Interplanetary Monitoring Platform) 
Plus which is put into orbit of Earth and monitored by 
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Ground. 32 Imp Plus sends and receives messages from 
Ground, but it always receives more than these messages. 
The text begins: 
He found it all around. It opened and was close. 
He felt it was himself, but felt it was more. It 
nipped open from outside in and from inside out. 
Imp Plus found it all around. He was Imp Plus and 
this was not the start. (1) 
This "more"--the "plus" that simultaneously "was himself" 
and "was more"--is a recurring concern of McElroy's text. 
This initial "Plus" or "more" (at the beginning of the book 
which is "not the start"), this excess--of message, of self, 
of experience--cannot be thematized into a totalized 
metaphysical picture. The messages from Ground come on a 
closed Concentration Loop, but even this direct sending does 
not guarantee their intelligibility; the more, the 
dissemination always already at work even at the "source," 
makes the meaning of the sendings from Ground difficult to 
control: "through the message impulses [from Ground] Imp 
Plus knew a thing more than what they told" (5); "Ground 
said the word" ( 7), but "Imp Pl us knew more" ( 8). As the 
text continues, this excess of message and of self, this 
ground withdrawing from both Imp Plus and from Ground, makes 
not only the meaning, but the very destination of the 
32 The "story" is very much more comp 1 i cated than I make 
it out here. For an excellent distillation of the plot of 
Plus, see David Porush's The Soft Machine (172-75). 
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sendings from Ground to Imp Plus impossible to control: 
"And Imp Plus did not know if the transmission was to Ground 
or him. He seemed to be transmitting within 
himself .... There was more all around, and the more all 
around was joining itself to Imp Plus" (36). This Plus, 
this more, this excess of signification, is one of the 
things that Derrida points to as a possibilization for 
deconstruction, for a postmodern exploration of the question 
of ground; he writes, 
If I had to risk a single definition of 
deconstruction, one as brief, elliptical, and 
economical as a password, I would say simply and 
without overstatement: plus d'une langue--both 
more than a language and no more of s language. 
(Memoires 15) 
The excess that Imp Plus experiences in the messages from 
Ground, "more than a language," is what makes the sendings 
from G~ound possible (allows them to be thematized in 
language, to be offered as representations), but 
simultaneously makes it impossible for them to come to the 
specific destination and interpretative closure that the 
representing, philosophical subject wishes to achieve--"no 
more of s langauge," no more of a single, univocal, self-
present message to be transmitted between stable 
interpreting subjects, and no more of a guide from the 
Ground of language as representation: "Ground did not fee 1 
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familiar now" (25). 
But this problematizing of the question of ground does 
not lead to a simple abandonment of the question of ground--
for Imp, Ground cannot simply be turned off or abandoned 
when it shows itself as problematic: "One thing he could do 
he found by having done it. This was to hear Ground's 
transmissions as silence. Yet when and how weren't sure" 
(73). Imp Plus contemplates turning off the sendings from 
Ground, but finds this impossible because the very activity 
of thinking--in this case, the category of negation--is shot 
through with and implicated by the metaphysical ground of 
representation. How or when can the conditions of 
possibility for discourse and thinking be abandoned or 
turned off, especially if it is these conditions which are 
being interrogated? The only way Imp can conceive of a 
different mode of thinking is through the system of a 
present mode of thinking, so he must interrogate the ground 
that modernist thinking stands on if he is to think 
differently: 
So all he knew was that what life he was possessed 
of inclined him to give Ground answers. In return 
for answers that in turn might make him know the 
more that he had come to be. (170) 
In order to theorize his postmodern existence--one 
characterized by a recognition of the inevitable excess 
which makes totalizing systems untenable--Imp engages the 
156 
ground of the modernist systems which his postmodern 
knowledge exceeds; this ground must be interrogated if he is 
to "know the more that he had come to be" on the way to 
postmodern thinking--a thinking that is inevitably, Imp 
realizes, in two places at once, both inside and outside 
representation as the language of the subject: "Imp Plus 
thought his being outside and inside had hit him with an 
impedance of doub 1 e vision" ( 50). This doub 1 e vision, 
needless to say, impedes my own sight of Plus; I am, in 
reading the text, inside a problematic of representation as 
critique while simultaneously attempting to open up this 
reading or critique to an outside, an excess, to the plus 
which makes reading Plus (im)possible. 
It is this "double vision" that a postmodern thinking 
and writing attempts to attend to--a double vision caused by 
"being inside and outside'' the structures of a thinking that 
is to be displaced. But if the postmodern must both 
displace and account for the displacement of the modern, 
then stubborn question of how such displacement is possible 
needs to be asked: how is it possible both to make use of 
and also to displace--to be inside and outside--the thinking 
of a tradition? Derrida likens this situation--the 
postmodern situation--to writing, receiving, thinking a post 
card: 
its lack or excess of address prepares it to fall 
into all hands: a post card, an open letter in 
which the secret appears, but indecipherably .... 
What does a post card want to say to you? On what 
conditions is it possible? (Post Card 17 November 
1979) 
157 
Derrida here poses the questions of end, sending, ground, 
and representation using the metaphor of a post card: a 
representation (a "world picture," one might say) sent along 
its way with the distinct possibility of never reaching a 
specific destination, open to many readings along the way. 
However, given its limited discursive space and the fact 
that--unlike a letter--its representations are open and 
inscribed directly on its surface, a post card is also prone 
to many misreadings along the way, and this is what a 
thinking\writing the postmodern attempts to account for: 
not only the possibility of plenitude, understanding, 
reading, but the simultaneous possibility--engendered by the 
same ground, by the same conditions of possibility--of non-
plenitude, misunderstanding, misreading. And it is perhaps 
this ability to understand the problematics of the 
(non)arrival of the post card which is the condition of 
possibility for postmodern writing and thinking; maybe it 
requires, as Derrida writes, 
Knowing how to play well with the poste restante. 
Knowing how not to be there and how to be strong 
for not being there right away. Knowing how not 
to deliver on command, how to wait and to make 
wait ... to the point of dying without mastering 
anything of the final destination. The post is 
always en reste, and always restante. It always 
awaits the addressee [destinataire] who might 
always, by chance, not arrive. (Post Card 
191/206) 
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Perhaps postmodern knowledge is "itself'' this writing of the 
approach, the never-not-yet of the (im)possible (non)arrival 
of truth; a conception of end in this thinking differently 
about metaphysics and about literature--end as other than 
simple limit--allows us to thematize this approach without 
arrival of meaning, this envoi, as other than a lamentable 
situation. As Derrida writes, "this divisibility of the 
envoi has nothing negative about it, it is not a lack, it is 
altogether different from subject, from signifier" 
("Sending" 324). We can thematize this envoi as a 
lamentable situation only from the premises of untenable 
metaphysical system, a system which is experiencing its 
closure. And Derrida's Post Card not only thematizes but 
also enacts or performs this (im)possible (non)arrival of 
truth after the closure of representation: the text is 
written in short, cryptic, sometimes discontinuous sections 
which strain and finally crack traditional distinctions 
between letters and post cards, between philosophy and 
literature, between the discourse of truth and the discourse 
of fables. 
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But despite Derrida's insistence that a writing of the 
post card shakes representation, it is important even--
perhaps especially--here to hesitate, to point out that the 
metaphor of thinking\writing the post card--if taken solely 
stylistically, as the "form" of the postmodern--risks the 
arrival of a new representation, a new world picture 
centered around the cryptic ambiguity and catchy slogans of 
a post card. One need only think of the myriad discourses 
(advertising and architecture, for example) which locate 
their notion of the "postmodern" in the short, ambiguous 
juxtaposition of unrelated images to see that this has 
already happened--and, one is quick to add, to reiterate the 
inadequacy of reading the postmodern as a sheerly stylistic 
phenomenon (what Lacoue-Labarthe has called the "rag-bag" 
school of postmodernism). 33 Such misreadings and 
misappropriations are, of course, inevitable in any period, 
but postmodernists, in attempting to account for these 
misreadings, can also become aware of the cultural logic of 
(mis)appropriation which .fuels them--to paraphrase an 
unlikely source, to understand how bad things happen to good 
ideas--and thereby remain aware of the risks of 
thinking\writing the postmodern. As Derrida writes, 
... "thought" risks in its turn (but I believe this risk 
is unavoidable--it is the risk of the future itself) 
33 Lacoue-Labarthe's remark is cited in Gasche's 
"Postmodernism and Rationality" (534). 
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being reappropriated by socio-political forces that 
could find it in their interest in certain situations. 
Such a 'thought' indeed cannot be produced outside of 
certain historical, techno-economic, politico-
institutional and linguistic conditions. A strategic 
analysis that is to be as vigilant as possible must 
thus with its eyes wide open attempt to ward off such 
reappropriations. ("Principle" 17) 
This problem of reappropriation--often criticized as 
something postmodernists celebrate--brings us back to the 
necessity of the double move: the necessity of both 
philosophical thematization (a thinking) as well as a kind 
literary reflexivity (a writing) which can disrupt the 
reappropriation of dialectical sublation; a double move 
which can attempt to disrupt the reappropriation of the 
postmodern as a commodity, as a programmatic institutional 
scheme--in short, as a representation.34 
34This is not to say that deconstruction or Heidegger's 
thinking are not commodifiable; aside from the more obvious 
academic commodifications, one need only note Bob Mackie's 
Spring 1990 advertising campaign with Bloomingdale's ("A new 
cool of thought. A new philosophy of style. Deconstruct. 
Lighten up. It's a 1itt1 e more free."] and the recent 
"Applied Heidegger" movement [cf. Gottleib's "Heidegger for 
Fun and Profit"] to see that there is indeed a rampant 
appropriation mind-set at work in what is perhaps too 
blithely called late capitalist society (a mind-set which, 
it should be noted, depends upon representation--upon the 
consumability of representations); however, it seems hasty 
to indict Derrida and Heidegger as cheerleaders for these 
misappropriations, or to accuse them of being romantically 
unaware of the dangers of reappropriation. See, in addition 
to numerous Derrida essays (esp. "Living On," Memoires, and 
"Principle"), Heidegger's remarks about the university, 
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And with this double move we return to the question of 
literature--to the question of the specificity, the place of 
literature--in a postmodern situation. Perhaps literature, 
what we call the literary, has always, from before the 
beginning, been that which poses the greatest danger to 
representation: perhaps it can be called the "post" which 
has always haunted the "modern", 35 the (im)possibility of 
representation which has haunted representation. Perhaps 
now--from the place we call the closure of representation--
we are able to read this threat that literature poses. 
Literature has existed throughout the modern, subjectivist 
period (one could argue throughout its entire history) only 
in, by, and for philosophy--only within the problematics of 
a revelation of its truth. Literature exists in the 
subjectivist period primarily insofar as it represents 
experience--the edifying truth embedded in the fiction of 
the fable. But what happens after Nietzsche, when the 
discourse of truth shows itself to be a fable? Literature 
comes to be that which can, in some sense, mark the break, 
the interruption, the insufficiency of truth as 
representation, and the necessity to tell the story 
differently. Hence a certain privilege of literature, of 
writing, in coming to grips with a postmodern logic; but, as 
capital ism, and the "gigantic" in "The Age of the World 
Picture." 
35 r steal this phrase from a conversation with John 
Protevi. 
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Lacoue-Labarthe warns, 
If writing has this privilege ... it is not because we 
are finally delivered from the world, from presence 
(and from representation)--as one now hastens to add 
rather quickly--by simply inverting (or even not 
inverting at all) metaphysical oppositions. Rather it 
is because writing is, above all, this reflection of 
experience where reflection (and hence experience) 
constantly undoes itself. ("Fable" 55-6) 
Postmodern writing (postmodern literature, postmodern text) 
then becomes the place (the site, the space) where the logic 
of the renvois (the logic of a writing which cannot control 
its own destination, the logic of what we would call the 
postmodern) moves and shows itself--as thinking\writing, 
that "reflection of experience where reflection (and hence 
experience) constantly undoes itself." It is not, as 
Lacoue-Labarthe maintains, a matter of inverting strategies 
--of scrapping the subjectivist category of representation 
and being free of it--but rather a matter of constantly 
undoing, of rethinking representation, end, and ground in 
writing--of thinking\writing the post card. 
So the literary seems a privileged place to ask the 
question of thinking\writing the postmodern--provided, that 
is, literature can twist free 36 from before the law of 
36 r lift this phrase from John Sal 1 is, who al lows -it to 
resonate as "the slightest twist, setting one from that 
moment adrift from the logic of opposition, adrift in a 
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philosophy, from before the law of representation which 
would give literature its form, its signifying transparency, 
its end. Literature can, perhaps, attempt to twist free 
from representation in being end-less, rejecting the 
transcendental signified--remaining a story without ends. A 
text like Ronald Sukenick's The Endless Short Story. In 
the penultimate section of ESS, "The End of the Endless 
Short Story, Continued," Sukenick asks the question of 
writing the postmodern, of writing the end-less, of writing 
a tenuously addressed post card from the closure of 
representation: "the end of one ti me is a 1 ways the 
beginning of another kind of time," he writes, "And who 
knows what the mailman may bring?" (130). Sukenick plays on 
notions of time and end in his text; his is a continuing 
rather than a simple end--an ''End, continued," an end which, 
like the postcard, may or may not arrive. In fact, the 
text's final endless story is titled "Post Card," and is 
characterized as 
a post card from THE ENDLESS SHORT STORY. THE ENDLESS SHORT 
STORY has a secret ambition it wants to write the Great Amer 
ican Postcard. The~e are some of the requirements for The 
Great American Postcard it has to have a Great Character. 
It has to have an All Encompassing Plot. It has to be Signific 
ant and easy to read. It should Be Serious but not so seri 
ous as to make us feel bad. (130) 
The traditional criteria for the form of a representative 
certain oblique opposition to logic" (160). 
37This quotation, as well as the ones which follow, 
contain Sukenick's original line breaks and spelling. 
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narrative are satirized here by Sukenick as the 
"requirements for the Great American Postcard": totalized, 
logical plot; a serious, significant--but not too 
depressing--theme; and simple, consumable readability. 
Sukenick's text possesses precious few of these 
"requirements": it is discontinuous, playful, and 
unreadable--that is, if reading means the consumption of "an 
All Encompassing Plot." The fractured "form'' of Sukenick's 
text also doubles or performs the fracturing "content": the 
fracturing of the text makes the call for the Great American 
Postcard "to be Signific/ ant and easy to read" a difficult. 
one to fulfill. In fact, because the Great American 
Postcard is itself a sending from the already disseminated 
ground of Sukenick's text--"a post card from THE ENDLESS 
SHORT STORY," a postcard within a postcard--the distinctions 
of form and content (origin and end, context and text, 
philosophy and literature) are themselves subject to a 
fracturing. The "end"--the revelation of meaning, the 
transcendental signified that representation has always 
dreamed of--is literally de-formed here by Sukenick: the 
form of language as representation is literally broken or 
cracked on the page in Sukenick's attempt to write/think in 
an other way. 
But Sukenick is not simply gushing abstract thoughts 
onto the page in random order--a romantic, subjectivist 
project to be sure; rather, his text both enacts and 
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thematizes (in a simultaneous double movement) the 
destructuring of the language and tradition of 
representation--the conditions of possibility given to 
postmodern literature. Sukenick writes of the tradition as 
alphabet soup dissolving in the thick warm broth of humanism 
fish food again. For as Captain Postcard knows the target 
is always poetry. And the bullet is poetry. And the gun is 
poetry. Every poem destroys the language a little. Blows a hunk 
off the stale i·ntractable block of it. Blows it to bit 
s so the fish can eat again and multiply in their many surpr 
ising species shapes and hues only to fall prey to bigger f 
ish or to fish that are smaller but more numerous and one ho 
pes more lively like dull unwieldy epistolary novels that break 
down into constituent postcards while tragic Captain Postcar 
d sails off his moment past to meet his fate in the bland de 
pths of cliche. What you hear is the sound of fish nibbling 
alphabets. It's three generations later and all of this has 
happened a 1 ready. ( 131 ) 
For Sukenick, the literature of the past gives conditions of 
possibility to a postmodern literature, which must work 
within the framework of the past insofar as it must use the 
same language and acknowledge its tradition as 
representation, but Sukenick is here literally rethinking 
the tradition of representation "three generations later." 
In Sukenick's text, this tradition is to undergo not only a 
critique but a destructur i ng: "the target/ is a 1 ways 
poetry. And the bullet is poetry. And the gun is/ poetry"; 
and each postmodern text "destroys the language a little. 
Blows a/ hunk off the stale intractable block of it. Blows 
it to bit/ s." Postmodern text destroys the language of the 
past to allow others to feed on its innovations and further 
open up the system to the possibility of thinking 
differently. The language of representation is the only 
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language we have, so the forms we take from the past--the 
"dull unwieldy epistolary novels" of the Eighteenth century 
--must "break down into constituent postcards'': the 
monolith of writing as representation must be broken down 
"so the fish can eat again and multiply," so artists can 
produce new forms. Indeed, the question of form here is 
crucial for Sukenick--his text both uses and disrupts forms 
of language as representation, but it does so without 
offering a ready-made form with which to replace 
representation. In this way, his text is both inside and 
outside representation: it gives way to an endless 
rewriting\rethinking of form--an approach of form--and 
broaches the possibility of thinking differently, thinking 
end-lessly, thinking as writing, thinking\writing the 
postmodern. 
This different thinking--an other thinking rather than 
another thinking--likewise calls for a different practice of 
literary "criticism." Sukenick concludes his text with two 
literary critics fishing for the meaning of the Great 
American Postcard--for the end of The Endless Short Story: 
Two fishermen with elaborate gear stand o 
ver a pool and talk about it. They haul out fish one after 
another club them pull out their guts. When they're done the 
y string them up on their car and take a snapshot. And ther 
e it is. The Great American Postcard. They stutter off in the 
clumsy model T of analysis bringing home food for though 
t. Dear ESS. Went fishing today but all I caught was a pos 
tcard and it wasn't Serious. Didn't have no plot. No charac 
(132) 
Here Sukenick suggests a certain practice of literary 
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criticism: haul out the fish--the new texts fed on the bits 
of langauge blown off by the gun of postmodern writing--and 
"club them pull out their guts" for a meaning, a 
representation, a world picture, a snapshot. Such a 
practice allows the critics to "stutter off in the/ clumsy 
model T of analysis bringing home food for though/ t," to 
bring the food for thought to the classroom as a dead fish 
brought home in a model T of paradigmatic analysis. But 
what they will have caught is the "Great American Postcard" 
--a sending which, in the end, cannot be "hooked." Or can 
it? A question remains: what have 1 caught here? Indeed, 
am I myself caught in the wide-angle lens which takes the 
fishermen/critics' snapshot, next to any number of dead 
fish: Sukenick, McElroy, Derrida, Heidegger? Have they 
become mounted and stuffed above these pages; has 
representation been waiting here, quietly at the end of this 
discussion, to reimpose its order? Perhaps, as there is no 
absolute escape from representation, no clean place or 
language--no untouched fishin' hole. But there remains also 
at this end an other notion of end, a hesitation rather than 
a resolution, a challenge to the fishing licence issued by 
representation, a sending that remains unapprehended: "Went 
fishing today but all I caught was a pas/ tcard and it 
wasn't Serious. Didn't have no p 1 ot. No charac." End of 
story; end of a certain kind of stories--or, perhaps more 
precisely, end of a certain kind of writing; end of a 
certain kind of thinking. End of a certain notion of 
end ( s). 
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CHAPTER 5 
GRAVITY'S RAINBOW AND THINKING THE POSTMODERN OTHER 
Alas, who is there 
we can make use of? Not angels, not men; 
and already the knowing brutes are aware 
that we don't feel very secure at home 
within our interpreted world. 
--Rilke 
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, 
but to refuse what we are. 
--Foucault 
There's no real decision here, neither lines of power nor 
cooperation. Decisions are never really made--at best they 
manage to emerge, from a chaos of peeves, whims, 
hallucinations and all-around assholery. This is less a 
fighting team than nest full of snits, blues, crochets, and 
grudges, not a rare or fabled bird in the lot. Its survival 
seems, after all, only a mutter of blind fortune groping 
through the heavy marbling skies one Titanic-Night at a 
time. Which is why Slothrop now observes his coalition with 
hopes for success and hopes for disaster about equally high 
(and no, that doesn't cancel out to apathy--it makes a loud 
dissonance that dovetails inside you sharp as knives). 
--Gravity's Rainbow (676) 
At this point in this work, an urgent question 
reemerges: how does one proceed after the end of a notion 
of ends? How does or can one read the postmodern? How does 
one read--let alone write about or "criticize"--a text that 
is perhaps the postmodern text par excellence, Gravity's 
Rainbow (hereafter GR), an encyclopedic, end-less text whose 
difficulty and resistance to interpretation are legendary, 
even within the criticism which.would want to interpret it? 
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How does a critic or discipline respond to a text that 
resists the paradigms of criticism, that always seems to 
elude being mastered, that puts aside the possibility of a 
determinate decision concerning its meaning? As I have 
suggested above, one way to deal with such an impasse is 
"simply" to re-thematize the work of criticism, to 
allegorize reading or critical work as the revelation of its 
own impossibility--the route taken by a certain kind of 
rhetorical deconstructive criticism. Strangely enough, this 
route is largely untravelled in Pynchon criticism, though 
almost all readings of GR contain a caveat about the 
difficulty, impossibility, or undesirability of totalizing 
the text. 1 In fact, for the majority of Pynchon scholars, 
the way into a reading of GR is precisely through this 
difficulty, through the text's status somewhere between 
meaning and non-meaning: GR is consistently thematized in 
terms of its richness (its vast size, complex use of 
sources, and highly complex narrative constructions and 
obfuscations), a richness which in turn offers criticism 
multiple--perhaps infinite--interpretations. 2 
1see, as a general caveat, Bernard Duyfhuizen's "Taking 
Stock," a review essay of 26 years of Pynchon criticism; he 
writes that "all future critics of Pynchon must remember the 
lessons of the past: his complex texts resist reduction, 
and patterns of meaning rarely extend beyond momentary, and 
sometimes illusory, conditions of being" (88). 
2There is, in fact, an entire genre of Pynchon 
criticism which takes this "encyclopedic" route; see, -in 
addition to Mendelson's seminal "Gravity's Encyclopedia," 
Toloyan's "War as Background in GR," Weisenburger's A_GR 
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Paradoxically, however, such a critical maneuver can 
end up treating discontinuity or unthematizability as a 
continuous theme--which, once uncovered, reveals that GR is 
not really unthematizable at all. GR's rich ambiguity 
becomes, rather, its over-arching theme, and the novel 
becomes an allegory for the ambiguity of the world and of 
art--for their plurality. In the secondary literature, GR 
is consistently read as a text which affirms a sort of 
Romantic, humanist freedom among myriad possibilities for 
being--the richness of the text figures the freedom of the 
reader within the plurality of the world. This is, in fact, 
virtually uniformly the case in GR criticism. I cite, 
almost randomly: Seed writes that GR's myriad patterns 
"raise multiple possibilities of arriving at knowledge. At 
the same time, since there is a continuity between 
characters' efforts to know and the readers', Pynchon raises 
different possible ways of interpreting his own novel" 
(209). Earl writes that we as readers "are all 
shocked ... into a higher consciousness that can finally lead 
us to a transcendental freedom" (249). Schaub argues that 
Pynchon's "writing succeeds in binding people 
together ... [his] fiction reminds us of what a true society 
would mean" (151-52). Hite writes that "GR is another 
mammoth project of loving the people, loving even their 
Companion and "The End of History?," Cowart's Pynchon: The 
Art of Allusion, and Moore's .Lhe Style of Connectedness. 
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preterition in its scatological profusion, avoiding a 
univocal standard of judgment, avoiding hierarchy .... It is 
instead a novel that affirms the nonsystematic, 
nontotalizing connections of a community based on making 
meanings" (156). Moore argues that "the reader of GR must 
learn to see the quasi-magical, part-hallucinatory web of 
interconnections, variously familiar, obscure, farfetched 
and hitherto unthought-of among all these images, signs and 
omens'' (28). Wolfley writes that for Pynchon "[n]othing 
really matters but individual freedom" (121). Ames argues 
that the Counterforce releases linguistic "possibilities 
that give hope and life to those outside" (206). Even 
Hume's study of myth in GR has a pluralist/humanist bent: 
"To our monomyth-shaped minds, openness, kindness, 
acceptance of preterition, and responsiveness to the Other 
Side seem terribly evanescent and fragile, but Pynchon 
organizes them into a structured model, so we can consider 
his proposition for its validity as a whole" (139-40). And 
so on. 3 
My question concerning GR and the critical project 
surrounding it, however, will be a different one: what 
happens when criticism encounters a text which, far from 
offering the critic many possible interpretations, radically 
3McHoul and Wills' Writing Pynchon is, in fact, the 
only major book that doesn't put forth such a humanist 
reading, and in fact has much to say about this reading's 
inadequacy to the complexities of GR (1-13). 
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resists any thematized reading whatsoever? If, as I have 
argued in the preceding chapter, the postmodern signals the 
end of a certain notion of ends, then an end-oriented 
discipline (if that is not a redundant formulation) which 
encounters an end-less writing must, in some way, 
domesticate that writing, put it to work in the service of a 
determinate end. Phrased in another--perhaps more 
combative--way, my question will be what happens if one 
takes quite seriously criticism's ubiquitous claims about 
the non-totalizing (or non-totalizable) nature of GR? If 
one is to take these claims seriously, it seems to follow 
that GR is characterized not by a plurality of possible 
interpretative meanings, but rather by a strange inability 
to interpret its meaning(s) at all. 
This, of course, will need to be worked out, but I must 
stress that I do not mean to suggest GR is, a la de Man, 
simply unreadable or without meaning. To clarify what might 
seem like an obvious and inescapable inconsistency (the 
problem of my own reading of what I have called an 
unreadable text), I hasten to clarify two necessary points 
about my conception of reading or thematizing the 
postmodern: 1) of course GR is able to be read and 
thematized--what else characterizes the readings cited above 
and makes possible my own reading of it?; and, 2) this 
thematization is a necessary and unavoidable step within a 
double gesture. The pull toward determinate meaning comes 
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with any use of language; however, I want to suggest here 
that there is something other than thematization which is 
not simply the opposite of thematization. I want to suggest 
that GR poses a ground-question to criticism's pull toward 
determinate meaning through its disruptions of any simply 
thematized reading, through its disruptions of any attempt 
to assign it a comforting, consumable readability. In 
short, I will argue that GR produces neither the plurality 
of interpretations that most Pynchon critics argue for, nor 
the reassuring unreadability that de Man practices, but 
rather a fracturing unreadability coupled with the 
imperative to read differently; in other words, GR produces 
an unreadability that is not simply the opposite of 
readability, but one which calls into question the field of 
opposition wherein the unreadable is simply opposed to the 
readable. GR's unreadability, as the epigraph to this 
chapter reads, "doesn't cancel out to apathy--it makes a 
loud dissonance that dovetails inside you sharp as knives." 
Pynchon and Pluralism; 
or, Pluralism is a Humanism 
It is well-documented that Pynchon's texts overtly 
discuss the status of thinking the "between"--the middle 
ground between the exclusionary poles of binary thinking. 
Many critical discussions of Pynchon use the texts' overt 
thematizations of the question of the between--in the· final 
pages of The Crying of Lot 49 and in the Pointsman/Mexico 
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debate in GR--to ground a pluralist reading.~ Hite sums up 
this pluralist reading in "Included Middles," the first 
chapter of Ideas of Order in the Novels of Thomas Pynchon, 
There is an infinite "middle" region between the 
hyperbolic extremes of an absolute, externally imposed 
... order and total chaos .... Pynchon's novels 
themselves are "middles," and they demonstrate how much 
significance can be included within a plurality of 
limited, contingent, overlapping systems that coexist 
and form relations with one another without achieving 
abstract intellectual closure. (16, 21) 
For Hite (as for the litany of critics cited above), Pynchon 
deals thematically with excluded middles in order to include 
them; he thematizes the ''bad shit" (Crying 137) of excluded 
middles in the service of a pluralistic community of 
interpretations. If this is the case, though, Pynchon's 
text finds itself placed in a rather sticky situation, 
valorizing or offering a vision of what is presumably the 
"good shit'' of inclusive pluralism in dialectical 
contradiction to the "bad shit" of excluded middles. 
Including the middle by hypostatizing it as an inhabitable 
place populated by competing relational systems precisely 
allows this "middle" to be located and sublated by a 
dialectic, allows dialectical thinking to achieve "abstract 
closure." And GR seems to take this into account: 
~See pages 136-37 in Lot 49 and 48-55 in GR. 
pluralist criticism's notion of the between as a place to 
write your own solutions, as a place to be ''included," is 
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precisely the reading of the between given by Pointsman, one 
of the arch-villains of GR, as he lusts after the minds of 
Kevin Spectre's tabula rasa shellshock victims, who are 
"egoless for one pulse of the Between ... tablet erased, 
new writing about to begin" (50). 5 The logic of pluralism 
remains a logic of metaphysics, of humanism. This pluralist 
"humanism," though, is something of a misnomer, insofar as 
pluralism is characterized not so much by a concern for the 
otherness of others, but by an obsession with manipulation 
and ends--with determinate meaning and rhetoric, persuasion, 
use. And Pointsman realizes the potential political economy 
of those in the between; he longs "to use their innocence, 
to write on them new words of himself, his own brown 
Realpolitik dreams" (50). 
Up to this point, I have (at least surreptitiously) 
been advancing the argument that literary criticism is a 
kind of "human science": I have argued that literary 
criticism is, in many ways, a quasi-scientific discourse 
interested in producing ever-more methodologies in the hopes 
of better controlling and understanding its object, 
literature--just as Pointsman dreams of producing ever-more 
methodologies in the hopes of better controlling his human 
5Throughout, ellipses are Pynchon's, except where 
enclosed in brackets. 
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subjects. This argument can most specifically be developed 
here, I think, by looking at the question of "pluralism" in 
and around the text of GR, a text that rather overtly 
concerns itself with sciences and their workings, 6 and 
likewise a text given a thoroughly pluralist reading by 
literary criticism. But we need to hesitate here and ask if 
it is really fair to say that a pluralist brand of literary 
criticism is just another sort of human science, a 
determining discourse that constrains its object in the 
midst of studying it. Isn't pluralism, as its proponents 
would argue, precisely an incredulous response to the iron-
fisted, totalizing metanarratives of the sciences--a call to 
recognize and foreground the constructed nature of any 
interpretative claim, and hence a call to acknowledge the 
potential plurality of such claims?7 Pluralism in this 
sense would seem precisely to invalidate the monologizing 
claims of the sciences--human or otherwise--and hence could 
be seen to be the "postmodern" discourse par excellence; as 
Brian McHale argues in his "Telling Postmodernist Stories'': 
To escape the general postmodernist incredulity toward 
metanarratives it is only necessary that we regard our 
own metanarrative incredulously, in a certain sense, 
preferring it tentatively or provisionally, as no more 
6see Alan Friedman's "Science and Technology." 
7see, for example, Fish's "What Makes an Interpretation 
Acceptable?" 
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(but no less) than a strategically useful and 
satisfying fiction .... I am recommending, in other 
words, that we need not abandon metanarratives--which 
may, after all, do useful work for us--so long as we 
'turn them down' from metanarratives to 'little 
narratives. ' ( 551 ) 
This is, I think, a concise formulation of the pluralist 
logic which underlies much GR criticism: the myriad 
sections and various world views represented in GR are 
consistently read as what McHale calls ''little narratives," 
multiple world views that can be and need to be adapted to 
fit various circumstances. As I argue above, this logic of 
pluralism could be said to inform the dominant reading of GR 
as a text that offers multiple readings, and in so doing, 
figures the freedom of the reader to engender his or her own 
provisional, un-transcendental narratives which can avoid 
the totalizing violence and hegemony of binary, scientist 
metanarratives. 
But, again, it seems that the text of GR would 
problematize such a humanist/pluralist reading, precisely by 
implicating it in the movement of a kind of violent, 
hegemonic scientism. For example, Pointsman sums up the 
world view of the master, Pavlov, in the following way: 
'Pavlov believed that the ideal, the end we all 
struggle toward in science, is the true mechanistic 
explanation. He was realistic enough not to expect it 
in this lifetime. Or in several lifetimes more. But 
his hope was for a long chain of better and better 
approximations.' (89) 8 
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Pavlov's scientific method, it seems, follows precisely the 
logic of a humanist pluralism, where the totalizing ends of 
inquiry--the "true mechanistic explanation" that Pavlov 
pragmatically knows cannot be reached--are protected by what 
McHale calls "a strategically useful and satisfying 
fiction." In other words, precisely what remains 
unquestioned by this pluralism are the ends of inquiry, the 
unquestioned "useful work" that a discipline or method 
allows one to perform. 
However, the ends of methodological or scientific 
inquiry often show themselves to be problematic rather than 
merely ''useful and satisfying," and the technological world 
in which these ends remain unquestioned is one of the 
principle concerns of GR, where a kind of pragmatico-
pluralist humanism shows itself as the technological world 
view par excellence--a world where everything becomes 
available for use, to be taken up by a method and converted 
unproblematically to an end. As Ihab Hassan writes, quoting 
8compare this quotation with the MLA's Introduction to 
Scholarship on the present and future of literary criticism: 
"Perhaps someday criticism will have become a science, 
equipped with scrupulous (if not infallible) rules of 
procedure. Perhaps someday critics will agree on most (if 
not all) of their principles. Everyone impatient with the 
current illogic and anarchy of much of the field would 
welcome that day" (92). 
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William James, the world of end-oriented thinking is the 
world of pluralist/pragmatist thinking, which "looks away 
from 'first things, principles, categories, supposed 
necessities,' and looks toward 'last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts,' and like a corridor in the great 
mansion of philosophy, it opens on many rooms" ("Making 
Sense" 453). In Hassan's words, pluralist thinking helps 
one breathe the fresh air of "many rooms" within "the great 
mansion of philosophy"--it opens thinking to the fresh air 
of many potential usages and many points of view, and allows 
this fresh air to invigorate the closed, stale air of the 
house of being; pragmatist thinking escapes totalization 
through its emphasis on multiple, provisional ends rather 
than on the inevitably metaphysical and unitary notion of 
grounds. However, this naming of ends as simply provisional 
or pragmatic in pluralist discourse hardly seems to shake or 
open up metaphysical thinking, as Hassan--and many other 
pluralists--seems to think it inexorably does. 9 The shift 
of emphasis from grounds to ends is precisely the movement 
of a technological, representational metaphysics--a 
metaphysics we see at work throughout GR, in the myriad 
forces that dog Slothrop, in the techno-representational 
world "where only destinations are important, [where] 
9see, for example, Hassan's reading of Rorty: 
"Pragmatism brackets Truth (capitalized), circumvents 
Metaphysics and Epistemology; it finds no universal 'ground' 
for discourse" ("Making Sense" 453). 
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attention is to long-term statistics, not to individuals: 
and where the House always does, of course, keep turning a 
profit" (209). 
It is this profit, this end product, this work, that a 
technological world view protects most greedily--and it is 
also this end product that a pluralist humanism cannot live 
without. The economy of such a world view dictates that 
ends must be determinable, that there be no reserve or 
excess, that inquiry proceed, as Laslo Jamf's work does, 
"logically, dialectically" (250). In fact, it is the 
dialectical thinking which pluralism protects--through a 
common obsession with ends and complete expenditure--that 
carries most clearly this technological world view. 1° For 
example, note the way in which dialectics and the 
expenditure (and/or profit) of ends are related in the 
following passage, where Richard Rorty muses on what happens 
when the "the pragmatist pulls out his bag of tried-and-true 
dialectical gambits": 
10 rhe rise of technology is, perhaps, the concern of 
contemporary thought, for thinkers as disparate as 
Heidegger, Adorno, Foucault and Bataille; Rebecca Comay 
nicely sums up the notion of technologization: "the 
progress of enlightenment brings new and seemingly 
irreversible forms of domination: the reification of 
experience and the introduction of the abstract measure of 
utility; the reduction of qualitative difference to the 
quantifiable identities of the market; the increasing 
centrality of productive labor as the determinant of thought 
and action; the expulsion of the mundane sacred and its 
replacement by an otherworldly deity; and, last but not 
least, the (Newtonian) determination of time as an inert 
continuum of exchangeable now-points" (69). 
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He proceeds to argue that there is no pragmatic 
difference ... between 'it works because it's true' and 
'it's true because it works' .... [The pragmatist] does 
not want to discuss the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a sentence being true, but precisely 
whether the practice which hopes to find a 
philosophical way of isolating the essunce of truth 
has, in fact, paid off. (Consequences xxix). 
For Rorty, it is precisely the pragmatist's "dialectical 
gambit" which has "paid off": in the metaphysican's game, 
Rorty offers the pawn of grounds in order to gain the 
favored strategic position of ends. For Rorty, ''truth" is a 
game for patsies insofar as it ignores the real business of 
thought: the pay-off of work, of use, of return--the 
dialectical pay-off that is the cornerstone of a well-
functioning pragmatico-technological world view. 
Strangely enough, this pragmatico-technological world 
view in GR is most often analyzed by critics not in terms of 
its offering multiple pragmatic freedoms for individual 
decision, but in terms of the marriage of multi-national 
corporations and government bureaucracies, wherein IG 
Farben's death-dealing arrangements with the Nazis come to 
prefigure the post-war order of multi-national 
capitalism. 11 (We should note here that this seems rather 
11 see, for example, Mazurek, who argues that GR 
"describes the emergence of the permanent war economies of 
the United States and the USSR from the ashes of World War 
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baffling, precisely because of the dependence of these 
readings on the premises of a humanist, pragmatic pluralism 
--a pluralism which would want to read individual freedom 
rather than institutional repression in its world view.) A 
Farben executive explains their corporate version of folk 
history and the future of multi-national capitalism to Nazi 
financiers: 
'The persistence, then, of structures favoring death. 
Death converted into more death. Perfecting its reign, 
just and the buried coal grows denser, and overlaid 
with more strata--epoch on top of epoch, city on top of 
ruined city. This is the sign of Death the 
impersonator. 
'These signs are real. They are also symptoms of 
a process. The process follows the same form, the same 
structure. To apprehend it you will follow the signs. 
All talk of cause and effect is secular history, and 
secular history is a diversionary tactic. Useful to 
you, gentlemen, but no longer to us here. If you want 
to know the truth--I know I presume--you must look into 
the technology of these matters.' (167) 
Throughout GR, this emphasis on technologies of death--
especially the V-2 Rocket, and the nuclear rocket which it 
(pre)figures--is perhaps the ultimate marriage of 
II, a world in which Lt. Slothrop, the middle-class 
everyman, is literally manipulated from cradle to grave by 
the multinational I.G. Farben" (156). 
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dialectical thinking and killing, of end-oriented research 
and capitalism, of technology and "structures favoring 
death." Note the importance of research to Farben's 
corporate world view, and their interest in dialectical 
thinking--in the "process" or "the technology" by which they 
hope to gain and maintain control. And it is this emphasis 
in GR that poses a very difficult question to claims for 
humanist freedom made by the pluralists: how can this 
emphasis on ends and use not be a concomitant emphasis 
manipulation and violence? Again, I cite Rorty: 
from a full-fledged pragmatist point of view, there is 
no interesting difference between tables and texts, 
between protons and poems. To a pragmatist, these are 
all just permanent possibilities for use, and thus for 
redescription, reinterpretation, manipulation. (153) 
Because it effaces differences among objects--or, better, 
because it treats everything as a potential object--this 
"full-fledged pragmatist point of view'' shows itself to be 
in league with a manipulative, technological world view; 
such a pluralist pragmatism, it seems, promotes the 
dialectical, end-oriented thinking which, in large part, 
allows and promotes the discovery of World War II's 
"structures favoring death." 
However, this relationship between dialectical thinking 
and death moves not only at the empirical level of 
invention, but indeed at the structural level that our 
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Farben executive points us to. Death can be seen as that 
which fuels dialectical thinking, that which allows the very 
movement of progress and history--as the Farben executive 
puts it, "epoch on top of epoch, city on top of ruined 
city." In fact, as Hegel argues, dialectical thinking 
cannot perform any useful work until it confronts and 
masters death--the dialectic moves forward only when it 
appropriates the negative moment of death, what Hegel calls 
"the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of 
thought, of the pure 'I.'" (19). Hegel continues: 
Death, if this is what we want to call this non-
actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to 
hold fast what is dead requires the greatest 
strength .... But the life of Spirit is not the life 
that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by 
devastation, but rather the life that endures and 
maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, 
in utter dismemberment, it finds itself .... Spirit is 
this power only by looking the negative in the face, 
and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative 
is the magical power that converts it into being. (19) 
·Hegel here makes it clear that dialectical thinking needs 
the negativity of death--the negativity of ''non-actuality," 
of the unrealized or unrealizable; 12 in fact, the negative 
12 The following discussion of death and negativity owes 
a tremendous debt to Paul Davies' reading of Blanchet and 
Hegel. 
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moment of the dialectic is the only "productive" moment of 
thought--the necessary ''dismemberment" of totality or surety 
wherein truth "finds itself. "13 If thought were to "shrink 
. 
from death," it would never experience this dismemberment, 
and hence never experience the higher unity that the 
dialectic allows--the ''magical power which converts it 
[death, the negative] into being." In short, dialectical 
thought--which uncovers the technologies necessary to build 
death-favoring apparatuses--is itself a "structure favoring 
death," death in the form of the productive negativity 
necessary to dialectical sublation. The dialectic confronts 
death--the absolutely other, that which dismembers life--and 
masters it, thereby allowing thought to master anything else 
in its path. And it is this structure (or, as Derrida 
writes, this stricture) of dialectical thinking that needs 
to be accounted for in pragmatic-pluralist criticism, which 
rather naively argues that a unitary metaphysics cannot deal 
with any kind of uncertainty, dismemberment or plurality--
that uncertainty or freedom can simply be opposed to or 
13 In fact, death is fundamental to Hegelian "Man," as 
Bataille points out: "If the animal which constitutes man's 
natural being did not die, and--what is more--if death did 
not dwell within him as the source of his anguish ... there 
would be no man or liberty, no history of individual. In 
other words, if he revels in what nonetheless frightens him, 
if he is the being, identical with himself, who risks· 
(identical) being itself, then man is truly a Man: he 
separates himself from the animal" ("Hegel" 12). 
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"defeat" a totalitarian certainty. 14 For Hegel, giving up 
such certainty is precisely the productive moment of 
thought: "Thoughts become fluid ... when the pure certainty 
of the self abstracts from itself--not by leaving itself 
out, or setting itself aside, but by giving up the fixity of 
its self-positing" (20, my emphasis). In GR, then, it seems 
one is compelled to analyze not only the death-dealing 
products of a certain technological world-view, but the 
structure of the world view itself--the structure of the 
structures favoring death, their insidious movement(s)--and 
to ask if these movements and structures can be disrupted in 
any way. 
While the intervention of a thematizing or interpretive 
moment is necessary and inescapable in this inquiry, there 
must be an other moment in the postmodern economy of meaning 
if a pluralist economy of ends is to be disrupted. As 
Derrida writes, 
The other relationship to competitive plurality would 
not be strictly and rightly through and through 
interpretive, even if it includes an interpretive 
moment. Without excluding the first interpretation, 
above all without opposing it, [this other 
relationship] would deal with the multiplicity which 
14 see, for example, Slade's "Escaping Rationalization" 
and Leverenz's "On Trying to Read GR," both of which center 
on the reason/unreason opposition--with unreason as the 
eventual winner--as the key to reading GR. 
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cannot be reduced to the order [of competitive 
plurality], be it a war order or not. It would deal 
with this multiplicity as a law of the field, a clause 
of nonclosure which would not only never allow itself 
to be ordered and inscribed, situated in the general 
Kampfplatz, but would also make possible and inevitable 
synecdochic and metonymic competitions: not as their 
normal condition of possibility, their ratio essendi or 
ratio cognoscendi, but as a means of disseminal 
alterity or alteration, which would make impossible the 
pure identity, the pure identification of what it 
simultaneously makes possible. ("Some Statements" 72) 
A "reading" of GR must be accompanied by an other reading, a 
second or double reading which "would deal with ... 
multiplicity as a law of the field," as a structural 
necessity rather than a pragmatic consequence, as a ground 
which must be attended to rather than an end which must be 
fought for. For all its discussion of multiplicity, a 
pluralist economy remains an economy of opposition because 
it does not consider the structure of the field or network 
in which truth arises--its conception of multiplicity 
consists rather of (re)evaluating competing claims among 
opposing truths. A double reading necessarily begins in 
such an economy of interpretation, opposition, 
thematization, but it moves from there to examine the ground 
of that economy itself, but not as a foundation which could 
189 
assure the ends of inquiry--"not as their normal condition 
of possibility, ... but as a means of disseminal alterity or 
alteration, which would make impossible the pure identity, 
the pure identification of what it simultaneously makes 
possible." The structure of the field--what I have been 
calling the "postmodern" field--both makes thematization 
possible and makes it impossible for that thematization to 
cover or master the entire field, both makes relation 
possible and interrupts determinate relation through a 
disseminal otherness or alteration within the constituting 
space of that relation. The discipline of literary 
criticism, as I have likewise argued, on the whole concerns 
itself solely with this first reading or economy. However, 
it is toward this other field or economy in GR which we now 
turn--though, of course, we never merely escape an economy 
of reading or interpretation; it is, rather, a matter of 
doubling this economy and disrupting it: altering the space 
of this economy, opening it to its other. 
The Structure of the "structures favoring death": 
Death and Dialectics 
One of the most compelling "plot lines" in GR revolves 
around the Herero, the African tribe subjugated by the 
colonial Germans and subsequently turned into death-
worshippers, into a people favoring death. It should ·be 
noted, however, that when the Germans went to Africa to 
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build colonies and subjugate the Herera, the logic behind 
this movement was precisely a dialectical one--where the 
other is appropriated as a version of the same, to be 
studied, ana 1 yzed, used. 15 As GR puts it, "Eu rope came and 
established its order of Analysis and Death" (722). This 
link between "Analysis and Death" explains Tchitcherine's 
(and, one imagines, his Schwartzkammando brother Enzian's) 
interest in dialectics: 
Not till recently did he come to look for comfort in 
the dialectical ballet of force, counterforce, 
collision, new order--not till the War came and Death 
appeared across the ring[ .... ] only then did he turn 
to a Theory of History--of all pathetic cold comforts--
to try to make sense of it. (704) 
When death appears and comes to thought--as the absolutely 
other, as that which cannot be experienced, thematized, 
understood--thought must in turn find a way to master that 
death, to find some way to make it productive, or at least 
to obviate its potentially interruptive or dissembling 
effects. Thought will "try to make sense of'' death through 
the "comfort" afforded by "the dialectical ballet of force, 
15cf. Hege 1, where otherness is thought as "a 
difference which is no difference, or only a difference of 
what is self-same, and its essence is unity" (99). See also 
Pynchon's 1969 letter to Thomas Hirsh, printed as an 
appendix to Seed: "I don't 1 i ke to use the word but I think 
what went on back in SUdwest is archtypical of every clash 
between west and non-west, clashes that are still going on 
right now in South East Asia" (242). 
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counterforce, collision, new order." But, insofar as death 
cannot be negated, used, understood, or even really chosen, 
it has the potential to cripple dialectical thought. For 
example, in a famous scene in GR, Tchitcherine and Wimpe 
discuss mystification and Marxist dialectics; Wimpe argues, 
in an eminent 1 y quotab 1 e passage: "'Marxist di a 1 ect i cs? 
That's not an opiate, eh?[ .... ] Die to help History grow to 
its predestined shape'" (701). Dialectics, here the Marxian 
variety (which, of course, carries a well-known debt to the 
Hegelian), 16 makes of death a productive moment within the 
narrative of history--substitutes the narrative of History 
for the narrative of God, and does so with the fuel supplied 
by the negative moment of the dialectic. 
But here a question remains: is death really so easily 
sublated, so easily mastered by a dialectic? Is death a 
simple, sublatable negativity? As Tchitcherine stumbles 
through the drug-induced argument with Wimpe, he becomes 
increasingly less sure; he goes on concerning death: "'You 
don't know. Not till you're there, Wimpe. You can't say.' 
'That doesn't sound very dialectical,' [Wimpe replies]. 'I 
don't know what it is'" (701). Indeed, death is not very 
16 see Marx's Introduction to the second edition of 
Capital: "The mystification which dialectic suffers in 
Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first 
to present its general form of working in a comprehensive 
and conscious manner. With him it [dialectic] is standing 
on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you 
would discover the rational kernel within the mystical 
shell" (25). 
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dialectical: as Tchitcherine points out, one never "knows" 
about death until one "is there"; however, when one "is 
there," one is no longer in a position to "know" anything at 
all--one is dead, drawn out of the network of possible 
relations which constitutes the world of knowledge. In 
fact, death--insofar as it does not respond to a rational 
analysis, will not answer the question "what is it?"--stands 
in a cripplingly neutral non-relation to thought: the 
inability to thematize death comes not from its potential 
richness or the plurality of relations that a being can have 
toward or with it, but rather from the fact that death shows 
itself in no determinate relation whatsoever to a being. 
As Hegel points out, there must be a double meaning to 
the negative if there is to be sublation and mastery: the 
negative [death] must first dissemble or rend totality, and 
then enter into a determinate relation with this 
fragmentation, in the process saving it from the status of a 
mere fragment. In other words, for the negative to be 
productive (indeed, for there to be production at all), the 
dialectic must grasp terms within a relation; it is the 
relation which assures the subject that it can appropriate 
anything. As Hegel writes of this dual meaning, 
"Consciousness distinguishes something from itself to which, 
precisely, it relates" (in Hyppolite 23-4). But, again, as 
Wimpe and Tchitcherine's conversation points out, the 
subject cannot have a determinate relation with death--
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insofar as death "is" the disruption or stoppage of life, 
the absence of all relationality. This is precisely why 
death has to be mastered by dialectical thought; it must be 
brought into a (productive) relation with life if there is 
to be any "progress," and this is precisely the brilliance 
of the dialectic: it acknowledges the potentially 
dissembling effect of something other than thought (other 
than life and reason) but goes on to master that other (that 
fracturing irrationality) in an ever-stronger and more 
rational unity. This other-than-thought is trapped in a 
productive relation with thought--becomes other-to-thought, 
thought's opposite, dialectically contained within thought 
as thought's other--and can thereby be taken up in a 
philosophical relation and used towards the ends of thought. 
Institutions like the White Visitation, then, strive to 
produce "rationalized forms of death--death in the service 
of the one species cursed with the knowledge that it will 
die" (230); in short, they produce technologies which 
reassure comfort in the face of death--if in no other way 
than through the knowledge that humans can (re)produce 
death, control its randomness, make death's negativity 
productive, put it at the service of a cause or a useful 
end, in a determinate relation with life. 
But perhaps there remains an other death, a death 
radically other to death as productive negativity--a death 
which stands in no determinate (and therefore no enabling) 
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relation to technological thought. As Rilke, certainly an 
important presence in GR, 17 writes, perhaps the problem 
becomes finding that which "permit[s] the reading of the 
word death without negation; like the moon, life surely has 
a side turned away from us which is not its opposite" 
(Letters 316, second emphasis mine). Heidegger glosses 
Rilke's strange formulation: 
Within the widest orbit of the sphere of beings there 
are regions and places which, being averted from us, 
seem to be something negative, but are nothing of the 
kind if we think of all things as being within the 
widest orbit of beings .... The self-assertion of 
technological objectification is the constant negation 
of death. By this negation, death becomes something 
negative. ("What?" 125) 
Perhaps Heidegger's gloss here is stranger than Rilke's 
formulation, but both ask a similar question: is there 
something which stands outside of the seemingly totalizing 
relation(s) of use, something which cannot simply be taken 
up by technological, dialectical thinking--something which 
is not simply "opposite"? Technological thinking ~ranslates 
all things into a determinate, negative relation and thereby 
17 For a concise discussion of the secondary material on 
GR and Rilke, see Hohmann's "Pynchon and Rilke: A Survey of 
Criticism" in his Thomas Pynchon's GR (271-82). Stark, for 
example, writes that "[i]nformation about Rilke is 
indispensable for a full understanding" of GR (in Hohmann 
271 ) . 
masters them dialectically--brings them into a relation 
where their truth can be known. In GR, for example, the 
Herera myth of death and the hidden side of the moon is 
tainted by precisely this technological relation: 
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It began in mythical times, when the sly hare who nests 
in the Moon brought death among men, instead of the 
moon's true message. The true message has never come. 
Perhaps the rocket is made to take us there someday, 
and then the Moon will tell us its truth at last. (322) 
Because the Herera have been "Europeanized in language and 
thought" (318), they are no longer able to think that 
perhaps the "moon's true message," as Rilke suggests, is 
that not everything exists to be appropriated by a 
technological world view, that (like death and the other 
side of the moon) not everything exists in some determinate 
relation to technological thought. Likewise, the Herera 
stood in no determinate relation to Europe until its 
technological order of analysis and death was reined upon 
them--an order that tricked them into believing there was a 
determinate ''truth" to the moon and to death, and enslaved 
them to the project of the rocket in the service of this 
deadly truth. 
All of this is not, of course, to argue that death is a 
wonderful thing--a positive rather than a negative; rather, 
it is to argue that death resists characterization, resists 
being opposed in any positive/negative way, resists being 
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placed in any determinate relation at all. The fact that 
one hears (and Blicero and the Schwartzkammando read) a 
death-worshipping affirmation of dying in Rilke precisely 
makes this point: we have not learned to hear death (nor 
anything else, for that matter) as other than simply 
negative or positive--we have not learned to think things, 
in short, as other, as standing in no determinate relation 
at all to humanity's technological world view. As Rilke 
writes, we have yet to think the "open": 
You must understand the concept of the "open" ... in such 
a way that the animal's degree of consciousness sets it 
into the world without the animal's placing the world 
' 
over against itself at every moment (as we do); the 
animal is in the world; we stand before it by virtue of 
that peculiar turn and intensification which our 
consciousness has taken .... By the open, therefore, I 
do not mean sky, air, and space; they too are 
"object", ... (in Heidegger, "What?" 108). 
This "open" that Rilke speaks of stands in no relation to 
the circumspective consciousness of appropriating, 
technological subjectivity--it cannot be object for a 
subject, and hence cannot be thematized in terms of the 
relationality that pluralism posits as an alternative to a 
binary world view. Rather, Rilke's "open" is the very 
opening of relationality itself--with which there can be no 
determinate relation. Everything in the technological world 
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has become "object" to or for totalizing "subject," and must 
be drawn out from that relation, allowed to resonate in what 
Rilke calls the "open." This would seem to require, then, 
some notion of de-subjectification, impersonality: the 
determinate self--which experiences the world in relational 
terms, in terms of use, of short term goals--must be 
scattered, must be drawn out of the determinate relations of 
dialectical thinking. 
And this is precisely Slothrop's fate in GR. 
Slothrop's self--a self tracked, charted, and probed 
endlessly throughout GR--is consistently compared to an 
albatross in section 4, until it finally becomes 
"scattered": "he has become one plucked albatross. 
Plucked, hell--stripped. Scattered all over the Zone. It's 
doubtful if he can ever be 'found' again, in the 
conventional sense of 'positively identified and detained'" 
(712). Slothrop's scattering is often treated in Pynchon 
criticism as a negative or lamentable situation. Edward 
Mendelson, for example, argues that Mexico ends up as the 
novel's hero, 18 while Slothrop, in his scattering, suffers 
a terrible fate; while Mexico survives to form the 
Counterforce, "Slothrop will lose all real and potential 
relation to any world, whether of language or of act" (191). 
Perhaps, though, there is an other way to read Slothrop's 
18 For Mendelson, Mexico represents the "affirmative and 
true aspects" of GR, the "book's moments of hope and love" 
(186). 
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scattering in GR--a way to read his scattering as other than 
involving a lack of wholeness or possibility. Perhaps, GR 
suggests, the self is an albatross, one of "their" agents: 
"The man has a branch office in each of our brains, his 
corporate emblem is a white albatross, each local rep has a 
cover known as the Ego" (712-13); and Slothrop, even 
(perhaps especially) in drawing out of "their" world of 
determinate relations, remains involved in a power struggle, 
a power struggle not thematizable as a simple opposition--a 
"Counterforce"--but rather a struggle against a more 
insidious kind of power. Perhaps Slothrop carries on the 
kind of struggle Foucault talks about in his late work, a 
struggle which sets out 
to attack not so much "such or such" an institution of 
power, or group, or elite, or class, but rather a 
technique, a form of power. This form of power applies 
itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, 
attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of 
truth on him which he must recognize and which others 
have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which 
makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of 
the word subject: subject to someone else by control 
and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a 
form of power which subjugates and makes subject to. 
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("Subject" 212) 
Slothrop's determinate relation to forces throughout this 
book--his individuality, his proper name--is precisely what 
allows him to be "'positively identified and detained,'" 
allows him to be marked by "a form of power which makes 
individuals subjects." His proper name, however, shifts 
throughout the book only to disburse in his scattering, in 
what could perhaps be called his final heroic action--if it 
were properly either "heroic," an "action," or even his 
final action in the logic of GR.19 
Language here becomes difficult, because it too depends 
on the categories (cause and effect, subjective intention 
and objective act) that Slothrop's scattering disrupts. It 
is not that Slothrop exactly causes this disruption through 
19 rt seems to be taken for granted in much GR criticism 
that Slothrop's "scattering" is tantamount to a 
disappearance into another realm--into a kind of 
transfiguration or rewriting of the Orpheus myth. The 
usually supremely authoritative Weisenburger, for example, 
writes that those in the counterforce "organize around 
[Slothrop's] memory" (Companion 263), which suggests 
Slothrop "dies" in some sort of traditional way at this 
point in the novel. T~is, however, doesn't pan out in the 
(admittedly odd and unreliable) logic of GR itself, though. 
On page 381, which Weisenburger dates mid-July, 1945 (at the 
Berlin White House), Slothrop overhears a conversation among 
some reporters concerning the 1946 Miss Rhinegold beauty 
pageant, though we' re told it "wi 11 be mont·hs before he runs 
into a beer advertisement featuring the six beauties" (381 ). 
When he does run into the advertisement (and finds himself 
rooting for a Dutch woman who reminds him of Katje), it will 
be after his early September "scattering"; likewise, we are 
told that Slothrop may have played harmonica on an album by 
"the Fool," put out sometime after the Stones were famous 
( 7 42). S l othrop does not, it seems then, "s imp 1 y" disappear 
as a mythic hero or Jesus figure; he hasn't transcended, but 
rather refuses to be tracked, identified. 
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an intentional subjective action; as Slothrop himself says, 
questioned about his ontological status by the deceased 
Tantivy in a dream, "'I didn't do anything. There was a 
change'" (552). 20 Rather, perhaps we should say Slothrop 
brings about or calls for(th) a certain disruption: 
Slothrop's scattering disrupts a kind of subjectivity which 
is part and parcel of the contemporary war state, of the 
modern world of the subject and the state which depends on 
identity, property, statistics, the individual. Slothrop's 
scattered state disrupts the world view of the Nazis, who he 
notices are consistently "purifying and perfecting their 
Fascist ideal of Action, Action, Action, once his own 
shining reason for being. No more. No more" (266). 
Perhaps in posing a question to the "Fascist ideal of 
Action, Action, Action," Slothrop wages his own war, but a 
war not waged in the name of "liberation" or action. 
Perhaps Slothrop's agenda is not "liberation" or his "self" 
at all; perhaps, as Foucault writes, 
the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem 
of our days is not to try to liberate the individual 
from the state, and from the state's institutions, but 
to liberate us both from the state and the type of 
individualization which is linked to the state. We 
20 Also, as the text informs us, this way toward 
scattering has been a long time coming and has not exactly 
been Slothrop's choice: "Slothrop, as noted, at least as 
early as the Anubis era, has begun to thin, to scatter" 
( 509). 
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have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the 
refusal of this kind of individuality which has been 
imposed on us for several centuries. ("Subject" 216) 
So Slothrop, when he scatters/is scattered, may indeed "lose 
all real and potential relation to any world," but he also 
opens up a gap--a resistance--in a world which thinks only 
in terms of "real" and "potential." Slothrop opens a space 
within the terms of dialectics, where an actual world is 
consistently opposed to a coming world, where the only 
relation among things is one of opposition, negation, 
sublation--in short, where the only relation is a relation 
of control. 
As I argue in Chapter 3, to grant a dialectical world 
view is to lose to the status quo in a fixed game, the game 
of the negative. To disrupt this world, it must not only be 
negated, opposed, but also contested, its grounds shaken. 
An "absolute" gap of otherness must be opened up within the 
totality of the same. As Emmanuel Levinas writes, 
What is absolutely other does not only resist 
possession, but contests it .... If the same would 
establish its identity by simple opposition to the 
other, it would already be part of a totality 
encompassing the same and the other. (Totality 38) 
So Slothrop's scattering, while it can be thematized as 
either active or passive (positive or negative), is properly 
neither, precisely because his scattering brings the rupture 
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of the proper, the dependability of the sameness of the 
same. In short, Slothrop's scattering--in drawing him out 
of the determinate relations of the technological world--
opens upon an otherness that is not simply the opposite of 
sameness, an otherness that breaches totality rather than 
allowing itself to be contained within totality: in short, 
an otherness that is--to strain language--other to the 
relations of opposition. Slothrop's death as scattering 
approaches, in this way, Rilke's "open" or his "other" 
death--an end that is not properly an end at all, a 
continuing end that carries no relation to a totality, but 
rather disrupts it.21 
And this disruption--this drawing language itself out 
of work, out of a determinate relation with traditional 
system(atic)s of meaning--is perhaps the postmodern "work" 
of GR, though it is a work which performs more than the 
thematizable work of the negative, and hence creates a 
disruption of work. The systematics of work and ends have 
obtained throughout the history of Western thinking, a 
history that Levinas thematizes in terms of war: "The 
visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the 
concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy" 
(Totality 21). This, of course, raises the question--a 
question I have emphasized throughout this dissertation--of 
21 see Blanchot's reading of Rilke and death in The 
Space of Literature. 
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the end of totality, the question of post-war, the question 
of postmodern. What is the post-war relation to a war 
economy--to the language and concepts of the war, of 
totality? In GR, this question first comes up as Slothrop 
escapes the V-2, in liberated France on his furlough at the 
Casino Hermann Goering: 
The manager of the Casino Hermann Goering, one Cesar 
Fleb6tomo, brought in a whole chorus-line soon as the 
liberators arrived, though he hasn't found time to 
change the place's occupation name. Nobody seems to 
mind it up there, a pleasant mosaic of tiny and perfect 
seashells, thousands of them set in plaster, purple, 
pink, and brown, replacing a huge section of roof (the 
old tiles still lie in a heap beside the Casino), put 
up two years ago as recreational therapy by a 
Messerschmitt squadron on furlough, in German typeface 
expansive enough to be seen from the air, which is what 
they had in mind. The sun now is still too low to 
touch the words into any more than some bare separation 
from their ground, so that they hang suppressed, no 
relation any more to the men, the pain in their hands, 
the blisters that grew black under the sun with 
infection and blood. (184-85) 
Here we see worked out quite intricately the post-war 
relation to the noccupation namen: the words ncasino 
Hermann Goering," once so pregnant with meaning for "a 
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Messerschmitt squadron on furlough," now exist in no more 
"than some bare separation from their ground, so that they 
hang suppressed, no relation any more to the men," no· 
determinate relation anymore to the war economy of totality 
in which they formerly functioned. Of course, this is not 
to say that the pre-war name bears no connection at all to 
the war name--not to say that a post-ontological language 
has no connection to ontology--rather it is to say that the 
post-war names do not exist in a properly philosophical 
relation, a relation which grasps into a totality.22 
Rather, these words are now "separat[ed] from their ground," 
uprooted from their fixed place within totality--after the 
war, after ontology--bearing no relation anymore to the 
painful work of the war: unable to explain the terror and 
horror of that economy, but not simply outside of it either 
--therefore able to open up a dissembling space within it. 
Post-war, Postmodern 
The incommensurability of pre-war and post-war 
vocabularies (following Levinas, ontological and post-
ontological language) is a recurring concern of GR, and is 
not simply, I would argue, a "thematic" or "critical" 
concern, insofar as such a problem concerns the very 
22 Again, Hegel: "Each extreme is a middle term for the 
other extreme, a middle term by means of which it enters 
into a relation with itself and gathers itself up .... {each 
term] is for-itself only through this mediation [relation]" 
(in Hyppolite 165n). 
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(im)possibility of something like a theme or critique in a 
postmodern context. In fact, this incommensurability is 
first treated in the novel's famous opening lines, the 
always already underway (non)place where Gravity's Rainbow 
begins: "A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened 
before, but there is nothing to compare it to now. It is 
too late" (3). Note the way the non-relationality of the 
rocket--"there is nothing to compare it to now"--is phrased 
in temporal terms; the rocket's non-relational "now" is, in 
Marc Redfield's words, "disturbingly sandwiched between 
competing temporal markers ('It has happened before' and 'It 
is too late')" (160). The rocket certainly refers to past 
occurrences, but these do not seem to be up to the task of 
describing it "now," of capturing this event in a properly 
philosophical relation: something like it may have happened 
before, but there is nothing to compare it to now, no 
context which can give it(s) meaning. Hence, this "nothing 
to compare it to now" is both a reversal--a negation, an 
opposition--and a displacement: the present itself--the 
"now'' in which there could be a philosophical relation--is 
exploded, and along with it goes the continuity between (and 
the ground for) the past and future. Under the postmodern 
logic of the rocket, the present, like Slothrop, becomes a 
perpetual crossroads that stands in no determinate relation 
to the known past or foreseeable future--it stands in 
relation only to the non-relation of an indeterminate future 
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characterized by the unthematizable approach of death. Each 
segment of the novel is, in turn, akin to this "beginning" 
undecidable screaming; past events or future promises cannot 
explain the events at hand: "now," post-war, post-modern, 
there is nothing to compare events with in order to reveal 
their hidden truth in the same way that one section of the 
novel cannot be appealed to in order to explain or ground 
all the others. GR is an exterior, flat network of 
statements, with all its sections on the same level, so to 
speak--with no secret message hidden below their surface. 
It has the structure of apocalypse without revelation--
things happen but episodes are not thematizable in any 
determinate way. 
This non-relationality in or of the text can be 
discussed in other ways, and is "at work" in any number of 
GR's other "controlling metaphors." In fact, the very title 
of the book poses a question to the sublation of dialectical 
relations. When two nouns are placed together, one would 
expect an attempt at sublation; with Gravity's Rainbow, 
then, one would expect an attempt to think Newton's 
explanation of the rainbow together with the imaginative 
resonances of the rainbow for the poet, to bring the two to 
some synthesis. 23 However, as the possessive of the title 
suggests, the rainbow--even in its long symbolic history in 
23 For just such a discussion, see Abrams, "Newton's 
Rainbow and the Poet's" (303-12). 
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poetic or imaginative writing--always already belongs to a 
kind of scientific discourse, insofar as even poetics is a 
sub-genre of the discourse of truth, of philosophy. So the 
question posed even in the title of GR is not how to think 
the technological (gravity) in relation to the poetic 
(rainbow), but how to think the poetic in such a way as it 
is not simply a subset of a determining technologized 
philosophical discourse: however, this project becomes not 
the romantic project (an attempt to recuperate the primacy 
of the imaginative rainbow over the technological 
determinacy of gravity), but rather the postmodern project 
of drawing the rainbow out of relation to the determining, 
technological world of gravity--of attending to its opacity 
rather than attempting to render it transparent. 
And this project likewise has resonances for the 
institutional apparatuses of literary criticism--a discourse 
which attempts to gain a kind of scientistic or 
technological mastery over its object, even if this mastery 
is presented as a pluralism. Underscoring the link between 
pluralism and technological thinking, Weisenburger makes 
much of GR's two mentions of Godel's theorem in his 
Companion; he reads Godel as yet another marker of pluralist 
hope: 
In GR, Godel's incompleteness theorem is a hopeful 
sign .... [T]he incompleteness theorem establishes that 
formal closure, completeness, and internal consistency 
may all be pipe dreams. As such, it makes a telling 
background to Pynchon's representations of closed 
versus open fields, of being "shut in by words'' as 
opposed to breaking free by means of them. (145) 
This is, by now, familiar ground: Godel's theorem is 
marshalled here by Weisenburger to bolster the humanist 
freedom that GR mirrors and calls for--Godel shows us how 
indeterminacy shatters determinacy and leads to freedom. 
There is, however, an other reading of Godel. As Derrida 
writes, 
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An undecidable proposition, as Godel demonstrated in 
1931, is a proposition which, given a system of axioms 
governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical nor 
deductive consequence of those axioms, nor in 
contradiction with them, neither true nor false with 
respect to these axioms. (Dissemination 219) 
Again, the difference here is that for Weisenburger, Godel's 
undecidability unleashes many possible relations by 
debunking the priority of the unitary; for Derrida, however, 
Godel's undecidability points to a radically plural non-
relation--an undecidability that stands in no dialectical 
opposition to decidability. Even though it makes that 
decidability possible, this undecidability stands in no 
properly philosophical relation whatsoever--is "neither true 
nor false" with respect to the axiomatics of scientistic 
decision. 
And GR "performs" this absence of philosophical 
relation--what in Chapter 2 I call an apocalypse without 
revelation--as well as being overtly "about" it: 
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Screaming holds across the sky. When it comes, will it 
come in darkness, or will it bring its own light? Will 
the light come before or after? 
But it is already light. (4, Pynchon's emphasis) 
With the Rocket should come some kind of revelation, a new 
determining order in its wake, as there should be a new 
determining order in the wake of the war, under the shadow 
of the nuclear Rocket. The text asks the common questions 
for us: is there something "new," a new light or an 
intensified darkness, that comes with the Rocket, and will 
this new order, this new light, come before the Rocket or in 
its wake? But these questions become complicated by the 
fact that "it is already light," that this process of change 
is always already underway, and it has been from what would 
metaphysically be called a beginning--a place prior to or 
outside the textual network which, if it could be found or 
posited, could give the text, the chain of referrals, a 
determinate meaning. But in GR, there is no beginning and 
there are no determinate ends--this is the logic that the 
Rocket allows us to see: that a positive origin or 
reference is always already withdrawing; the effects of a 
network are always already in play; the other is always 
already at work within the same. In this sense, GR is like 
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the diaspora of the novel's opening page: "No, this is not 
a disentanglement from, but a progressive knotting into" (3, 
Pynchon's emphasis). It is not an attempt to isolate and 
study a kind of consciousness or reveal what is "behind" the 
postmodern world--this, we should remember, is Pointsman's 
and Laslo Jamf's work. Instead, it is a postmodern 
thinking, which Foucault characterizes as a thought that 
bursts open the other, and the outside. In this sense, 
the diagnosis does not establish the fact of our 
identity by the play of distinctions. It establishes 
that we are difference, that our reason is the 
difference of discourses, our history the difference of 
times, our selves the difference of masks. That 
difference, far from being the forgotten and recovered 
origin, is the dispersion that we are and make. 
(Archaeology 131/172-73) 
So the Rocket, perhaps, does bring a new light with it--a 
kind of revelation: it is the light of that which has been 
neglected throughout the history of light, but at the same 
time has made that history possible: non-dialectical 
difference, otherness, "the dispersion that we are and 
make." 
CHAPTER 6 
POLITICS, POETICS, AND INSTITUTIONS: 
"LANGUAGE" POETRY AND LITERARY CRITICISM 
A society which was really like a good poem, embodying the 
aesthetic virtues of beauty, order, economy and 
subordination of detail to the whole, would be a nightmare 
of horror for ... such a society could only come into being 
through selective breeding, extermination of the physically 
and mentally unfit, absolute obedience to its Director, and 
a large slave class kept out of sight in cellars. 
Vice versa, a poem which was really like a political 
democracy--examples, unfortunately, exist--would be 
formless, windy, banal and utterly boring. 
--W.H. Auden 
Academic colonization is contemporary poetry's fundamental 
social problem because it incorporates the politics of 
culture into a process that can only be determined 
institutionally .... Although historically self-defined 
within an 'anti-academic' tradition, its long-term 
engagement with social, aesthetic, and linguistic theory 
provides language poetry with both a vocabulary and 
potential mechanisms for posing the institutional question 
that, for example, the anti-theoretical college workshop 
tradition lacks. 
--Ron Silliman 
Up to this (late) point, I have for the most part 
deferred overtly posing the question of the political 
implications of the postmodern--though, of course, the topic 
has come up in several different guises throughout this 
study. In the literary critical field at large, the 
political questions raised by postmodern thought and 
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literature are certainly well commented upon.1 
Unfortunately, however, the arguments concerning the 
politics of postmodernism are often all-too-easily reduced 
to a kind of crude parody which betrays much of the 
complexity of the questions. Note, for example, the way 
Jerome McGann formulates the question concerning the "heated 
controversy which has developed around the idea of the 
postmodern--is it or is it not a reactionary social 
phenomenon?" ("Contemporary Poetry" 627). McGann's phrasing 
of the question concerning the politics of the postmodern is 
quite problematic, and for reasons other than its reductive 
either/or binary form: McGann's question presupposes, as so 
much of the secondary literature on the politics of 
postmodernism does, that the "idea of the postmodern" is 
somehow a unitary thing, and that this idea has some sort of 
monolithic consequences--reactionary or progressive--for a 
"society." The apotheosis of this kind of reasoning can be 
found in Jameson's "The Politics of Theory: Ideological 
Positions in the Postmodernism Debate," where he presents a 
table of six theorists of postmodernism with a "+" or a " " 
1The amount of work done on this question is, in fact, 
staggering. Jameson's work is, perhaps, "seminal." See, in 
a similarly Marxist/Frankfurt School vein, the critiques of 
Huyssen and Habermas--both of which react to the type of 
"poststructuralist" treatment found in Lyotard's The 
Postmodern Condition. For feminist discussions of the 
politics of postmodernism, see the essays collected in 
Nicholson. See also the essay collections edited by Ross 
and Arac. This, of course, only scratches the surface of a 
topic that is buried under scholarship. 
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(or both, as in the case of Lyotard) next to their names, 
"the plus and minus signs designating the politically 
progressive or reactionary functions of the positions in 
questions [sic]" (111). I think we must remain wary of this 
"either-or" approach to the complex question of 
postmodernism's political implications for several reasons: 
first, because it reduces a highly complex and contested 
field to a simple binary skeleton. Also, such a phrasing of 
the question is troubling because it takes for granted an 
unproblematic movement between aesthetic phenomena and 
political actions--or, conversely, perhaps the problem lies 
in the fact that this formulation so cleanly separates text 
and context, postmodern art and postmodern culture. 
In this literary critical parlance, "postmodern 
culture'' most often means "fragmented culture"--as I argue 
in Chapter 4, the one thing that various postmodernisms and 
postmodernists have in common is their assertion that a 
stable transcendental has withdrawn; and the controversies 
surrounding the politics of postmodernism tend to focus on 
whether this fragmentation or loss of center can be seen as 
a positive or negative thing--whether it is socially 
progressive or reactionary. Again, as ~cGann writes, 
In postmodern work we become aware of the many crises 
of stability and centeredness which an imperial culture 
like our own--attempting to hold control over so many, 
and so widely dispersed, human materials--inevitably 
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has to deal with. The response to such a situation may 
be either a contestatory or an accommodational one--it 
may move to oppose and change such circumstances, or it 
may take them as given, and reflect (reflect upon) 
their operations. (628, my emphasis) 
Again, we see a familiar but problematic either/or spelled 
out here. For McGann, who engages contemporary American 
poetics here, any (poetic) response to the conditions of a 
seemingly monolithic postmodern existence can be categorized 
as "either a contestatory or an accommodational one''; a poet 
produces either a work which opposes the ''capitalist empire" 
(624), or one which merely takes it "as given" and reflects 
upon bourgeois experience, thereby reifying and validating 
it. 
The problem that remains here is one which we have 
touched upon continually throughout this study: how does 
one secure a position outside the "given" structures of a 
language or society in a postmodern situation--a situation 
which is in large part defined by the absence of an outside, 
the absence of an uncontaminated theory which could ground a 
truly revolutionary practice? Likewise, couldn't it be 
argued that reflecting on the operations of culture--on, for 
example, the operations of advertising or the State 
Department or the university--is far from a merely 
"accommodating" societal response, but rather a reflection 
that can carry with it a necessary questioning? Lastly, it 
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seems that McGann conflates rhetorical or formal 
experimentation--the devices by which contemporary poetry 
makes us aware of postmodern "crises of stability and 
centeredness"--with politics, making a mistake that Auden 
warns us against in one of the epigraphs to this chapter. 
While Auden's (elitist) poetics and politics are not exactly 
to be lauded, he does warn us of the dangers of simply 
equating poetic structure and political structure--of 
assuming a simple relation (or of assuming any relation at 
all, for that matter) between the structure of "society" and 
the structure of a "good poem."2 
It is against the backdrop of questions like these--
questions about the politics of postmodern poetic form and 
content, about the possibility of political and syntactic 
disruption from irreducibly within a dominant discourse--
2I have no wish to endorse Auden's conception of poetry 
or of politics here--his idea that all poetry involves the 
"aesthetic virtues of beauty, order, economy and 
subordination of detail to the whole" is certainly among the 
first casualties of both "New American" and "Language" 
poetics; also, his contempt for a radically democratic 
rhetorical poetics seems quite obviously tied to his elitist 
politics. However, I think it is important to keep in mind 
(as Auden reminds us) that anything written is necessarily 
structured; and, indeed, much of the literature that poses 
essential questions to Auden's conception of poetry is 
itself intricately structured--even if it is structured in 
such a way as to de-structure "beauty, order, and economy." 
The question is, in other words, always one of structure(s) 
--in poetry as in politics; it is not simply a matter of 
structure-order-totalitarianism vs. anarchy-freedom-peace. 
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that the current debate over "1 anguage" poetry3 is being 
played out. Enough general accounts of the language poetry 
"movement" exist to justify making my introduction to it 
here brief . 4 Language poets take their name from the 
poetics journal L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, edited by Bruce Andrews and 
Charles Bernstein from 1978-81. The term language poetry 
has come to name a loosely affiliated group of North 
American poets who are engaged in a radically heterogenous 
questioning of contemporary poetic syntax, theory, and 
politics--though the radicality of their critique makes 
their grouping under such a homogenous label quite difficult 
from the outset. In fact, the name "language" poetry seems 
to suggest an emphasis on language, hardly something new in 
the history of poetics, and an emphasis which does not--on 
3I insist on the quotation marks around "language" here 
at the beginning, and will hereafter drop them. But 
dropping them does not involve lifting the designation 
"'language' poetry" to the level of the proper--a certain 
non-propriety of usage being the primary reason for putting 
words in quotation marks. Instead I wish to uphold a 
different economy of quotation marks here vis-a-vis my usage 
of the term "language" to describe language poetry. Derrida 
describes this kind of economy quite nicely: "It is this 
proper sense of propriety which, this time, is put in 
quotation marks and not the opposite, which has always been 
the case" ("Some Statements and Truisms" 77). 
4For a general introduction to and evaluation of 
language poetry, see especially Silliman's Introduction to 
In the American Tree; see also Bartlett, McGann, Hartley's 
Introduction, and Perloff 's review essay "The Word as Such: 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Poetry in the 80's." 
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the face of it--seem conducive to a "political" poetry. 5 
However, as Lee Bartlett points out, the common thread among 
these heterogeneous poets is their interest in 
poststructuralist theoretical discourse about language 
(750); they share an interest in language as that which, in 
some senses, shapes experience and constructs the world, and 
an interest in the materiality and play of the signifier 
rather than in the meaning of the signified--in paratactic 
orders of poetic surface rather than in strictly hypotactic 
orders of subordination and depth. In this view, they draw 
connections between themselves and the radical modernist 
poetics of Stein, Williams, Zukofsky, Mallarme, and even the 
Eliot of The Waste Land. 6 
Language poetry began as an "outsider" movement in 
5rndeed, as Michael Greer points out, an emphasis on 
"language" is perhaps not what these disparate poets have in 
common at all: "The name 'language poetry' is a misnomer 
insofar as it suggests an organic or essentialist view of 
language .... [I]t seems that one should argue instead that 
'writing' rather than 'language' is the central term in this 
field of work--not poetry, politics, or theory as distinct 
fields of discourse, but writing as a space in which all of 
what were once distinct genres, forms, modes of address, may 
now intersect, undermine, reinforce, echo, contradict, 
restate, or transform one another" (351 ). 
6cf. Silliman's "Negative Solidarity": "Like other 
avant garde movements, 'language poetry' began by 
identifying its own distinctness, criticizing the naive 
assumptions of a speech-centered poetics. But, unlike many 
of its modernist ancestors, 'language poetry' also drew 
positive connections between itself and the work of 
preceding generations, most explicitly to the New American 
Poets of the 1950s and '60s: the projectivist or Black 
Mountain writers, the New York School, the San Francisco 
Renaissance, and even the Beats" (171). 
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American poetics, and it remains consistently a discourse 
marginal to the dominant "academic" or ''workshop" poetics 
which informs the teaching of poetry in most MFA programs 
and the publishing of the prestigious poetry magazines; 
language poetry remains at the margins of what Charles 
Bernstein has called "official verse culture" (Content's 
Dream 246). 7 However, language poetry--as with almost any 
avant garde--is now moving from the margins toward the 
center, as it gains more attention from academic critics and 
as more of its ''practitioners" take jobs within the 
university. 8 And this attention has, not surprisingly, 
only gained them more scorn in the eyes of fellow poets and 
in the pages of The American Poetry Review; language poet 
Ron Silliman summarizes the ''conflict" over language poetry 
within the poetry community: 
The specific charges are the following: "language 
poetry" is alleged to be driven by theory; it is anti-
speech and thereby anti-individual (sometimes this is 
7see, for example, the letter exchange between 
Bernstein and Marvin Bell in the September/October 1990 
American Poetry Review, or David Shapiro's review in the 
January/February 1991 APR, in which he argues that one could 
plausibly map the current poetic spectrum as a political 
one, with "'Language' poetries as an infantile left'' (37). 
8Bernstein, for example, has recently taken a funded 
Chair in the Humanities--formerly held by Robert Creeley--at 
SUNY-Buffalo, and Barrett Watten is now on the editorial 
board of Representations. Other poets associated with 
language writing have had more long-standing associations 
with the academy: Bruce Andrews, for example, has long 
taught political science at Fordham. 
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extended to anti-democratic and elitist); it 
participates in self-conscious collective behavior; it 
valorizes the ugly and the unintelligible; its leftist 
politics are strident and didactic. Taken together, 
the implicit claim is that "language poetry" is closet 
academic verse, seeking explicators rather than 
readers. ("Negative" 172) 
One is immediately struck by the fact that the "charges" 
levelled against language poetry are strikingly similar to 
those levelled against theoretical discourse in general: 
language poetry is accused--as is, say, deconstruction--of 
being at the same time impenetrable or elitist in its 
difficulty and ultimately frivolous or meaningless; language 
poetry is accused of slashing and burning a speech-based 
poetic tradition in favor of an "unintelligible," "strident 
and didactic" writing process; and it is accused, like the 
theoretical discourse it often incorporates, of being a 
"collective behavior" produced solely for other insiders. 
As critic Eliot Weinberger writes, for many language writing 
is far too "jargon-entangled" (181), characterized by 
"specialized language, self-referentiality, and disdain for 
the uninitiated" (182); however, for Weinberger, all of this 
sound and fury signifies nothing in the end: "the 
'language' poets have exploded the myth of the whole, and 
what seems to be left is what television calls 'bites' .... A 
'language' poem in perhaps its most typical form begins, 
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ends, and goes nowhere" (184). 
It will, of course, be difficult to assess these 
charges without examining an "actual language poem"--though, 
of course I run the converse risk here of having any poems I 
cite stand in as generalizing and narrow ''examples" of an 
extremely diverse and contested field of writing. This, 
however, is a necessary risk; if I were to leave any 
analysis of specific language poems aside, this text would 
run the more dangerous risk of allowing the heterogeneity 
and specificity that language writing stresses to be 
obscured in generalizations. So, we must keep this in mind, 
even as I generalize about language poetry from the scanty 
and in some ways arbitrary evidence of Barrett Watten's long 
poem Progress, which begins: 
Relax, 
stand at attention, and. 
Purple snake stands out on 
Porcelain tiles. The idea 
Is the thing. Skewed by design 
One way contradictory use is to 
Specify empty. 
Basis, its 
Cover operates under insist on, 
Delineate. Stalin as a linguist 
I trust replication. 
Gives, 
Surface. Lights string 
The court reporter, distances. 
That only depth is perfect .... 
Comes to the history of words. 
The thought to eradicate 
In him. The poetry, 
by 
Making him think certain ways .... (1, ellipses Watten's) 
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The first thing we note about Progress is that it begins 
with a logical contradiction: the contradictory imperatives 
"Relax, I Stand at attention, and." 9 We note also that this 
opening sentence ends with "and."--another seeming paradox, 
insofar as the connector "and" should signal and/or promise 
syntactic continuation and continuity. However, an answer 
to the syntactically logical question "'and' what?" is 
immediately disrupted by the period. The sameness or 
continuity of meaning which should be guaranteed by the 
syntactic bridge of the "and" is interrupted from the very 
beginning of the poem: the bridge which should guarantee 
the very intelligibility of the line "It is one and the 
same." (21) is destroyed from the outset. The opening 
sentence ends in mid-thought, without coming to a proper 
sublation or synthesis of meaning, without fulfilling the 
dialectical promise of the connector. The continuous 
movement of meaning is interrupted prior to the initial 
sublation necessary for progress (or for the poem Progress) 
properly to begin. 
Progress continues (or does it begin again?): "Purple 
snake stands out on I Porcelain tiles. The idea I Is the 
thing. Skewed by design .... " These lines seemingly 
9For reasons which I hope will become obvious, I cite 
Watten's text complete with intra-line periods, ellipses, 
and other punctuation. This may require some patience on 
the part of the reader: some of his periods will end·some 
of my sentences, though any punctuation I add to a quotation 
will be cited within brackets. 
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engage the poetics of William Carlos Williams: "Purple 
snake stands out on I Porcelain tiles." seems a gentle 
parody of Williams' "The Red Wheel Barrow," though the 
question posed to Williams' poetics becomes more pressing in 
the sentence "The idea/ Is the thing.": the emphasis here 
is shifted from Williams' "no ideas but in things" to an 
even more radical emphasis on the materiality of the poetic 
idea: "The idea I Is the thing." emphasizes the absence of 
an interior space within or behind things which could carry 
or protect their essence, and which poetry could make it its 
job to reveal. Rather, Watten's revision of Williams' 
dictum--and the following stanzas quoted here--emphasizes 
repetition and surface as a kind of radically non-revelatory 
"essence": "I trust replication. / Gives, I Surface." 
Williams' "no ideas but in things" presupposes a depth--
presupposes, as does "the court reporter," "That only depth 
is perfect . Watten suggests here that thinking in 
terms of depth may actually "eradicate" poetry, eradicate a 
type of poetic thinking that moves along the surface play of 
writing. 10 "[T]he history of words" thought as depth, 
"distances[,]" or meaning eradicates poetry "by/ Making him 
think certain ways .... "and not others; but perhaps the 
10 see also Watten's Total Syntax, where he compares 
Williams' and Silliman's "insistence on the unheroic 
particulars[ ... ] where the 'nonaesthetic' observed detail 
is the key to social insight": "in Williams[ ... ] the 
inconsequential is dramatized in a single moment of truth 
that is also ironic, while in Silliman its use is in a much 
more radical, ongoing process of evaluation" (109). 
223 
idea here is written as surface (and the fragmentation 
thereof): "I write, as in a mirror, I This present." (4). 
It should be noted, though, that in Progress this "I" 
which "writes" and "trust[s] replication" also places its 
"trust" in a lot more than replication: we find "I trust 
wheat .... " (2); "I trust the materials." (2); "I trust 
the thing itself ... ," (3). It seems here that trusting 
replication is trusting not "in" the idea in things, but 
rather trusting the necessary movement of or between things, 
the necessity of error, of change--in short, the 
impossibility of static meaning: "Stasis is a pinball." 
(10). The "I" that "trusts" and "writes," then, is likewise 
drawn into this drama of non-teleological movement: "I am 
otherwise." (69) because "I" am always part of this 
"replication[,]" of this linguistic network which ''Gives, I 
Surface." The poem, then, becomes a matter of thinking and 
writing this surface--"Thinking on the planes / Of a 
building, I but in verse." (6)--rather than thinking toward 
a dialectic sublation which could reveal the stable essence 
of the thing. 
For Progress, it is not simply a matter of employing 
words whose "contradictory use is to I Specify empty'' the 
category meaning. Nor does Progress give in to the urge 
simply to "delineate[.]" Rather, poetry like Progress 
attempts to think an other notion of progress--an economy 
which is not simply found or represented, but haltingly, 
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disruptively written from the ground up. Progress names its 
disruption as an ~Aggressive neutrality." (6), a kind of 
writing which Bernstein characterizes as 
noninstrumental (a writing that does not carry a 
meaning along with it as information to take away, 
which would make the writing there primarily to serve 
up this information, a shell in itself) where language 
is not in gear, is idling .... Writing as stupor, 
writing as out-to-lunch. Writing as vacation. Writing 
degree zero. Idleness as antistatic (functionless, it 
becomes estranged). Writing as idled thinking (not 
just the means to a displaced end ... ). (Content's 83-4) 
The intransitivity of writing named here seems to describe 
well Watten's Progress--and is, perhaps, characteristic of 
language poetry on the whole, much of which could be called 
"idl~d thinking (not just the means to a displaced end)." 
While there certainly is a displacement that language 
writing creates, the writing and thinking of language poetry 
is "not just the means to a displaced end," but rather 
brings forth this displacement coupled with a necessary 
displacement of end-oriented thinking itself--of disrupting 
a larger end-oriented economy of meaning. 
But, even within this double economy of disruption, it 
is not a matter of being once and for all free of 
teleological meaning's economy; as Bernstein writes in the 
poem/talk/essay Artifice of Absorption, 
... the designation of the visual, acoustic, 
& syntactic elements of a poem as "meaningless", 
especially insofar as this is conceptualized as 
positive or liberating--& this is a common habit 
of much current critical discussion of syntactically 
nonstandard poetry--is symptomatic of a desire to 
evade responsibility for meaning's total, & 
totalizing, reach; as if meaning was a husk 
that could be shucked off or a burden that could be 
bucked. Meaning is not a use value as opposed to 
some other kind of value, but more like valuation 
itself; & even to refuse value is a value & a sort 
of exchange. Meaning is no where bound 
to the orbit of purpose, intention, or utility. (8) 
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For Bernstein, there certainly is a "positive or liberating" 
moment in language writing's "syntactically I nonstandard 
poetry," but this liberation of alternative syntactical 
meanings is not "just" the "displaced end" that language 
writing moves toward. Rather, there is a second and 
simultaneous consideration for this writing, a consideration 
which makes it impossible to "evade responsibility for 
meaning's total, & I totalizing, reach"; poetry, in other 
words, cannot be simply liberated from an economy of 
meaning, "as if meaning was a husk I that could be shucked 
off or a burden that could be I bucked." Meaning is not 
just one poetic value among others, but "more like valuation 
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I itself"; hence, language writing, if it wishes to pose a 
question to this economy, cannot simply throw off meaning, 
but rather must disseminate meaning--doubly disrupting it to 
the point where meaning becomes "no where bound I to the 
orbit of purpose, intention, or utility." As Bernstein 
writes, his notion of language poetry is "a poetry that does 
not assume a measure but finds it" (75), a writing that does 
not move toward the wholeness of a meaning, but strives to 
find a measure for itself, a way to account for the surface 
play of the poem itself, rather than solely to refer to or 
clarify some end or meaning "outside" of this play. 
The politics of such a poetic project, however, seem 
unclear at best. In fact, for many commentators language 
poetry comes dangerously close to reproducing an "art-for-
art's-sake" aesthetic, and, despite the overt political 
claims of the poets themselves, 11 a question is often posed 
to language poetry concerning the potential for a political 
praxis drawn from a poetics of "idleness," discontinuity or 
dis-functionality. For example, Marjorie Perloff, following 
Jackson MacLow, writes that "If language were really 
stripped of its referential properties ... 'language poetry' 
would be no more than a mandarin game, designed to entertain 
11 silliman, for example, writes quite clearly and 
unambiguously: "Let us undermine the bourgeoisie" ("If by 
'Writing'" 168). His essay is included in the second 
section of The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, in which more than 25 
writers associated with language writing take up the 
question of Writing and Politics (119-192). 
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an elitist coterie" ("Word as Such" 233). 12 This equation 
of language poetry with an art-for-art's-sake aesthetic, 
however, seems to miss the essential questions posed by 
language writing. It seems odd, for example, that Perloff 
would align language poetry with something like MacLeish's 
famous art-for-art's-sake dictum "A poem should not mean I 
But be." A conception of poetry like MacLeish's--where the 
poem is mystifyingly wrenched out of the material networks 
of language and into the purity of the realm of being--is 
precisely the prime target of language poetics. In fact, an 
art-for-art's-sake aesthetic always has as its end some 
notion of aesthetic distance, where the artistic object is 
elevated above any networks of signification, placed at an 
unreachable distance, and then contemplated in its being. 
But this aesthetic distance is precisely what is collapsed 
in postmodern work like language poetry--the language poem 
exists in a network where language and syntax cannot be 
separated from meaning and being. The language poem cannot 
be purified and held at a distance precisely because no 
notion of disinterested aesthetic distance can continue to 
hold in language poetics; as I argue throughout this work, 
12Perloff, however, goes on to argue that this impotent 
elitism is not necessarily the case in language poetry 
because much of its syntactically non-standard work can 
empower or free the reader to see myriad connections between 
things. In the end, though, Perloff remai~s a bit 
skeptical: "the question remains whether the calling .into 
question of 'normal' language rules ... is a meaningful 
critique of capitalism" (233). 
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in a postmodern context no pure space outside the drama of 
signification can be secured. 
This is, however, not simply to call for or validate 
what is called an "engaged art." As Levinas writes in a 
1948 essay on Sartre's engaged art, an art-for-art's-sake 
aesthetic certainly "is false inasmuch as it situates art 
above reality and recognizes no master for it" (''Reality" 
131). However, Levinas asks, 
Is to disengage oneself from the world always to go 
beyond, toward the region of Platonic ideas and toward 
the eternal which towers above the world? Cannot one 
speak of a disengagement on the hither side--of an 
interruption of time by a movement going on on the 
hither side of time, in its 'interstices.' ("Reality" 
131) 
Perhaps, as Levinas suggests here in the context of a 
similar argument, the interruptions of language poetry 
cannot be collapsed quite so easily into Perloff's hermetic 
"mandarin game. As Levinas suggests, there can be a 
disruption of meaning--a disengagement--which does not 
simply or necessarily elevate the work of art to the 
untouchable realm of being; rather, there is a disr,uptive 
0 
engagement brought about by attending to the discontinuous 
space between things--by attending to the "interstices" of 
presence or experience rather than to the seemingly smooth 
continuities. Perhaps language poetry is attempting to 
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bring about this disengagement on what Levinas calls the 
"hither side of time," an interruption on this side of 
transcendence--a disengagement that does not try to take the 
work of art beyond the world into a realm of purity, but 
rather a disengagement which attempts to create a disruption 
in the smooth functioning of this world's systems of meaning 
and being. This disruptive disengagement, then, would be 
one which denies itself what Levinas calls the "pretentious 
and facile nobility" ("Reality" 131) that characterizes the 
aesthetic distance engendered by an art-for-art's-sake 
theory. 
However, the politics of language poetry's poetics of 
disengagement, disruption, or discontinuity remains a 
sharply contested question. Perhaps the most famous 
academic critique of language poetry along these lines is 
contained in Jameson's "Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic 
of Late Capitalism." For Jameson, language poetry is 
architectonic of the surface-obsessed, fragmentary, 
"schizophrenic" aesthetic of postmodernism--is 
representative of an aesthetic/cultural logic that, in its 
destruction of the autonomy of the subject and the 
continuity of history, cannot help but ruin any possibility 
for personal conviction or political change. 13 Jameson, in 
t3As Jameson writes, a postmodern critique may liberate 
one from the bounds of subjectivity, but it also entails a 
"liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, ·since 
there is no longer a present self to do the feeling" (64). 
Likewise, this type of critique animates many feminist and 
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fact, critiques a notion of postmodernism very much like the 
one I have been developing here; my recurring concern with 
the ''flattening of discourse"--the absence of an outside or 
hors-texte, the (dis)locating of the subject within in a 
network of exteriority--is precisely what Jameson attacks as 
"a new kind of flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of 
superficiality in the most literal sense--perhaps the 
supreme formal feature of all the postmodernisms" (60). For 
Jameson, Warhol's work and language poetry are prime 
examples of this schizophrenic depthlessness and its 
emphasis on the surface or signifier. While discussing 
Warhol's "Diamond Dust Shoes," however, Jameson 
inadvertently makes a case for a kind of "depth" to Warhol's 
work--and to postmodern "fragmentation" on the whole. He 
writes 
[in "Diamond Dust Shoes"] it is as though the external 
and coloured surface of things--debased and 
contaminated in advance by their assimilation to glossy 
advertising images--has been stripped away to reveal 
the deathly black-and-white substratum of the 
photographic negative which subtends them. (60) 
It seems that Jameson here (dis)misses the fact that 
Warhol's emphasis on something like a "photographic 
post-colonial critiques of postmodernism, which are less 
interested in ''feeling" than in the oppositional power which 
seems to require a subject position. See Christine Dt 
Stephano's essay in Nicholson and Trinh T. Minh-ha's Woman, 
Native, Other. 
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negative"--that which allows pictorial representation to 
take place but is not itself representative--is precisely a 
kind of "depth" exploration, insofar as it is an exploration 
of the conditions of possibility for representation. But, 
as Jameson notes, for Warhol this negative subtends the 
image--that is, "underlie[s] as to enclose or surround" it 
(American Heritage Dictionary). So the subtending negative 
has no essential or philosophical depth-relation to the 
photograph; it is not simply before or below the 
photographic image, but rather is both before the image and 
contained within it, is a kind of always-already-divided 
ground. 14 
This emphasis on a peculiar kind of ground in Warhol's 
work helps bring us back to Derrida's thinking, which Gasche 
has written about in similar terms--in terms of the 
subtending, non-reflective back or "tain" of a mirror which 
makes reflection possible without itself being reflective. 
Gasche writes, 
Derrida's philosophy, rather than being a philosophy of 
reflection, is engaged in the systematic exploration of 
that dull surface without which no reflection would be 
possible and no specular or speculative activity would 
be possible, but which at the.same time has no place 
and no part in reflection's scintillating play. (6) 
Gasche here sums up in a nutshell many of the arguments I 
14 see my discussion in Chapter 4 above. 
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have been making concerning postmodernism and (the end of) 
philosophy: the emphasis on the play of surfaces or 
networks in the work of Derrida, Foucault, Pynchon, or the 
language poets is not simply a hedonistic, irresponsible 
reaction to an ethos of impossibility; rather, this 
confrontation with surface or depthlessness is, as I have 
maintained throughout, necessary insofar as it is part and 
parcel of the systematic and historical specificity of the 
postmodern situation. There simply is no outside to appeal 
to, no space which can be protected from the play of an 
exterior network; hence, thinking must proceed differently, 
in and through the thought of difference without reduction 
to sameness. 
Of course, the recognition of the conditions of 
postmodernity does not stifle but rather amplifies the 
question of the politics of this kind of postmodern work--
and specifically the politics of language poetry. In 
"Postmodernism," Jameson critiques language poet Bob 
Perelman's poem "China," which begins: 
China 
We live on the third world from the sun. Number three. 
Nobody tells us what to do. 
The people who taught us to count were being very kind. 
It's always time to leave. 
If it rains, you either have your umbrella or you 
don't. 
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The wind blows your hat off. 
The sun rises also .... (in Jameson 73) 
"China," we should note in passing, only gets increasingly 
discontinuous from here, and Jameson hails this emphasis on 
discontinuous, paratactic series as the "fundamental 
aesthetic" of "so-called Language Poetry" (73). For 
Jameson, this paratactic emphasis on the play of signifiers 
in the poem means that it "turns out to have little enough 
to do with that referent called China" (75); he goes on to 
argue that the poem's refusal to engage the real historical 
situation of third-world China--"the third world from the 
sun"--robs it of any proper political significance that it 
might have had, leaving it instead merely as an example of 
late capital's "schizophrenic fragmentation'' (73). 15 In 
Jameson's reading of "China," then, "the signifying chain ... 
is reduced to an experience of pure material signifiers" 
15cf. Bernstein, who poses a question to Jameson 
concerning his totalization of the conditions of 
postmodernism and the artistic responses to it: "the 'same' 
artistic technique has a radically different meaning 
depending on when and where it is used .... For example, 
juxtaposition of logically unconnected sentences or sentence 
fragments can be used to theatricalize the limitations of 
conventional narrative development, to suggest the 
impossibility of communication, to represent speech, or as 
part of a prosodic mosaic constituting a newly emerging (or 
then again, traditional but neglected) meaning formation. 
These uses need have nothing in common .... Nor is the little-
known painter who uses a Nee-Hellenic motif in his or her 
work necessarily doing something comparable to the architect 
who incorporates Greek columns into a multimillion dollar 
downtown office tower. But it is just this type of 
mishmashing that is the negative horizon of those 
discussions of postmodernism that attempt to describe it in 
unitary socioeconomic terms" ("Centering'' 47). 
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(72); the signified is ''reduced" to the level of the 
signifier, and we are left with the materiality of language 
without any hierarchical order(ing)--we are left with a 
world bereft, therefore, of history or praxis. In short, 
for Jameson language poetry's paratactic aesthetic of 
fragmentation cannot help but be politically reactionary 
insofar as it simply mimics and thereby upholds the 
fragmentation and apathetic end-lessness promoted by the 
bourgeois ideology of late capitalism. 16 
However George Hartley, in Textual Politics and the 
Language Poets, takes issue with Jameson's characterization 
of the politics of language poetry. Hartley argues that 
when Jameson reads Perelman's poem merely as a schizophrenic 
"breakdown of the signifying chain" (Jameson 72) and a 
reification of the logic of late capital, he misses the fact 
that "China" produces precisely the kind of powerful 
critique of bourgeois ideology that Jameson sees lacking in 
much postmodern art; for Hartley, Perelman's ''China" is an 
example of language poetry's "deconstruction of the 
'referential fetish'--and with it the bourgeois claims to 
'natural' language" (99); language poetry performs this 
16cf. Adorne's Aesthetic Theory, where he offers an 
interesting retort to this line of reasoning: "Those who 
allege that art has no longer any right to exist because it 
upholds the status quo do no more than promote one of the 
stale cliches of bourgeois ideology. The latter has always 
been prone to frown and demand to know 'where all this is 
going to end'. Art, in effect, must escape from this-sort 
of teleology .... The idea of destination or final end is a 
covert form of social control" (357). 
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"deconstruction" through a "laying bare of the framing 
process" (99), through the exposure of the arbitrariness and 
multiplicity of any poetic order(ing). This being the case, 
Hartley writes, 
Ironically, Perelman and other so-called language poets 
can be seen to meet Jameson's call for a new political 
art whose 'aesthetic of cognitive mapping' in this 
confusing postmodern space of late capitalism may 
achieve 'a breakthrough to some as yet unimaginable new 
mode of representing [the world space of multi-national 
capital], in which we may again begin to grasp our 
positioning as individual and collective subjects and 
regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at 
present neutralized by our spacial as well as social 
confusion.' (52, quoting Jameson 92) 
In Hartley's reading, Jameson misses the point of language 
poetry's "fragmentation"; Hartley argues that language 
poetry does precisely the needed work of ideology critique 
so that, in Jameson's own words, "we may again begin to 
grasp our positioning as ... subjects," begin once again to 
act and struggle against the forces of late capital. 17 In 
fact, Hartley argues that language poetry performs this 
17cf. Hartley: "It is to the ruling class's benefit 
that we do not recognize the socially-constructed nature of 
language, for if we did we might recognize that the 
hegemonic views of reality--such as that commodities are 
'natural'--are to a certain extent arbitrary, and, 
therefore, open to questioning" (35). 
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progressive ideology critique in and through the very 
concepts that Jameson points to as the reactionary element 
in language poetry: its fragmentation of poetic form and 
its emphasis on the materiality of the signifier. Hartley 
writes, 
In their questioning of the function of reference, the 
self-sufficiency of the subject, and the adherence to 
standard syntax of the closed text, some so-called 
language poets have developed a poetry which functions 
not as ornamentation or as self expression, but as a 
baring of the frames of bourgeois ideology itself. (41, 
my emphasis) 
So, in the end, for Hartley language poetry functions as a 
discourse which, far from simply reifying bourgeois (poetic) 
ideology, actually bares the ideological frame of bourgeois 
workshop poetics and its conception of poetry as a product 
or message simply to be consumed--"as ornamentation or as 
self expression." And in laying bare this framing process, 
language poetry allows the reader to see and participate in 
the myriad possibilities for meaning which are covered over 
by a unitary poetic and sociological ideology of 
consumption. 
So, in the end, Jameson and Hartley have less a 
disagreement on the proper ends of a politically engaged 
postmodern art than they do a disagreement over whether 
language poetry fits the bill. For both Jameson and 
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Hartley, it is imperative that there be produced a 
postmodern art of critique, an art, in Jameson's words, 
"which explicitly foreground[s] the commodity fetishism of a 
transition to late capitalism" (60). The thematization of 
language poetry's project as this kind of ideology critique 
has, in fact, become the dominant reading of language poetry 
in academic literary criticism today: for McGann, language 
poetry's project is to reverse or oppose that "deformed and 
repressive form of reference called referentiality wherein 
language is alienated from its use-functions" (640); 
likewise for Marjorie Perloff, who argues that language-
oriented writing helps us to see that "our words can no 
longer be our own but that it is in our power to represent 
them in new, imaginative ways" ("Can(n)ons" 654). 
But, as compelling as it may be, this critical apology 
for language poetry remains itself problematic, insofar as 
these literary critical readings of language poetry seem 
rather unproblematically to recuperate a proper "job" or 
brand of commodified "work" for language poetics: namely, 
the work of ideology critique. This work of ideology 
critique, it should be noted, is in large part a job given 
to language poetry by criticism. 18 However, several 
18 rt should be further noted, however, that many 
language poets in the late 70's and early SO's were quite 
comfortable with a poetry of ideology critique which 
attempted to restore to the reader and society a linguistic 
use-value rather than a deformed exchange-value. This, 
however, has since come under scrutiny. Steve Mccaffery 
writes, for example, "In hindsight, I can admit to certain 
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pressing questions remain for the standard literary critical 
reading of language poetry: how, for example, is the 
politically engaged critic or poet to account for the end 
product or work performed by ideology critique itself--how, 
in other words, can a poetics of ideology critique pose a 
radical question to the drama of commodification if it too 
produces a circumscribed use- or exchange-meaning, if it 
reveals a consumable end? In yet other words, one could ask 
whether reading language poetry as ideology critique doesn't 
precisely allow or force language poetry to become simply 
another "bourgeois" poetry of reference in which the reader 
comes to a consumable poetic realization or epiphany--an 
epiphany concerning the poetic "framing process itself, and 
by extension the process of ideological framing which is no 
longer taken for granted" (Hartley xiii). If language 
poetry moves in the service of the pre-determined end of 
ideology critique, as so many critics assert, doesn't it 
then participate in a rationalist project which leaves it 
squarely within an enlightenment bourgeois ideology of truth 
as unconcealment? How can the project of "laying bare" the 
truth behind the ideology escape the very ideological fetish 
which it seems that language poetry would displace: a 
naiveties in that approach. This writing was all produced 
before any of us had discovered Baudrillard's seminal work 
The Mirror of Production .... In light of the Baudrillardian 
'proof' that use value is but a concealed species of 
exchange value, I would say now that the gestural 'offer' to 
a reader of an invitation to 'semantically produce' hints at 
an ideological contamination" (in Bartlett, 747n). 
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referential fetish which ignores the surface in favor of the 
revelation, which ignores the parataxis of material 
signifiers in favor of the hypotactic truth of the signified 
which lies behind them. Indeed, language poetry's , 
"political" import seems to lie precisely in its refusal of 
a such a commodifiable "project"; as language poet P. Inman 
writes "Writing is inescapably political. It doesn't 
illustrate the bleakness of late capitalism. It can't get 
outside itself. It is, rather, amidst itself, made out of 
the social world around it" (224). 
This gap between the surface of language writing and 
its reception or thematization by certain literary critics 
seems yet another indication of the drive toward 
determination in the discipline of literary criticism, which 
must cut this estranging discourse down to fit a 
recognizable literary category; when language poetry becomes 
thematized as an engaged avant garde, its politics and its 
styles become recognizable. Critics who laud or disparage 
language poetry's politics for the most part eschew the fact 
that, in Michael Greer's words, language poetry's 
"'political' claims rest not so much on the expression of a 
'position' or an agenda as they do on an effort to change 
the way we attend to texts, 'poetic' and otherwise" (335). 
Language poetry, in other words, has no traditionally 
recognizable political ''agenda" over and above its 
engagement with thinking, with texts. (This, however, is no 
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small field--as language poets on the whole recognize no 
essential barrier between the text and the world; as Inman 
writes, the poem is "made out of the societal world around 
it.") In fact, as Greer argues, literary criticism's 
disciplinary drive to circumscribe language poetry and to 
assign it a task ultimately diffuses the disruptiveness of 
the writing, diffuses the potential radicality of its 
rethinking the terms of the poetic and the political; he 
writes, "the rethinking of subjectivity and authorship [in 
language poetry] is ultimately overshadowed by a competing 
impulse [in literary criticism] to situate 'language 
poetry,' to name and define its 'place' in contemporary 
poetry" (336). He goes on concerning McGann, Bartlett, and 
Perloff: 
all these critics share an impulse to characterize 
language poetry as the repressed 'other' of a dominant 
'workshop' poetic, theoretically sophisticated where it 
is naive, philosophically skeptical where it is 
idealistic, and politically oppositional where it is 
accommodating .... Language poetry is, in effect, 
marginalized as part of an avant-garde 'alternative' 
which functions merely as an 'ongoing corrective' to an 
equally reified 'dominant' poetic. It loses any 
political or aesthetic significance it may have had in 
its own right as this binary historical map is drawn, 
and it becomes merely a way of provoking or irritating 
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some fictional 'mainstream.' (337, 340). 
Greer argues that McGann, Bartlett, and Perloff de-
radical ize the disruptions created by language poetry when 
they name it as simply the opposite of the mainstream 
workshop poetics--as "an avant-garde 'alternative' which 
functions merely as an 'ongoing corrective' to an equally 
reified 'dominant' poetic." By locating language poetry as 
the center's opposite and opponent, a determining "binary 
map" is drawn and the fragmented text of language poetry 
suddenly becomes easily readable--the location of the work 
and the intention behind it having been ascertained. 
Literary critics likewise domesticate language poetry, 
I would argue, when they make claims for language poetry's 
status as ideology critique; when language poetry is 
thematized as performing ideology critique, this 
determination ends up collapsing it into a familiar role--an 
engaged avant-garde literature--which allows its potential 
disruptions to become revelatory in a traditional or 
recognizable way. It seems that this is especially true for 
Jameson's and Hartley's reading of an engaged postmodernism: 
when Hartley argues that language poetry can actually assist 
in Jameson's project of cognitive mapping, he goes a long 
way toward domesticating language poetry as precisely the 
kind of anti-postmodern postmodernism that Jameson calls for 
throughout his essay--an art which involves "reconquest of 
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sense of place" (89). 19 In short, readings which prescribe 
such literary critical work for language poetry seem not to 
account for the disciplinary politics of positing 
recognizable labels such as "engaged avant-garde" or 
"ideology critique" for language poetry. Literary criticism 
reduces the complexity of reading language poetry into an 
accessible and commodifiable code or intention just as 
workshop poetry reduces the complexity of poetic experience 
to the consumability of an epiphany. As Bernstein writes 
about the recognizable codes and epiphanies of workshop 
poetics, 
Experience dutifully translated into these 'most 
accessible' codes loses its aura and is reduced to the 
digestible contents which these rules alone can 
generate. There is nothing difficult in the products 
of such activity because there is no distance to be 
travelled, no gap to be aware of and to bridge from 
reader to text: What purports to be an experience is 
transformed into the blank stare of the commodity--
19Again, see Adorne's Aesthetic Theory, where, contra 
Jameson, he calls for an authentic artistic "mode of 
experience that is able to overcome the tendency to resort 
to false immediacy. Immediacy is gone forever" (31~). More 
recently, however, Jameson's work has been becoming a bit 
more sympathetic to ''fragmentary" postmodernism; in the 
recent "Postmodern Architecture," for example, he speaks 
approvingly of the necessity for "a new kind of sentence, a 
new kind of syntax, radically new words, beyond our own 
grammar" and likewise seems more sympathetic to a radical 
materiality, lauding architect Frank Gehry's "attempt to 
think a material thought" (147). 
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there only to mirror our projections with an unseemly 
rapidity possible only because no experience of other 
is in it. (Content's Dream 59) 
In its identification of language poetry as ideology 
critique, the question of literary criticism's determining 
disciplinary role again goes unasked. When language 
poetry's intention is thematized as the dialectical other of 
academic workshop poetry's bourgeois poetics, the 
unthematizable experience of "other" in reading it is 
hypostatized, is negated and sublated: the dissembling 
experience of "other" in language writing is smoothed out of 
the work as it is given a determining intention and a job to 
do, as its heterogeneous surface "is transformed into the 
blank stare of the commodity.· 
However, it is important to note that when language 
poetry is thematized as the dialectical other of academic 
workshop poetry, something of a semantic confusion is 
involved: "academic poetry" is itself vehemently opposed to 
the academy; it sees itself as the protector of the values 
of the individual against the increasing 
institutionalization of modern life. It values the 
"naturalist" qualities that are summed up in a speech-based, 
subjectivist poetics: the priority of the human voice, the 
priority of non-linguistic experience over abstract thought, 
the priority of individual freedom over institutional 
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constraints. 20 This being the case, however, this 
tradition is left in something of a compromising position--
trapped within a university structure it would want to 
question, while quite literally compromised by its position 
within that structure. The obverse of "insider" dilemma, of 
course, is to remain ''outside" the academic poetic 
establishment, but this likewise seems compromising, insofar 
as it effectively cedes authority to the status quo. The 
canons of poetry and the manner in which poetry is taught, 
read, and disseminated to the general public would remain 
untouched in following this "outsider" strategy; political 
purity would be purchased at the cost of impotence. 
Weinberger, for example, defends his poetics against 
language poets and literary critics--both of whom, remember, 
he chastises for being too theoretical; 21 he writes, 
"Unlike critics and 'language' poets, I have no agenda and 
am opposed to all canon-formation" (184). Unlike critics 
and language poets, Weinberger here seems quite naive in his 
belief in a disinterested place of objectivity, an outside 
where he can be unproblematically opposed to and untouched 
by the politics of an "agenda" or a "canon." Indeed, it is 
2
°For a good--if polemical--summary and critique of 
workshop poetics from outside the language movement, see 
Dooley's "The Contemporary Workshop Aesthetic." 
21This is, I hasten to add, not to suggest that _ 
Weinberger is a friend of an apolitical, workshop aesthetic; 
however, he does see poetry as a defender of the ideals of 
individualism. 
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precisely through their common engagement with theoretical 
discourse that "critics and 'language poets''' would both 
become suspicious of the agenda embedded in Weinberger's 
claim, "I have no agenda." Likewise, as Silliman notes in 
one of the epigraphs to this chapter, it is precisely "its 
long-term engagement with social, aesthetic, and linguistic 
theory [that] provides language poetry with both a 
vocabulary and potential mechanisms for posing the 
institutional question that, for example, the anti-
theoretical college workshop tradition lacks." 
That "institutional question," as I have emphasized 
throughout this study, is necessarily a double one: if a 
pure "outside" space must be found in order to pose a 
relevant question, it will not soon be formulated because 
this kind of outsider distance has disappeared in a 
postmodern epoch; the "purity" of the outside shows itself 
as an illusion. It seems, then, that the great 
institutional lesson learned by marginal groups over the 
past 25 years has been the necessity of mediating 
institutions--that, despite the potential problem of co-
optation, the presence of traditionally oppressed or 
excluded groups within society's institutions is absolutely 
necessary, as is a simultaneous and ongoing engagement with 
problem of institutionality. There must be, as I argue 
concerning Derrida's and Foucault's thinking, a double move: 
first, there is the necessary and indispensable critical 
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move which intervenes and overturns a historical repression 
or exclusion--whi~h promotes access by the excluded to 
traditionally insular societal and political institutions; 
but there must likewise be a second move--an ongoing 
reevaluation of the field itself--if this critical move is 
to avoid re-visiting the very exclusion it seeks to redress. 
As Silliman argues in "Canons and Institutions," each 
important social movement of the twentieth century 
gravitates towards institutions to sustain its victories, or 
it dies--the pro-choice movement, for example, would likely 
die if there were no women serving as legislators and 
lobbyists; feminism would exist in name only if there were 
not concomitant institutional gains by women in politics and 
public life. As Silliman writes, "The history of movements 
like these is virtually unanimous on the point that all tend 
to gravitate over time toward mediating institutions, 
regardless of what their original stance toward them may 
have been, or else they suffer defeats and dissolve 
outright" (162). Generally speaking, institutions are at 
the forefront of visiting repression on marginal groups, 
which, of course, makes these groups wary of becoming 
institutionally involved. However, the reification of this 
inside/outside distinction depends on a kind of atheoretical 
one-way logic, wherein institutions are simply and 
repressively "bad" and outsider status is liberating and 
"good." As Silliman writes, this one-way logic of 
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institutional avoidance can no longer hold: 
I have suggested throughout this talk that a feature of 
mediating institutions is in the fact that they are 
inescapable. All forms of organization that attempt to 
bypass, deny or avoid them are, I believe, social forms 
of psychological denial built out of an inner need to 
reject internal conflict and complexity. (162) 
For Silliman, the question of marginal groups and 
institutions cannot be sufficiently posed within an "attempt 
to bypass, deny, or avoid" institutions, but rather must be 
posed within a network of "internal conflict and 
complexity," within a theoretical framework that refuses to 
think institutions such as the academy in simple good/bad 
terms. As he writes, "Rather than being reducible to any 
reified identity, for example that of 'the enemy,' the 
academy is a ground, a field for contestation" (165). 
This, it seems to me, summarizes the institutional 
resonances of many of the theoretical arguments I have been 
tracing throughout this work: the theoretical position that 
there is no pure uncontaminated space, liberation, or 
outside--in short, that there is no extra-text--has gone a 
long way toward theorizing the institutionalization of 
interpretation, theory, poetry, and intellectual inquiry in 
this postmodern era. If they have anything in common, the 
theoretical and literary works I discuss here engage and 
engender a withdrawing, postmodern conception of ground. 
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The unavoidable impurity of intention and meaning allows one 
to account for misreading or multiple readings as something 
other than error or plurality, as something engendered by 
the linguistic ground of thinking itself. As heterogeneous 
as this work is, all of it in some way or another posits or 
attempts to think an other-than-negative way to account for 
error, to account for our necessary status inside a 
domineering discourse as other than simple contamination or 
co-optation--in short, to account for life in a postmodern 
epoch. 
Insofar as it confronts head on the impossibility of 
traditional or metaphysical notions of the theory/praxis 
distinction, this absence of an outside, rather than 
paralyzing praxis, makes praxis possible in a different way 
--as Bernstein writes, it allows one to "resume [activity] 
in a different way, from a different direction" ("Optimism'' 
833). How does, for example, a revolutionary explain that 
in seizing power, his or her movement often replicates the 
atrocities that made the old order untenable? For that 
matter, how does an intellectual movement--say, 
deconstruction--account for the reinscription of orthodoxy 
performed in its name? Generally speaking, this accounting 
is done in one of two ways: some conciliation to 
''pragmatic" concerns, a chilling subgenre of the Nuremberg 
defense--and a line of reasoning that one sees quite a bit 
in literary criticism these days; or, conversely, a 
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protestation that the truth of the movement had been 
hijacked, slandered, misread, manipulated--when, in fact, 
there is nothing we could any longer recognize as purity in 
the first place. 
All of this is not to say that Democrats and 
Republicans, Derrida and de Man, the Klan and the NAACP are 
collapsed into a mishmash of the same; rather, as Bernstein 
suggests above, seeing that nothing is pure, there is no 
outside allows you to start again, in a different direction, 
with your eyes wide open to differences, able to account for 
difference in its own right, as other than a negative--other 
than as a falling away from the possibility of sameness. 
The only way postmodern ''essence" can actually be hijacked 
or slandered is through attempts to reconstitute a 
philosophically proper essence, an essence which engenders 
positive, inexorable circumstances and leaves the question 
of truth and the field where truth comes about undisrupted. 
The "essence" of the postmodern is in its impropriety--in 
its withdrawal of the proper, and its acknowledgement of the 
ground of thinking and acting in the other of the proper. 
As Derrida writes, "the proper of a culture is to not be 
identical to itself--to have to say "me" or "us" in the 
difference with itself" (''L'autre cap" 11). 22 In the end, 
as language poet Peter Seaton writes, 
22r must thank Michael Naas for his translation of this 
passage. Also, the final quotation from Peter Seaton is 
found in Bernstein, Artifice (44). 
("we keep coming 
back and coming back 
to the vision of dis-
placement at the site of 
enactment, procurement, 
debasement, trans-
substantiation, fulmination, 
culmination ... ) 
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CONCLUSION: 
ENDS 
[T]wo propositions seem to me to have continued validity: 
that the strictly technical work of art has failed, and that 
the opposing route of arresting technique arbitrarily leads 
to indifferent results. While technique is the epitome of 
the language of art, it also liquidates that language. This 
is art's inescapable dilemma. 
--Adorno 
These few general remarks to begin with. What am I to do, 
what shall I do, what should I do, in my situation, how 
proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and 
negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later? 
Generally speaking. There must be other shifts. 
--Samuel Beckett 
Even while remembering all we have said about ends, 
here at the end of this work perhaps a question remains: 
are we, despite everything, left here at the end with a 
version of what we began to study? Are we, after the end of 
an end-oriented economy, left simply with another--more 
pernicious--impasse? In the epigraph above, Adorno outlines 
this sort of impasse, the impasse of a language whose end-
oriented economy of meaning as "technique" "has failed," but 
a language which likewise needs this economy in order that 
it not lead merely to "indifferent results." For Adorno, 
these "indifferent results" are brought about whenever one 
tries to pose a question to an end-oriented economy of 
techinque by which a work of art tries to communicate a 
determinate message; "indifferent results" are, then; the 
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inexorable upshot of taking "the opposing route of arresting 
technique arbitrarily," of attempting to question the 
functioning of meaning. According to Adorno, because of the 
postmodern disruption or alteration of an end-oriented 
economy of meaning, the language of art--indeed, discourse 
in general--cannot hope to lead to anything other than these 
indifferent results. Because art is left with nothing other 
than this failed language, it too must fail; as he writes, 
"while technique is the epitome of the language of art, it 
also liquidates that language." For Adorno, this double 
bind is "art's inescapable dilemma." 
This dilemma could, of course, also be posed within the 
question of the theoretical or societal ends of discourse in 
general--that is, if Adorno does not pose it in these terms 
already. Insofar as determinable ends in a postmodern 
economy seem both necessary and impossible, the dilemma of 
ends is the dilemma of the language of art; in fact, these 
dilemmas are tied together by the question of language, by 
the inescapability of language, the necessary mediating role 
that language plays in society's discourses--a role which, 
in a frustrating turn, makes determinate ends both possible 
and impossible. Language holds out the promise of an end, 
while simultaneously sweeping the ends of determinate 
meaning away, and this would seem to leave us squarely 
within another impasse, as deep if not deeper than the 
institutional impasse with which we started. 
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However, throughout this work I have tried to 
articulate an other economy of meaning, one which does not 
depend on traditional notions of opposition, possibility, 
ends or language--and hence an economy of meaning which is 
not simply stifled by the closure or radical alteration of 
these philosophical problematics. Note that I do not write, 
as Adorno does, about the "failure" of philosophy, language, 
or thinking; as I argue concerning de Man, to talk in terms 
of failure is to grant the validity of a philosophical 
economy of ends. To talk of failure (or, for that matter, 
to talk of pluralism) is to remain always within reach of 
the end, always having to account for the non-existence of 
an end as the lack of an end (or the multiplicity of many 
ends)--in short, always having to account for difference in 
terms of the ultimate possibility of sameness. It has been 
my contention here that there is a thinking which, while not 
wholly or simply outside or beyond the problematics of this 
discourse, remains other to the discourse of opposition, 
lack, or plurality--other to Adorno's choice between a 
feeble discontinuity and an iron-fisted control. 
Adorno's impasse is located at the impossible choice 
between two untenable opposites: the uncertain "route of 
arresting technique arbitrarily" and the stifling or 
oppressive "strictly technical work of art." Perhaps 
Beckett's epigraph, though, offers us an other way to think 
this opposition. It begins by likewise taking up Adorno's 
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problematic--speaking of two impossible ways to proceed: 
merely discontinuously ("by aporia pure and simple") or 
simply within the language of dialectical philosophy (by 
"affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered, or 
sooner or later"). However, perhaps I have, throughout my 
text, been trying to approach a reading of the final words 
of Beckett's epigraph here, specifically the sentence that 
comes after the impossible (non)choice or opposition we seem 
to be left with--after the recognition of an impossible 
postmodern decision between a seemingly non-sensical 
progression and a wholly untenable and manipulative fall 
back into tradition. In the end, I have perhaps argued 
nothing other than this: at the time or space we call the 
postmodern, "There must be other shifts." 
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